Thread by @olga_chyzh

The West, especially @POTUS, has demonstrated a complete lack of the most basic understanding of crisis bargaining, brinkmanship, and deterrence. Here are the Cliff’s notes of Schelling, Fearon, and Powell with an application to #PutinsWar. This is taught in any Intro to IR. 1/n

War is a bargaining failure. The goal of crisis bargaining is to find the bargaining range-the division of pie that ALL parties prefer to fighting. Such a bargaining range always exists: war is costly-it decreases the size of the pie. The pie is always larger before the war start

So why do wars occur? There are two main reasons: private information and commitment problems. (There is really a third—issue indivisibility—it is more of a bargaining strategy than a cause of war, and it is subsumed by the others).

Wars occur as a result of private information, when actors are uncertain about each other’s power (capabilities and resolve), and lack credible means to convey it, except on the battlefield.

Essentially, if opponents had perfect a priori information about each other’s capabilities and resolve, they would have no need to fight—they could just divide the pie in proportion to the true balance of power between them.

The problem is that each side has an incentive to exaggerate their own military capabilities and resolve —if they can successfully convince their opponent, then they get a larger share of the pie in the negotiation.

The key crisis bargaining strategy is to take any actions that may convince your opponent of your resolve and capabilities. That is why Putin moved his troops to the Ukrainian border and put them in an offensive position.

Keeping troops in an offensive position for a long time is costly—hence, doing so was a clear signal to the West and Ukraine that the invasion was imminent in the absence of concessions.

So why did the war happen if Putin sent such a clear message about his resolve? Because Ukraine had its own private information (that it will fight like hell), but this was a priori not credible to Putin (He saw very little resolve/punishment when he took Crimea/Donbass in 2014).

An abysmal crisis bargaining failure is to take actions or make statements that show a lack of resolve to your opponent. You want them to believe that you MIGHT fight—if you do so successfully, that will increase your share of the pie obtainable through bargaining.

When Putin hears again and again that NATO will do NOTHING militarily to stop his invasion, that decreases his costs for war, increases his demands in negotiations, and outright emboldens him.

When @POTUS goes on record saying that NATO will not defend Ukraine militarily, even in case of a chemical attack—that weakens NATO’s bargaining position. The strategy is to keep the adversary uncertain (even if you are bluffing).

Basically, the bargaining strategy is to ALWAYS exaggerate your resolve, say "maybe" NOT "never". Even if you have no intention to fight at all. (That is why Putin did not believe Ukraine).

Because the strategy is to always exaggerate your resolve--and your opponent expects you to--when NATO says they will NEVER intervene, it sends a strong signal that they have no resolve. This is an invitation for Putin to do as he pleases--it EMBOLDENS him. Beyond just Ukraine.

Had NATO signals been ambiguous (even if their true intention was NOT to defend Ukraine), that would have raised Putin’s expected costs of war-he doesn't want to fight NATO. Even a small risk of NATO involvement would have forced him to tread lightly, and maybe, prevented the war

Another bargaining tool Putin uses brilliantly is brinkmanship, which is taking actions that increase the chance of an accidental war. The goal is to make the adversary lose their nerve and back down. Putin engaged in brinkmanship when he ordered to put his nukes on high alert.

Now that was not a threat against Ukraine—that was a direct threat to the West. (It’s not Ukraine he plans on nuking—a topic for another thread). The counter-move is to escalate further, to raise the stakes, so that the opponent backs down.

By responding, you take control. Ignoring the threat does NOT help preserve peace or de-escalate—it gives all the control to the opponent.

The goal of crisis bargaining is to avoid war. But counter-intuitively, you often have to escalate the threat of war to get your best bargaining outcome WITHOUT going to war. Putin understands crisis bargaining, and that gives him the upper hand.

NATO keeps announcing that they fold, which prompts Putin to keep poking to find out the limits (e.g. his recent threat to target the weapons convoys).

The other cause of war--the commitment problem—has to do with actors lacking the tools to credibly commit to a division of the pie a priori. This will become more relevant here, once the war is over or when there a negotiated settlement is reached.

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