Thread by @MarkHertling

Today's thread, a deeper dive on the current discussion of what a Theater Commander (CDR) does....

This is a followup to the excellent article published yesterday by @ZcohenCNN and @KatieBoLillis . 1/18

KatieBo's & Zach's article reports the Pentagon is stumped about who is leading RU's effort in Ukraine.

Is that important? From my perspective, yes. Knowing "who" provides us insight into that commander's background, potential actions & ways he might conduct a campaign. 2/

Several people posit there may be no overall theater commander...that the Combined Arms Army Commanders (several 3 star Col-Generals) are coordinating amongst themselves.

If true, that also provides insight into how RU forces are acting, why there's dysfunction. 3/

Early in this campaign, I spoke to @brikeilarcnn about the Principles of War. One of those is UNITY OF COMMAND.

As defined: UNITY OF COMMAND requires a single commander with authority to direct ALL forces in pursuit of a unified strategy.

IOW, CDRs drive the MISSION.
4/

So what kind of "Mission" drive? It's what emanates from the political strategy?

Roosevelt's guidance to Eisenhower for D-Day (below) is an example of a perfect mission, based on desired strategic ends. Short, sweet, w/ few details. It requires the CDR to analyze & plan.

5/

Now, I have no idea of Putin's mission to the Theater CDR, but it might be something like:

1. Execute regime change in Ukraine
2. Control of Black/Azov Sea Ports & land bridge to RU
3. Destroy Ukraine's Army
3. Subjugate Ukraine's population
4. Further Divide NATO/US 5/

If those - or something like those - were Putin's words, it is his political strategy.

And the Theater Cdr must translate this into operational action.

He analyzes with staffs & subordinate CDRs to determine essential missions they must accomplish together.

Things like... 6/

-The Forces required
-The Intelligence needed
-A logistics execution plan
-Analysis of terrain/weather
-Tasks subordinate cdrs MUST accomplish (when, where & why)
- The coordination of other service commanders (air, navy, artillery, cyber, etc)

And hundreds of other things. 7/

And that's just the PLANNING. As we all know, no plan survives first contact with the enemy...or, as a famous boxer once said: "Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth!" 8/

After planning, a Theater CDR is responsible for overall mission execution.

He must:
-Place Forces
-Synchronization all actions
-Distribute intelligence
-Guide Subordinate CDRS' execution
-Conduct Resupply Operations
-Synchronize other services (navy, air force, etc) 9/

As I told @ZcohenCNN: "Unity of Command means 1 person is in charge— to coordinate fires, direct logistics, commit reserve forces, measure the success (and failure) of different 'wings' of the operation, synchronize the entire joint force, & adjust actions based on that." 10/

In effect, A Theater CDR is the "Operational Artists" of a campaign, blending science with art.

They know the political strategy, and they plan the sequence and execution of the operations so that the tactial battles achieve the political strategy.

11/

What was the operational plan?

Here's my guess:

1.Main Effort (ME): Attack Kyiv from N & E (regime change)
2.Secondary Effort (SE) 1: Attack E & W from Crimea (to establish land bridge to Odesa (& beyond?))
3. (SE) 2: Envelop & Annihilate UKR's Donbas army. 12/

Here are SOME issues with this plan:
1. RU deployed 190k troops...UKR's army has 240+k & territorials. Force mismatch
2. RU force training is substandard; leadership at all levels is poor.
3. Terrain & weather known, but ignored
4. Intelligence on UKR forces poor
(cont) 13/

5. Naval amphibious landing dependent on ground force reaching Odesa.
6. Air Force poorly trained, Navy not synchronized
7. Communication plan disconnected
8. Troop-to-task requirements excessive
9. No massing of long range fires (rocket, missile, artillery) 14/

Critically important to a theater campaign plan: Logistics support.

A War College Maxim: "If you forget logistics...you'll lose."

Russia did not adequately plan or execute logistics.

Russia has "Exterior Lines," UKR has "Interior Lines."

Here's what that looks like: 15/

RU Commanders had to deal with 1400 miles around the perimeter of Ukraine on the Exterior Lines for resupply, troop movements, deployment and communication.

UKR can more easily resupply and move forces with Interior lines. 16/

All are part of the planning and execution responsibilities of a Theater CDR.

In combat-as a subordinate (Division) commander-I've worked for 2 General Theater CDRs who bore these responsibilities.

In peacetime, I worked for another Theater CDR (an Admiral) who did the same.17/

RU came into this fight with a purported advantage in force quality & quantity. Their plan was to conduct an extremely complex battle of annihilation & regime change.

They failed..

Not having a Theater CDR may have been the reason.

It will be tough for RU to recover.18/18