I've returned from a research trip to Ukraine, where I met many people in Kyiv and along the frontlines. They are brave and kind in ways that words fail to capture. The situation is serious and urgent for many reasons. I share my thoughts in the thread below. /1
As officials and others have already said publicly, Ukraine is facing a shortage of manpower - infantry in particular. Mobilization has not brought relief for many reasons. More impacts in the story below. /2 ft.com/content/adbef9…

Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇 carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/… My report discusses why an increase to the standing army’s size by 30% to 1.5 million, simultaneous to a sweeping procurement program, would require a significant reordering of Russia’s economy and labor market beyond where it is now- the Kremlin has not wanted to do that so far.

A brief 🧵about updates and observations about Russian forces' response in Kursk and Russian operations in Donetsk near Pokrovsk. I start by including guidance from Admiral Stockdale, as it's been meaningful to me in my analytic practice, perhaps others will find it helpful too. Since this thread, Russia has set up a command structure for Kursk. It's been declared a "counter-terrorist operation) and Defmin Belousov set up a "coordination council" that meets every day and named Yunis-Bek Yevkurov as the deputy./2

https://x.com/MassDara/status/1823058780537733306

Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵 Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2

Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1 First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2

Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇

https://twitter.com/archer83able/status/1788878878607282435?s=46

Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…

Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1

https://twitter.com/Aviation_Intel/status/1785781845814329765

Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.

The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵 First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2

More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1

https://twitter.com/massdara/status/1601206618825203713

“Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2

I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/

https://twitter.com/mike_eckel/status/1770495261770391938

In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2

Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change. @CarnegieEndow 1/4

These graphics are designed to inform the debate on how the battlefield could degrade if current challenges are not addressed soon.

They are not traditional warning products, but can be used to inform that process. (2/4)

If Ukrainian ammunition and manpower needs are not met, its battlefield position will continue to worsen before reaching a tipping point, possibly by this summer. This is no time for despair; it’s time for urgent action. My latest below⁩ and a brief 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-r… To create an effective strategy that capitalizes on Russia’s weaknesses, Western policymakers + observers need to see the Russian military for what it is: not the hapless, broken, depleted force that many wished it would be by now but a dangerous organization advancing in Ukraine

A thread on Avdiivka, what it its loss says about Russian strategy and capabilities, and what they may try to do next. /1 At Avdiivka, multiple Russian brigade and regiment elements attacked intensely for five months. They gained 31 kilometers for an estimated cost of over 600 armored vehicles @naalsio. /2

https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1758670525499367570?s=20

One year ago today Gerasimov took back command. As an experiment, what specifically has he done well? Shoygu+ Kremlin secured foreign weapons. Surovikin's C2 structure + defense lines held, Teplinsky tightened them up. Chemezov turned crank on industry.... And Gerasimov? /1

https://twitter.com/MassDara/status/1613249592287453194

What are Gerasimov’s specific contributions as commander in chief of this war since Feb 2023? C2 structure and defensive lines and many tactical modifications were inherited from Surovikin. VKS experimentation accelerated under Afzalov’s command but was in place before. /2

Russia launched missiles from the DPRK up to 460km inside Ukraine, according to declassified intelligence (assessments for other launches are ongoing). A few thoughts. /1

https://twitter.com/john_hudson/status/1742976043307131292

Looking at that 460km range, when the max for that system is 900km (per John Kirby), I have some working theories on Russian thinking on precedents or “norms” for externally provided missile use, but I will wait to see what else is released. /2

This is a good chronology and summary of today’s missile attacks on Ukraine, h/t ⁦@JanR210⁩. Russian forces continue experimenting with missile arrival times, routes, & launch profiles in an attempt to overwhelm missile defenses in Kyiv. /1 war.obozrevatel.com/kovalenko-ross… I share the view that Russia has been preparing these strikes for some time— their targeting cycle is still slow and they’ve pooledresources for months. be skeptical of any suggestions this was a “retaliation for Belgorod” or similar, that would only be a Russian PR claim. /2

For those in town making choices on security assistance to Ukraine, if you need more reasons, then I have a warning to share with you about the Kremlin. I feel that I have a duty to warn. /1 The Kremlin is starting to gloat that it is beating us – the west. If they feel like they can win by outlasting the political will of the United States and Europe about Ukraine, they will become much worse in the years to come, cocky and partially reconstituted. /2

Russia's Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev made remarks today about economic mobilization while in the Central Federal District (green below). It's important to read his speech in context. Most of it was about securing sites from drone attacks and preventing sabotage /1 Patrushev claimed Russia has dealt with "8,000 attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces" in border regions Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod. Note: these districts have been under increased restrictions for over a year. (think of their status like martial law ultra-lite)/2

A few observations about Russian forces in recent weeks that I'm watching: improvements to targeting, continued assaults on Avdiivka, possible missile hoarding, and new loitering munitions. /1 Last week, Russian forces used an Iskandr SRBM missile to target the UAF 128th Brigade and potential CP during an award ceremony, killing experienced artillery teams. /2

It appears that the Russians may be losing multiple brigade elements from the 2nd CAA and DNR forces in their assault on Avdiivka. Gerasimov strikes again, this time with no pushback on his bad ideas (so far). Yet there are some troubling issues to consider. A thread. (/1) If you’ve followed me for a while, you know that I don’t give Gerasimov’s command in this war high marks, to say the least. /2

https://twitter.com/massdara/status/1613249626538389504

Excellent geospatial analysis from @OSIA_RUSI, identifying one location for DPRK-supplied weapons (most likely artillery shells) to Russia. A thread with a few thoughts. 1: This facility is beyond missile strike range for UAF but not drone range.

https://twitter.com/rusi_org/status/1713861846002721236

2: The modifications made at this facility are small vehicle-sized berms that are not standard for artillery storage facilities farther east in Russia. But still safer than throwing it in a pile with a barbed wire fence, like they did in field depots in 2014-2015 in the Donbas.