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Dara Massicot Profile picture
Dara Massicot
@MassDara
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia and Eurasia Program, focusing on defense issues in Russia. Opinions mine RTs not endorsements.
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May 12 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1 Image First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
May 10 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇
Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…
May 2 • 9 tweets • 4 min read
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
Image Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.
Apr 29 • 17 tweets • 5 min read
The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵 First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2
Mar 29 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1 “Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2
Mar 21 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/ In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2
Mar 19 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change. @CarnegieEndow 1/4
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Image These graphics are designed to inform the debate on how the battlefield could degrade if current challenges are not addressed soon.

They are not traditional warning products, but can be used to inform that process. (2/4)
Mar 8 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
If Ukrainian ammunition and manpower needs are not met, its battlefield position will continue to worsen before reaching a tipping point, possibly by this summer. This is no time for despair; it’s time for urgent action. My latest below⁩ and a brief 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-r… To create an effective strategy that capitalizes on Russia’s weaknesses, Western policymakers + observers need to see the Russian military for what it is: not the hapless, broken, depleted force that many wished it would be by now but a dangerous organization advancing in Ukraine
Feb 20 • 25 tweets • 6 min read
A thread on Avdiivka, what it its loss says about Russian strategy and capabilities, and what they may try to do next. /1 Image At Avdiivka, multiple Russian brigade and regiment elements attacked intensely for five months. They gained 31 kilometers for an estimated cost of over 600 armored vehicles @naalsio. /2
Jan 12 • 20 tweets • 4 min read
One year ago today Gerasimov took back command. As an experiment, what specifically has he done well? Shoygu+ Kremlin secured foreign weapons. Surovikin's C2 structure + defense lines held, Teplinsky tightened them up. Chemezov turned crank on industry.... And Gerasimov? /1 What are Gerasimov’s specific contributions as commander in chief of this war since Feb 2023? C2 structure and defensive lines and many tactical modifications were inherited from Surovikin. VKS experimentation accelerated under Afzalov’s command but was in place before. /2
Jan 4 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Russia launched missiles from the DPRK up to 460km inside Ukraine, according to declassified intelligence (assessments for other launches are ongoing). A few thoughts. /1 Looking at that 460km range, when the max for that system is 900km (per John Kirby), I have some working theories on Russian thinking on precedents or “norms” for externally provided missile use, but I will wait to see what else is released. /2
Jan 2 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
This is a good chronology and summary of today’s missile attacks on Ukraine, h/t ⁦@JanR210⁩. Russian forces continue experimenting with missile arrival times, routes, & launch profiles in an attempt to overwhelm missile defenses in Kyiv. /1 war.obozrevatel.com/kovalenko-ross… I share the view that Russia has been preparing these strikes for some time— their targeting cycle is still slow and they’ve pooledresources for months. be skeptical of any suggestions this was a “retaliation for Belgorod” or similar, that would only be a Russian PR claim. /2
Dec 11, 2023 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
For those in town making choices on security assistance to Ukraine, if you need more reasons, then I have a warning to share with you about the Kremlin. I feel that I have a duty to warn. /1 The Kremlin is starting to gloat that it is beating us – the west. If they feel like they can win by outlasting the political will of the United States and Europe about Ukraine, they will become much worse in the years to come, cocky and partially reconstituted. /2
Nov 16, 2023 • 17 tweets • 3 min read
Russia's Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev made remarks today about economic mobilization while in the Central Federal District (green below). It's important to read his speech in context. Most of it was about securing sites from drone attacks and preventing sabotage /1 Image Patrushev claimed Russia has dealt with "8,000 attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces" in border regions Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod. Note: these districts have been under increased restrictions for over a year. (think of their status like martial law ultra-lite)/2
Nov 9, 2023 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
A few observations about Russian forces in recent weeks that I'm watching: improvements to targeting, continued assaults on Avdiivka, possible missile hoarding, and new loitering munitions. /1 Last week, Russian forces used an Iskandr SRBM missile to target the UAF 128th Brigade and potential CP during an award ceremony, killing experienced artillery teams. /2 Image
Oct 23, 2023 • 22 tweets • 6 min read
It appears that the Russians may be losing multiple brigade elements from the 2nd CAA and DNR forces in their assault on Avdiivka. Gerasimov strikes again, this time with no pushback on his bad ideas (so far). Yet there are some troubling issues to consider. A thread. (/1) Image If you’ve followed me for a while, you know that I don’t give Gerasimov’s command in this war high marks, to say the least. /2
Oct 16, 2023 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
Excellent geospatial analysis from @OSIA_RUSI, identifying one location for DPRK-supplied weapons (most likely artillery shells) to Russia. A thread with a few thoughts. 1: This facility is beyond missile strike range for UAF but not drone range. 2: The modifications made at this facility are small vehicle-sized berms that are not standard for artillery storage facilities farther east in Russia. But still safer than throwing it in a pile with a barbed wire fence, like they did in field depots in 2014-2015 in the Donbas. Image
Sep 21, 2023 • 12 tweets • 4 min read
This is the first September in 15 years that the Russian military has not conducted a large-scale military exercise. ZAPAD-2023 was cancelled after it was announced. Most Russian military exercises are disrupted this year as a result of strain and war in Ukraine. A brief thread:
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Image The biggest cancellation was ZAPAD-2023, announced by MOD in December 22 then cancelled. It would have involved multiple military districts. When asked about why this fall, Defmin Shoigu had this to say: "this year we have training in Ukraine". Meaning, /2 Image
Sep 18, 2023 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
There’s a few ways to interpret this: the VDV is being used to shore up worn out 58th Army units that have been engaging UAF brigades for months and add new challenges to UAF’s main attack. Also, that Russia may not have other skilled units ready for that task. (/1) Side note: these are the same 58th Army units that Popov warned were at the breaking point months ago and got exiled in Syria for leaked audio criticizing Gerasimov’s bad leadership. Those units have been backstopped by other units a few times before this current rotation /2
Sep 5, 2023 • 23 tweets • 5 min read
A photo of Surovikin and his wife has emerged. A thread on the choppy information about him, which is more telling, and some implications for the state of Russian military leadership and the war effort. /1 Image About this photo. That is them. The uncropped version shows that he is not walking down a street, but probably in a courtyard of some kind. I don’t know when or where this is and that’s not really the point: the point is that he is shown, not in prison, and with family. /4 Image
Jul 21, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Good that he’s locked up. Russia didn’t arrest him for his role in the shooting down of a civilian flight (MH-17) or war crimes as their proxy commander in 2014. But pointing out flaws in the war and making a band of misfits to do it? He’s done. Kremlin wants no more critiques./ Girkin was found guilty of command responsibility by Dutch courts for the SA-11 strike that downed Mh-17 and killed 298 people. 2/3 theguardian.com/world/2022/nov…