Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia are unprecedented in scope and scale.

But I'm not sure they'll actually "work".

[THREAD]

The massive economic sanctions being imposed on Russia...

bbc.com/news/world-eur…

...are aimed at achieving...wait, that's the first problem. What are they intended to achieve?

That hasn't been clearly articulated, as @dandrezner wrote here:

washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…

Yes, a goal is to punish Putin/Russia for invading Ukraine.

As Biden said when the sanctions were imposed: “Putin’s aggression against Ukraine will end up costing Russia dearly, economically and strategically. We will make sure of that.”

time.com/6151188/biden-…

But absent full withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, what conditions need to be met to end their use?

Instead of having clear policy goals, the sanctions seemed to have been deployed so that the international community could be seen as "doing something!"

As Gary Clyde Hufbauer, @KimAElliott, Jeffrey Schott, & Barbara Oegg found in their influential @PIIE study, turning to sanctions without clearly stating why and how isn't unusual.

amazon.com/Economic-Sanct…

They wrote: "In many cases, sender countries hastily imposed economic sanctions without adequately analyzing their potential impact, simply to slake the public demand for action against foreign outrages."

That was a key reason why sanctions became popular after WWI.

As @njtmulder argues in his new book, they are an instrument of war "perceived" (that's a key word) as a way to take action without carrying the same risk and cost as actually going to war.

amazon.com/dp/B09MJ9RTQG/…

"Perceived" is a key word because threatening sanctions can actually make a situation more tense by leading a target to dig in.

This is partially why @dandrezner aptly labels sanctions use a "paradox": they are used in highly contentious situations, which is where they are most likely to fail.

amazon.com/Sanctions-Para…

This is also why @KimAElliott, writing in @IntSecJournal in the 1990s, said that analysts are "are generally far more nuanced in their conclusions and more limited in their expectations of what sanctions can achieve"

direct.mit.edu/isec/article-a…

The hasty and unclear fashion in which the sanctions against Russia were imposed is just the first reason why I have doubts about the their ability to "work".

A second reason is that I'm skeptical of the ability of "targeted sanctions" to work in this case.

By "targeted", I'm referring to sanctions on Putin and the "oligarchs".

reuters.com/world/europe/u…

As is evident from this @NPR interview by @MichelMcQMartin with @apmassaro3, actually getting to the oligarch's assets is really tricky and requires a long game. Don't expect immediate results.

npr.org/2022/03/06/108…

This is on top of the fact that cutting off their assets is unlikely to make the oligarchs unsupportive of Putin, as @olga_chyzh detailed in this 🧵

Though I have to admit that cutting off Adidas track suits might prove effective (h/t @SevaUT):

The third reason I have doubts about the use of sanctions against Russia is their sustainability: can the international community actually stay committed to imposing these sanctions?

There is no doubt that the sanctions are doing serious economic damage to Russia:

As @Noahpinion wrote, "It’s pretty clear that in any conceivable economic or financial terms, this was is not worth it for Russia."

noahpinion.substack.com/p/how-are-the-…

And now the extremely valuable oil industry is being targeted

apnews.com/article/us-rus…

But here's the thing about sanctions: all of that damage does harm to those imposing the sanctions too.

abcnews.go.com/Politics/tough…

Sanctions rely on the extent to which the global economy is interlinked, as @OzgurOzdamar & @evgeniia_s discuss in @IntlStudiesRev

academic.oup.com/isr/article/23…

"Weaponizing" such "interdependence" (h/t @ANewman_forward & @henryfarrell) can be powerful, but it comes at a price for the sender

direct.mit.edu/isec/article-a…

Incurring economic self-harm for six days? Sure.

Six weeks? Maybe.

Six months? 😬

Indeed, there are already signs of cracks in the sanctions regime

It all comes down to what "the Bobs" taught us long ago, "cooperation under anarchy is difficult"

cambridge.org/core/journals/…

The fourth and final reason that I have doubts about the use of sanctions against Russia is the possibility of that they could actually make the situation worse.

As I discussed in another 🧵, there is the concern that the sanctions could actually backfire by inducing Putin to lash out.

In sum, it's understandable why the international community turned to sanctions as an instrument to punish and coerce Russia.

But I'm not sure they'll work.

[END]

Addendum 1: Further emphasizing the ambiguity in the goal of the sanctions 👇

Addendum 2: Great thread on what a "goal oriented" sanction regime could and should look like

Addendum 3: Underpinning how sanctions success requires the international coalition imposing the sanctions to stay together, @lady_professor in @II_journal wrote how "only concession by the sender causes sanctions to `fail'".
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…

Addendum 4: Not only are the sanctions unlikely to lead to a "palace coup" among the oligarchs (see @olga_chyzh's 🧵 above), but, as @TomPepinsky points out in 👇🧵, the general economic crisis in Russia is not going to lead to Putin's ouster either.

Addendum 5: In addition to the potential for the sanctions coalition to collapse, it's important to note that some key players are not participating (h/t @daniel_mcdowell). Sanctions are indeed only as strong as the weakest link.