Thread by @MassDara

Shoygu and Putin provided some updates in a regularly scheduled MOD speech, the MOD Collegium. Shoygu signals changes to the Russian military's force structure are coming. Text below, and some initial reactions /1
telegra.ph/Tezisy-vystupl…

Some changes make sense, and others arguably go backwards in time and suggest the General Staff is not learning the right lessons from the war at this point in time. Let's go through the changes in order from "that makes sense" to "??????" /2

1: with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the Western Military District will revert back into the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts – like before 2010, as well as an Army Corps HQ in Karelia. This makes sense with NATO expansion, so this change checks out /3

2: Putin tells Shoygu he will have no funding restrictions and “the country and the government are providing everything that the army asks for” but for the ‘special military operation’ but there’s a catch: Shoygu has to fix the problems, to include mobilization. /4

If there is anything the last decade and war in Ukraine have shown, Sergey Kuzhegetovich Shoygu is the definitely the wrong person to give a lot of money to and ask to fix the military's problems. He is loyal to Putin so there's that. /5

3: Create three new vehicle repair and maintenance facilities. This makes sense. Shoygu then throws his predecessor under the bus about that, instead of acknowledging that he’s been in his job for ten years and had ample time to fix it himself /6

4: Conscription ages changes from 18-27 to 21-30. This is an odd shift. I don’t think it’s related to demographics, unless so many in that 18-21 age group fled Russia in 2022 leaving them in an unexpected bind. I’ll need more time to think this through. /7

5: 3 new divisions will be created in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Makes sense..but how? From units already deployed there, pulling from strategic reserve of older equipment, moving units from other mil districts, or just not filling them? /8

6: uh-oh more divisions: convert 7 Ground Forces brigades into divisions , continuing a slow process of rollbacks from the “New Look” reforms. They’ve been doing this slowly for 10 years. The problem is this: they need more people and more equipment to make these units larger /9

7: more divisions! coastal defense brigades to be converted into divisions. need more people and equipment, both are in short supply. /10

8: divisions again - the VDV will form two additional air assault divisions. the VDV in 2022 is so severely degraded it will be a struggle to return to prewar levels in the year ahead, but they want to increase it. That will be hard /11

7: raise contract servicemen numbers to 695,000 of a planned 1.5 million military billets. These numbers may be a goal, but they aren’t realistic, given their casualties, resignations, and what I presume must be recruiting and retention problems for contractniki /12

8: Shoygu says in 2023 the Russian military will “continue the special military operation until the tasks are fully completed.” open-ended. /13

What do I take away from this speech? At a workshop this summer, I noted we should not assume the General Staff will learn the correct lessons from the war. Wrong lessons could include a regeneration plan cooked up by parochial interests, and Arbat generals in the General Staff

The wrong lessons I thought at that time would be things like, letting the Ground Forces continue to dominate all discussions, creating more divisions, more conscripts to recreate something vaguely Soviet…/14

..instead of understanding the correct lessons for what went wrong – like excessive secrecy and letting the intel services plan the war, poor use of the VKS, and insufficient enablers for precision munitions, and commanders so toxic as to undermine combat capabilities /15

To me, this speech is a sign the General Staff is learning the wrong lessons and parochial interests are taking over in many ways. Many have hated brigades since they were announced in 2009. /16

The General Staff concludes they need larger units for high intensity war, and the brigade and BTG do not suit their needs. Part of that is true – the BTG was not designed for this kind of war. /17

The Russian military was purposefully redesigned in 2009 away from the kind of war it is fighting in 2022 but they didn't fix the force design before the war they chose to launch. /18 warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-bu…

With nearly half of the Russian Ground Forces estimated to be wounded and killed in 2022, and a major percentage of their active duty armored equipment destroyed (30-50%), they announce they need more soldiers and larger units. /19

Increases also to tactical aviation: three air divisions, 8 bomber regiments, 1 fighter regiment, six army aviation (helos) brigades. Each Ground Forces combined arms army will have mixed aviation division/brigade of 80-100 helos. /20

But these plans - bigger units more people --don’t make a lot of sense for Russia’s new reality. With losses of personnel, equipment, and a loss of trust more broadly, they will struggle to make these plans a reality. /21

TL:DR: these plans are not based on Russia's reality and a lot of folks on the Arbat have a little too much Soviet nostalgia and can't face what has happened on their watch. /end