Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

This is exactly the "backed into a corner/nothing to lose" scenario that worries many.

[SHORT THREAD]

Specifically, imposing economic sanctions is a key part of the international response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
bbc.com/news/world-eur…

While we might think of sanctions as a "non-violent" instrument that can deter an attack or cause a war to deescalate, that's not always (or even often) the case
journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

Showing "resolve" via sanctions/imposing no-fly-zones/sending arms is not always a straight line of "the more pressure I impose, the more resolved I look, and, hence, the more likely my opponent is to back down."
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…

Sometimes, clear demonstrations of "resolve" can backfire.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

In particular, an opponent, due to the prospect of losing or experiencing the hardship of a war, could take desperate actions.

Sanctions + war fighting not going well can feed such a sentiment in an opponent.

This can be due to the opponent following a "better now than later logic" (i.e. it's only going to get worse for us, so better strike now)
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

Indeed, this logic goes a long way towards explaining why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941

jstor.org/stable/204828

Or the opponent's leader can "gamble for resurrection" because they have nothing left to lose.

jstor.org/stable/2111408

Autocratic leaders are especially prone to the latter logic because, once out of office, things don't typically end well for them.
cambridge.org/core/journals/…

In sum, there is worry that the more actions the US/NATO/International Community takes to show "resolve" (via sanctions or other measures), the more desperate Putin could become...and the greater the risk of major escalation.

[END]