Thread by @RALee85

Thanks to @yapparova_lilya for this interview. One thing I want to emphasize is that defense analysis depends on the quality of the data. I don't have a great understanding of the force ratios in Kherson, which means it is difficult to make a high confidence prediction.

There are important tangible (e.g. quantity and quality of forces/equipment) and intangible factors (e.g. leadership and morale). I think the intangible factors favor Ukraine, and but many of the tangible factors are harder to assess (at least from my vantage point). 2/

Ukraine now has very good NATO artillery with PGMs and HIMARS/M270, and has a greater quantity of tubes and ammunition than in early summer. It has enough 155mm ammunition to conduct an offensive and its crews are proficient with these systems. 3/

But it is less clear if Ukraine has sufficient tanks, IFVs, and other system, which are critical to for any offensive. And you need well-trained forces (with armor) to conduct offensive operations well and to rapidly exploit breakthroughs. 4/

In order to mass sufficient forces that are well-trained for an offensive in Kherson, Ukraine may have to pull units or reserves away from other parts of the front. That means Russia may be able to take terrain elsewhere as a result. 5/

So any analysis of whether Ukraine will have success in Kherson depends on making estimates about a number of critical tangible factors (other people may have a better estimate/understanding). When you add several uncertain estimates together, you have weak data. 6/

So I can't make a high-confidence prediction, but Ukraine has a number of advantages pursuing a campaign in Kherson. It may not have an overall advantage in artillery and armor, but it likely does in Kherson and certainly in tactical engagements when it masses them. 7/

Russia depended on a significant advantage in artillery rounds fired in the Donbas. Russia can resupply its forces across the Dnipro with ferries, but it likely can't deliver enough artillery ammunition and other heavy equipment if Ukrainian leans heavily on artillery. 8/

Russia will also have difficulty deploying reserves across the river. Kyiv has advantages in Kherson and will likely achieve successes, but without a solid understanding of force ratios, equipment, # of well-trained Ukrainian units, etc., it is hard to predict how much or when.9/

So I don't know how much terrain Ukraine will be able to take back this month, but, when we look at the medium-to-long-term, I think manpower issues will become a greater problem for Russia and Ukraine can make Russia's occupation efforts more costly and less sustainable. 10/

Russia's force in Ukraine depends on volunteers who signed 3 or 6 month contracts. Will they sign another contract? Can Russia keep meeting its manpower needs without mobilization? I don't know, but I have a feeling many volunteers won't want to spend the winter in a trench. 11/

The 3rd Army Corps deployment will give Russia new forces to occupy frontage. It is more likely its deployment will make a Ukrainian offensive more difficult than facilitating a Russian offensive. But will its battalions with 6 month contract volunteers exist by February? 12/

So I think there are a number of military factors that favor Ukraine in Kherson and elsewhere, particularly over the medium-term. How and when will these advantages translate into gains on the battlefield? I can't say with a high-level of confidence. 13/

Good piece by @Jack_Watling putting this offensive in the broader context. 14/
rusi.org/explore-our-re…

An additional thought. If Ukraine can achieve local pockets of air superiority on the FLOT for TB2 strikes or so UAVs can locate targets more effectively for arty, then that could compensate for a lack of a numerical superiority with ground forces. 15/