Very struck by recent analysis + reporting that highlights a risk--highly uncertain but not so far widely discussed--of a significant escalation of the Ukraine war in coming weeks. What it means, and what it implies for US policy, are not at all clear 🧵
2/ First is the superb Watling + Reynolds essay, which catalogues a disturbing shift in Russia "from presenting the war in Ukraine as a limited struggle for Donbas to a systemic struggle with NATO in which Ukraine was merely the military battlefield"
rusi.org/explore-our-re…
3/ "Russian television has been flooded with statements urging escalation as part of an existential struggle." They cite the Deputy Head of the State Duma: "This is a metaphysical clash between the forces of good and evil... This is truly a holy war we’re waging and we must win"
4/ They worry that Victory Day will be "used as a fulcrum to mobilize a much larger force," and predict that Moscow will "use 9 May as the day on which the 'special military operation' is officially framed as a 'war'" and Putin demands national mobilization for a longer conflict
5/ Then there's this chilling report: "Russia’s military believes that limiting the war’s initial goals is a serious error. They now argue that Russia is not fighting Ukraine, but NATO. Senior officers have therefore concluded that the Western ..."
cepa.org/vicious-blame-…
6/ "... alliance is fighting all out (though the supply of increasingly sophisticated weaponry) while its own forces operate under peacetime constraints like a bar on airstrikes against ... infrastructure. In short, the military now demands all-out war, including mobilization"
7/ Public rhetoric from Russia about being at war w/NATO appears to be becoming more intense
wsj.com/articles/russi…
8/ Unless he is just posturing, moreover, Putin himself is now once again broadcasting the message that the US + West are trying to "destroy Russia from within." Not a new theme, but offered w/new intensity
usnews.com/news/world/art…
9/ At the same time, recent days have seen more hints of expanded RU operations. One example is new reports of expanded long-range strikes against a wider range of Ukrainian infrastructure targets
politico.com/news/2022/04/2…
10/ And fresh instability in Moldova--possibly a Russian ploy to help unseat an EU-leaning president and justify military operations pushing in that direction. That's exactly, by the way, what Watling and Reynolds foresaw in their essay
theguardian.com/world/2022/apr…
11/ What do we make of all this? It could be RU posturing to scare off Ukraine's friends. It could reflect the views of some Russian officials, but not the key ones. It could be accurate now--and Putin could change course. But the risk of such a scenario cannot be ignored
12/ What happens if Putin does use May 9 to commit to nat'l mobilization to get a total win in Ukraine? In the process telling the RU people they are at war w/NATO? And if he ends restrictions on mil ops, for eg on airstrikes or covert ops vs NATO convoys + training centers?
13/ This would create huge dilemmas for US + NATO. The US judgment so far has been that it doesn't possess vital interests sufficient for direct involvement in war. A seemingly out-of-control, hyper-nationalist RU going for broke would cause many to question that assumption
14/ Pressures to "show credibility" and jump into the war would be intense. Alliance solidarity would be brutally tested: Who would fight? And how could EU keep buying gas from such a Russia? But if it stops, recession follows. Are EU publics along for that ride?
15/ What then do third parties do? Do US allies boost aid? What of the hedgers: Do India, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Vietnam etc now go full-throated in condemnation of RU--or do they tilt the other way and demand that Ukraine + the West essentially give up?
16/ This puts current US strategy in a perilous light. As @IgnatiusPost explains, the US is signaling a desire to degrade RU power in dramatic ways--a "high-stakes strategy" though one that is a reasonable alternative to direct participation in the war
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…
17/ Yet I disagree w/Ignatius that "The exit ramp surely must look more attractive to Putin now than it did several months ago." That assumes Putin is getting accurate info on the war's costs + prospects. It assumes he doesn't have faith in his ability to out-muscle the West
18/ Ignatius notes that superpowers have abandoned failed wars in Vietnam + Afghanistan. But these were more marginal and only abandoned after years of brutal losses + wishful thinking. It's difficult to imagine Putin choosing an outright loss vs a dice-throw of escalation
19/ Such a move would be a foolhardy venture w/huge risks of larger war. It's tough to see Ukraine, the US or NATO backing down, or envision any real victory for RU. This scenario may still be unlikely; Putin has options short of mobilization, which carries big political risks
20/ But it can't be discounted. If it happens, demands for knee-jerk US action will come thick + fast. The balancing act at the core of US strategy--support Ukraine and punish RU enough to win + enforce norms, w/o courting a larger war--will become acute + perhaps unsustainable
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