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Tong ZHAO Profile picture
Tong ZHAO
@zhaot2005
Senior fellow @carnegiechina @carnegienpp @CarnegieEndow. Nuclear, arms control, nonproliferation, new mil tech, Asia-Pacific security, US-China. Views my own.
6 subscribers
Apr 19, 2022 • 23 tweets • 5 min read
I am of the view that #UkraineWar generally reduces the risk of a near-term military conflict over the Taiwan Strait, but new uncertainties are rising too. We need to keep eyes wide open to avoid sleepwalking into a war over Taiwan. A thread🧵: 1/ The most desirable outcome for China remains peaceful unification. To Beijing, this means to avoid war & use time to further build up material power, including military power. By the time China establishes clear military advantage, Taiwan and US would have to accept reality.
Mar 2, 2022 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
FWIW, a thread 🧵to share my preliminary thoughts on the impact of #UkraineRussiaWar on China’s future strategic orientation. 1/ China likely failed to predict the war. Even many Russian senior intel & mil officials, as well as lots of top Russian experts didn't seem to foresee the war. Given deep distrust of US, China probably dismissed the intel shared by US as psychological warfare to drive wedge.
Oct 18, 2021 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
🧵An important technical driver of China's reported FOBS+glider development is probably the perceived threat from US missile defense.
But a more complex question is: could the US readjust its missile defense policy to influence China's calculation behind its nuclear buildup? Recall the fact that recent US development of missile defense capability & policy has been incremental & no dramatic changes. Whereas China's investment in nuclear triad, like reported new silos & various new delivery systems, appears to have much accelerated in recent years.
Jul 1, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
I wonder if the idea is exactly to keep China's enemies guessing. It would force its enemies to take all new silos seriously and bolster China's image as a much stronger nuclear power than before. Whether China will actually fill each silo with an ICBM is a different matter. 1/6 China may believe it needs to be viewed as a stronger nuclear power today because it is convinced the US has become much more hostile against China strategically. This perception has less to do with US nuclear policy than US policies on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, human rights, etc. 2/6
May 12, 2020 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Honored to be interviewed by @SCMPNews on @HuXijin_GT's call for China to quickly build at least 1000 nukes.

A short thread on China's domestic debate on nuclear expansion.

scmp.com/news/china/mil… 1) Hu stimulated the largest-scale public debate in China's history about its nuclear policy. Among the general public, he received massive support. Not a surprise, given the overwhelming public concern of US hostility. Expert community is more skeptical, but no consensus view.
Mar 22, 2020 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
1/5
 Why have so many Chinese diplomats become more aggressive recently?

These are senior diplomats; it is unlikely they don't see the consequences of their aggressive words & deeds. They must know they are destroying China's international image, more than any foreigners can do. 2/5
 It is more likely that they choose not to care, because their aggressive performance on the international stage would win themselves greater career success domestically, in a political system that has undergone dramatic change in recent years.