Thread by @ChrisO_wiki

1/ In this sixth and final 🧵 based on the memoir of former Russian paratrooper Pavel Filatyev, I'll look at his commentary on the state of the Russian army and why it has performed so poorly in Ukraine. It provides an informative insider's perspective on what has gone wrong.

2/ For the first part of Filatyev's story, covering the six months he spent in training with the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment in Crimea before the war, see the thread below:

3/ The second part, covering the period immediately before and after the invasion was launched on 24 February, is here:

4/ And for the third part, highlighting the haphazard and disorganised Russian takeover of Kherson in the face of even less well organised Ukrainian resistance, see below:

5/ The fourth part deals with Filatyev's experiences of the start of the occupation of Kherson and Russia's disastrous attempt to take Mykolaiv and Odesa:

6/ Filatyev's evacuation to hospital and his decision to publicly oppose the war by publishing a scathing 141-page memoir is covered in the fifth part:

7/ As he notes in his memoir, Filatyev had been associated with the same unit – the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment (formerly Brigade) – for nearly 30 years. His father had served with it during the Second Chechen War (1999-2009), when it fought and defeated Chechen separatists.

8/ Filatyev writes, correctly, that "it was a qualitatively and fundamentally different army." It was primarily a conscript army, unlike today's Russian army. The army's nature changed under Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (2007-2012), who introduced radical reforms.

9/ Serdyukov's most important reform was to professionalise the Russian army by drastically reducing the size of the officer corps, cutting the number of military districts and transforming the army from a large conscript force to a smaller force of contract soldiers.

10/ In 2012, Putin sacked Serdyukov after a corruption scandal (see thread linked below) and replaced him with Sergei Shoigu, the current Defence Minister, who undid some of the earlier reforms. Military corruption increased significantly under Shoigu.

11/ Filatyev experienced the army before and after the reforms, having served from 2007-2010 and then again from 2021-2022. "Despite the fact that not everything was perfect then, now, 12 years later, I understand that service then was [treated] much more [seriously]."

12/ "I spent my childhood up to 15 years in the 56th, now after 17 years everything ... changed, I saw nothing in common with the Airborne Forces of the past. People became different, the shine was lost, the twinkle in the eyes disappeared, now only the name remains from it."

13/ Sharp divisions had appeared between relatively well-paid contract soldiers and poorly-paid and maltreated conscripts: "Contractors more often than not simply ignore orders to do cleaning, so the conscripts are forced to mow the grass or carry something somewhere uselessly."

14/ Filatyev experienced many logistical problems when he rejoined the army in 2021, from beds being unavailable in barracks, to uniforms and boots not being available, and having to buy his own as the army couldn't or wouldn't provide them. His training happened only "on paper".

15/ "Our ammunition and uniforms are uncomfortable and of poor quality, as evidenced by the fact that most military personnel buy and change into American, European models or even Ukrainian ones," Filatyev writes.

16/ When Filatyev went to war in Ukraine, his unit was equipped with old vehicles and equipment that broke down and was abandoned on the way. He was given a rusty, broken machine gun and crossed the border in an ammunition truck that lacked working brakes and crashed on the way.

17/ "Our equipment was hopelessly outdated, the UAZ [car] and Ural [truck], the BMD-2, machine guns and automatic grenade launchers, all of which were in service 50 years ago! 50 years ago! Of course they were great vehicles and weapons, but it's been 50 years!"

18/ "We still have the same tactics as our grandfathers! The same tactics as our grandfathers! We're a paratrooper assault battalion, sent to war in UAZs!" Filatyev says that blindly praising the army and its equipment simply leads to them "self-destructing".

19/ Filatyev spent a month in the trenches of southern Ukraine under constant bombardment, without being relieved or rotated. (In World War I, in contrast, British troops on the Western Front spent an average of only 4 days at a time in frontline trenches before being rested.)

20/ Not surprisingly, he concluded that "the top doesn't give a shit about us, they demonstrate in every possible way that we are inhumans for them, we are just like cattle." He blames "the terrible corruption and mess in our army, its moral and technical obsolescence".

21/ "For twenty years," Filatyev writes, "the military institutes have been entered through bribery and graft. Many of the most ideological and worthy men who served in the army have left it, realising that it was useless to fight the system."

22/ "Career advancement is only possible with connections and loyalty to the system. In today's army, in order not to get in trouble, you have to do as you're told, even if you've been told complete nonsense."

23/ "The system of military institutes and the officer ladder structure has become obsolete ... Officers are still being taught how to run a conscript army and not a professional army of contract soldiers who are often older than the young officers."

24/ "How can the truly promising and enterprising contract servicemen to work their way up? There is no way!"

25/ "A man has to go to a military institute after school and come in as a 21-year-old lieutenant in the army, go through 100 circles of hell of bureaucracy, mess and humiliation ..."

26/ "... to become a company commander, then another round of hell for a deputy battalion commander, and so on and on. That's why a huge number of officers drop out of the service and leave."

27/ "Those who do make it to higher ranks sit and keep their teeth clenched in their posts and don't fight back, they endured so much to get it. And all the while not realizing that it's because they don't speak that the system is eating itself."

28/ "It's impossible to build a strong and close-knit team under these conditions ... The system doesn't let the most promising, strongest and the smartest advance, but [prefers] those who can adapt to it, the higher up you go, the more you have to get dirty."

29/ Filatyev writes that "for many of these reasons, many of those who are really promising and interested in the military are going [instead] to the private military companies," in other words mercenary organisations such as the Wagner Group.

30/ He is also harshly critical of his officers' leadership in battle. "In all my time in the war I can't remember officers going to the trouble of leading soldiers, many getting drunk and sitting in normal fortifications while all the crap is done by regular contract soldiers."

31/ The blame lies with the corrupt careerists who run the army, Filatyev says: "Those who see the whole mess from the inside lie to themselves and everyone around that it's not all that bad. They have different motives, there is little time left until retirement ..."

32/ "[A typical commander acquired] big stars on the shoulders, for the sake of which he spent his whole life, shoved common sense to hell and endured everything for so many years, anything to advance his career in this rotten system."

33/ The army also did not bother to take care of its own troops in the field. The soldiers went without food or medical supplies. By the time he was evacuated, "more than half the regiment was gone" through death, sickness and wounds.

34/ It was "a war where no one will give a damn about your security, about what you eat and drink. Where parcels sent from family and friends can be stolen. Where humanitarian aid doesn't make it to the front lines and all the cream settles at headquarters on the second line."

35/ "A man is listed missing, but nobody cares when witnesses come forward and say they saw him die ... There are plenty of dead whose relatives have not been compensated, and whose injured and sick have been denied compensation and insurance."

36/ Acts of bravery were often denied recognition, Filatyev says. "Awards aren't always given to those who deserve them. In our regiment, I don't know that anyone was given one except posthumously."

37/ In many countries, soldiers are assured of a 'military covenant', a compact in which the state looks after their needs and their families in recognition for the soldiers' willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country. But in Russia, this appears to be absent.

38/ Filatyev concludes bitterly: "I didn't believe it would come to this, but in this war, they've just decided to throw our corpses at Ukraine, the women will still give birth to more." /end

(thread seems to be broken, continues here:)