Thread by @zhaot2005

FWIW, a thread 🧵to share my preliminary thoughts on the impact of #UkraineRussiaWar on China’s future strategic orientation.

1/ China likely failed to predict the war. Even many Russian senior intel & mil officials, as well as lots of top Russian experts didn't seem to foresee the war. Given deep distrust of US, China probably dismissed the intel shared by US as psychological warfare to drive wedge.

2/ China further failed to predict the strong international response or to fully appreciate its implications for China, thus the lack of rapid & effective readjustment of its publicly sympathetic position toward Russia.

3/ To simplify, China faces two strategic paths going forward. Option 1 is to continue & even double down on the current "no upper limits, no forbidden zone, no finishing line" close alignment with Russia to promote global order & stability as they envision.

4/ Option 2 is to seize the opportunity to improve relations with the West (especially US), by making good use of Western countries' growing interest to prevent a China-Russia bloc. After all, China strongly desires stable relations with US/West but questions their commitment.

5/ China's high profile commemoration of 50th anniversary of Nixon's visit to Beijing is the most recent display of such Chinese desire. It is widely understood that access to West's technologies and markets will remain essential for China's continuous rise in near- to mid-term.

6/ This could be a pivotal moment, as how China makes this strategic choice would have the most profound geopolitical consequences for China's future and international peace & stability.

7/ The biggest uncertainty is how China's small, closed, & opaque decisionmaking circle--with Paramount Leader Xi at the center--sees things & makes choice. The #UkraineWar highlights how Putin's small, closed, & frivolous inner circle ultimately determined war and peace.

8/ The issue is more salient in China as power is more centralized under one leader. Besides KJU, there is probably no third person in the world that enjoys such absolute authority & overwhelming flattery for so many years. How that affects one's mindset/psychology? No one knows.

9/ Observers have pointed out: in 🇨🇳, Great Firewall is much higher than 🇷🇺; also less civil society, tighter management of public thinking/perception, less open policy debate, less questioning of national narrative, no opposition. In other words, less internal checks & balances.

10/ As such, despite the appealingness of Option 2 to some experts, Mr. Xi could well end up leaning to Option 1. As pointed out by observers, he shares Putin's worldview & believes the inevitable structural change of international balance of power determines China-West rivalry.

11/ His solution to deter a potentially violent eventual showdown is to prioritize material power buildup, including accelerated military modernization & nuclear expansion. His recent preaching of "fighting spirit" to young Party cadres shows no readjustment of such mindset.

12/ The fact that Putin-Xi's personal bond has been a key driver of bilateral relationship behind which Mr. Xi reportedly has thrown his weight makes radical change of China's approach to Russia harder, as Chinese experts may not want to critique the wisdom of current policy.

13/ China is likely also shocked to watch Western countries butcher 🇷🇺's economy & isolate 🇷🇺government. It probably swears never to allow this happen on itself.

14/ This could further strengthen Mr. Xi's long-standing preference of self-reliance & autarky, believing China must be able to prevent external strangulation. It may limit how much China-West can prevent decoupling & develop mutually beneficial & interdependent relations.

15/ On top of these is the growing strategic perception gap at the societal level btw China & West. Longtime info bubble creates parallel universes where the two peoples disagree on basic factual issues. As Chinese experts believe #UkraineWar results from US abetting and

16/ as state media overwhelmingly adopt Russian narratives, it is kind of hard to expect strong advocacy for Option 2 from the experts community, public opinion leaders, or the general public.

17/ #UkraineWar highlights how information & perception gap can be a fundamental threat to international peace, but this problem is only getting worse between China & the West too.

18/ For scholars, a key lesson from all of this is: to develop deep understandings about the impact of domestic decisionmaking environment on an opaque superpower's security/foreign policymaking is hugely important for future research of international peace & strategic stability.

19/ As for the #UkraineWar, China will likely take time to wait for the perceived total chaos to settle & for the new global geopolitical landscape to clarify, before making significant policy changes. Its public positions in the meantime will probably remain generic & abstract.

20/ But what choice Beijing will make at the end of this crisis is going to be very consequential. Hopefully thorough debates among Chinese experts and between Chinese and international experts now can help people think through these issues and thus help promote the right choice.