Regarding drones entering Poland last night: the event is serious and requires a muscular response, otherwise Russian carelessness and provocations will continue. A brief thread on flight paths+ the behavior of Russia/Belarus since this event and what it reveals /1 Flight path: after the pink line (mine), Gerbera and other drones from two northern routes veer in multiple directions into Poland. Launch routes to the south continue to their targets. /2

For the second time, Russia finds itself with few military options to support a critical partner in the Middle East. This thread explains Russia’s military options and limitations for supporting Iran before, during, and after this conflict. /1 Note: this thread doesn't delve into the political balancing Russia engages in across the Middle East, which informs their choices. Here, I address Russian military and defense base capacity and how it shapes options. /2

It’s official- the new commander of the Russian ground forces is Mordvichev. Previously op group center commander (Donetsk front & longest in post as op group commander). It signals a few things about the next phase for the Russian army 🧵 /1 Mordvichev’s appointment to Ground Forces commander is a signal that the military intends to integrate experience from the war in Ukraine. This position is responsible for force posture/employment, training, readiness and other roles critical for reconstituting the army. /2

Russia did not call off a large drone attack last night within ten minutes of the presidents’ call, and 100+ drones were launched last night from 1900 (when call ended) until after midnight Moscow time. We can step through this with basic timelines and calculations. /1

https://twitter.com/mike_eckel/status/1902314547270017034

We know Shaheds speeds, launch sites thanks to various monitors, we know general routes, and what time they impacted cities last night. (Older image below for reference). /2

On the operational impact of US aid suspension to Ukraine: frontline stability for the AFU rests on effective drone and artillery use. The timeline below is a gradual degradation and not off/on switch. The suspension will have other problems for soldier morale and operations. /1

https://twitter.com/christopherjm/status/1896918979828125993

Morale: Ukrainian forces are undermanned already, and this problem is unresolved. Desertions, recruiting, soldiers going AWOL for a few weeks to recover, are known problems. Suspension of aid and simultaneous rapprochement with Russia worsens these problems /2

Pausing to reflect, I've now worked 20 years in DC. 20 years on the Russian military. 5 U.S. administrations and 4 Russian wars. What a time it has been. A brief thread of gratitude to those I've met on the way. /1
To friends and colleagues from the Pentagon and the shadows: as we said back then, if they made a movie about things we've seen with our own eyes, no one would believe it. Pacing the Pentagon courtyard at dawn and late night, windows all lit up, I was proud to be part of it. /2

There are many rumors that Russia is evacuating its bases at Tartus and Khmeimim in Syria, but most assets remain there. If evacuation happens, it will be obvious. A brief thread on what is happening now and what future moves would look like. 🧵 As of 7 December, most of Russia’s ships are in or near port in Tartus. Follow @KaptainLOMA for updates on their presence.

https://x.com/KaptainLOMA/status/1865421769806430310

One of Russia’s top priorities in Syria is maintaining base access. Syria is a critical waypoint for Russian activities elsewhere in the region. Watch for signs that PMCs are redeploying to Syria. By now, Russia probably has made its assessments and is executing plans. (1/3) Z channels lament the loss of experienced commanders like Surovikin/Prigozhin. Surovikin has been tapped before to address hard problems like this and received awards for his Syrian command (old photo). There are politics involved now, Gerasimov tapped in Chaiko. Let’s see. (2/3)

I've returned from a research trip to Ukraine, where I met many people in Kyiv and along the frontlines. They are brave and kind in ways that words fail to capture. The situation is serious and urgent for many reasons. I share my thoughts in the thread below. /1
As officials and others have already said publicly, Ukraine is facing a shortage of manpower - infantry in particular. Mobilization has not brought relief for many reasons. More impacts in the story below. /2 ft.com/content/adbef9…

Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇 carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/… My report discusses why an increase to the standing army’s size by 30% to 1.5 million, simultaneous to a sweeping procurement program, would require a significant reordering of Russia’s economy and labor market beyond where it is now- the Kremlin has not wanted to do that so far.

A brief 🧵about updates and observations about Russian forces' response in Kursk and Russian operations in Donetsk near Pokrovsk. I start by including guidance from Admiral Stockdale, as it's been meaningful to me in my analytic practice, perhaps others will find it helpful too. Since this thread, Russia has set up a command structure for Kursk. It's been declared a "counter-terrorist operation) and Defmin Belousov set up a "coordination council" that meets every day and named Yunis-Bek Yevkurov as the deputy./2

https://x.com/MassDara/status/1823058780537733306

Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵 Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2

Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1 First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2

Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇

https://twitter.com/archer83able/status/1788878878607282435?s=46

Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…

Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1

https://twitter.com/Aviation_Intel/status/1785781845814329765

Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.

The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵 First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2

More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1

https://twitter.com/massdara/status/1601206618825203713

“Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2

I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/

https://twitter.com/mike_eckel/status/1770495261770391938

In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2

Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change. @CarnegieEndow 1/4

These graphics are designed to inform the debate on how the battlefield could degrade if current challenges are not addressed soon.

They are not traditional warning products, but can be used to inform that process. (2/4)

If Ukrainian ammunition and manpower needs are not met, its battlefield position will continue to worsen before reaching a tipping point, possibly by this summer. This is no time for despair; it’s time for urgent action. My latest below⁩ and a brief 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-r… To create an effective strategy that capitalizes on Russia’s weaknesses, Western policymakers + observers need to see the Russian military for what it is: not the hapless, broken, depleted force that many wished it would be by now but a dangerous organization advancing in Ukraine

A thread on Avdiivka, what it its loss says about Russian strategy and capabilities, and what they may try to do next. /1 At Avdiivka, multiple Russian brigade and regiment elements attacked intensely for five months. They gained 31 kilometers for an estimated cost of over 600 armored vehicles @naalsio. /2

https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1758670525499367570?s=20