An interesting read - but there are other factors. I took Air Defence of the UK as the subject for a research piece and argument made at the RAF’s Basic Staff Course at Bracknell jn 1997. The core theme is still valid - over optimistic assumptions that become unaffordable. 1/5

https://twitter.com/airpowerhistory/status/1619831876516216832

The RAF took AD seriously. The plan was multi-layered and had modern C2 at its core: IUKADGE, Improved UK Air Defence Ground Environment. Fed by many radars and AWACS it would control long, medium and short range fighters and medium and short range SAMs. F2, F4, Eurofighter… 2/5

Recent events demand an update on my last major thread, which was based on this paper for @Policy_Exchange titled: Staying power - How Ukraine can Prevail Tactically and Strategically. I shall use that simple formula to assess how things stand today.
policyexchange.org.uk/staying-power-… The paper reduces to: tactically, the nation that evolves its war-fighting concepts better and faster (conceptual component), and has the strong national resolve to win (moral component), can prevail over a nation with nominally larger forces (physical component).

There Is something important here for Western forces to consider: have we become too procedural and safety oriented? Run a thought experiment:
1/4 nytimes.com/2022/08/28/us/… Imagine taking a bunch of our bright young troops and removing their usual kit. You send them to the training area via the ring-road with a credit card and task them to buy commercial drones. They are to use commercial IT and geospatial Int only. Could they rig an ISTAR system?

Previously I asked whether we were seeing a split between 'Old' and 'New' Europe in their approach to Russia. Recent events in the Donbas allow us to view that through the lens of strategic 'staying power'. 1/22

https://twitter.com/edwardstrngr/status/1523936302835679232?s=20&t=swDOCfWEKtbOuvrb0WcNLg

Staying power requires a long-term view, to not knee-jerk to the vicissitudes of the current tactical battle. There is no campaign I have been involved in that has not swung to and fro tactically, and taken longer than expected: GW1, Libya, Kosovo... 2/22
samf.substack.com/p/how-long-wil…

Isaiah Berlin's famous essay on the Hedgehog and the Fox might provide a way to look at the benefits of SWE and FIN in NATO. In Defence terms they are Hedgehogs and know one big thing - coping with Russia. The foxes such as US/UK are more generalist. 1/11
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hedge… First, inputs and outputs. SWE spends $7.2Bn, FIN $5.8Bn. But both have sophisticated concepts of Total Defence, mobilising society, using reserves, and, unlike RUS, do so within a democracy that regularly tests and audits the strategy and plans. 2/11

A few thoughts triggered by the prevalence of heuristics - instinctive, learned responses - especially w.r.t. assumptions of mass and might. Principally the enduring assumption that Russia has latent capital reserves of mass it can 'liquidise' into combat power. 1/15 The FT published a 'long read' that demonstrates such thinking, citing "western officials" who reveal that Russia will get its act together militarily when it fights "as they were trained to fight". This is a heuristic response. So can Russia do that? 2/15
ft.com/content/f299cb…

Some thoughts on the air war over Ukraine and its implications for air forces in general. I caveat all by stating that we don't know very much about UKR tactics, and if we did we wouldn't want to be too descriptive. But we can pick out some essential observations. 1/11 The first point is that in the eighth week of this war the Russian Air Force (VKS) still shows no sign of running a campaign to gain air superiority. Given the advantages it has in the 'physical component' of air combat power this is truly remarkable. So it probably cannot. 2/11

This good analysis by @PhillipsPOBrien suggests that Ukraine is not ceding the initiative in the Donbas. I offer that it is quite possible that the Battle of Donbas will unfold more like the Battle of Britain than the Kursk more usually predicted... 1/11

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1515931307544662017?s=20&t=bPAWZTxxr44oNNEPYLY5Lw

...In that it could turn out to be an evolving campaign of adaptation whose pivotal moment might only be discerned retrospectively. The battle is already underway, in fact has been underway since 2014. The defender has thought about the manner of his defence. 2/11

Is 'The West' at war with Russia? Ask two questions: Has The West firmly stated that it is politically opposed to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and wishes to see it fail? Is it in the interest of future West European security to see Russia be defeated in Ukraine? 1/11 I suggest the answer to both questions is yes: whether Russia emerges victorious or defeated will define the European security architecture for decades, and so have a material bearing on everyone's security and prosperity - including Russia's. 2/11