Thread by @edwardstrngr

A few thoughts triggered by the prevalence of heuristics - instinctive, learned responses - especially w.r.t. assumptions of mass and might. Principally the enduring assumption that Russia has latent capital reserves of mass it can 'liquidise' into combat power. 1/15

The FT published a 'long read' that demonstrates such thinking, citing "western officials" who reveal that Russia will get its act together militarily when it fights "as they were trained to fight". This is a heuristic response. So can Russia do that? 2/15
ft.com/content/f299cb…

It is increasingly difficult to see Russia being able to mobilise a large reserve much within a year. So its troops in the Donbas are what it has. (There are lessons here for general assumptions on generating mass: if even Russia cannot...) 3/15

Most estimates place >80K RUS troops in BTGs against >40K UKR in good defensive positions. This is not a good ratio for any attacking force - even with firepower. But can it 'fight like its doctrine' under its new, centralised commander: Dvornikov? 4/15
foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/12/rus…

My own experience makes me sceptical that he & it can. 5Eyes Generals will admit only the US Army can train effectively at Corps or Army level - and it is complicated, hard, and needs repeated exercising to master. Mark Hertling gives a flavour: 5/15

Also, Dvornikov will need to build a C2 apparatus for his new, huge, command. How will he fuse the previous regional C2? Will he take the southern command and expand it to sit above, or build anew? How will he train the staff for it? 6/15

And that decades old, corrupt & bankrupt RUS military culture is not going to change overnight. Yes, the Darwinian instinct will teach the BTGs how to be less vulnerable, but don't expect great flourishes of manouevre warfare. 7/15

And then there is the logistics. Fast armoured warfare relies on equal dash from the loggies. We just don't see it. And every mile further into UKR territory is another vulnerability from extension, and exposure to a hostile pop'n. 8/15
defense.gov/News/Transcrip…

Russia is caught between needing a lightning offensive campaign to achieve a bold victory, and not being able or capable enough to risk its remaining force in such a move. It has neither the assumed mass of the East nor the skill of the West. 9/15

So when you see maps with dramatic, pincing arrows suggesting RUS' next move, think on what each of those easy to draw symbols means in all-arms manoeuvre, logistic support, and then holding the territory taken. 10/15

UKR must work out how much ground it is willing to trade while writing down RUS through attrition. Some assess UKR now has more tanks. But it needs more long-range artillery, and a CONOPs for going on the offensive eventually with smaller numbers. 11/15
telegraph.co.uk/world-news/202…

Which is why the Biden administrations announcement of $33Bn is so significant. It has bought time for UKR to work out what its modern CONOPs and theory of victory looks like, as long as it can contain current RUS pressure. 12/15

Two things remain. The threat of nuclear weapons should retain its awe. But proper statecraft can manage this as long as NATO does not get directly involved, ie the escalation remains sub-strategic. See @LawDavF below: 13/15
samf.substack.com/p/escalators-a… https://t.co/MJbgjpttaD

And to best do that NATO must ensure it does not get directly involved, where a route to an existential rationale for RUS is easier to draw. Our rhetoric on these two points needs to be careful and deliberate. 14/15

But my overall conclusion has not changed. There is no room for complacency, but a well-sustained UKR can prevail and defeat the invasion of its territory. It is in everyone's interests that it does, and the US has just put down a big bet. 15/15