Thread by @randymot4

UKRAINE VICTORY: 1/22
Much of the opposition to US aid to Ukraine stems from the notion that this will be an "endless war." This is a mistaken notion caught up in the current state of the front, but at odds will the experts view of the rest of the year./1

Russia sent in its professional army in February and March 2022. They got bogged down and mauled. Putin had previously moved from conscription to professionla military to try to improve its performance. This did not achieve its objective by any measure./2
sofrep.com/news/these-are…

The first big evidence is the sorry state of the Russian army (90% of which is committed to the war at this point. New big Russian offense turned out to be throwing more poorly trained conscripts into the battle, where they were slaughtered in large numbers./3

The recent desperate effort to take Bakhmut has resulted in RF casualty rates going up to the level they experienced in the early months of the war. After committing a major share of its forces for months to try to cut off the city, Russia has failed./4
tvpworld.com/68584569/bakhm…

The 155th Naval Infantry was supposedly one of Russia's best remaining units. But it has had 250% turnover & was largely raw conscripts when it was humiliated in Vuledar - exhibiting every aspect of an untrained unit./5
wsj.com/video/series/n…

This is representative of the state of the Russian army at this juncture. From 50% to 70% of its professional soldiers have been killed or otherwise taken out of the war. Both mobilizations have failed./6

Every mobilization in Russia produces a lower quality of soldier that is less well-equipped. The Russian goal of a ceasefire or lengthy peace discussions is to create time to train and equip essentially a "replacement army" for the one lost in Ukraine./7

The problem is not so easily addressed by time, since Russia has a huge problem replacing its "modern" equipment due to sanctions. This shows up in several ways, including the deployment of 50-60 year equipment from storage./8
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/r…

Experts estimate that Russian can only replace one out of ten tank losses and the replacements do not use their more modern feautres./9
finance.yahoo.com/news/russia-ca…

“They’re producing and reactivating nowhere near enough to compensate for those loss rates. Their current armoured fleet at the front is about half the size it was at the start of the war,” Henry Boyd, research fellow at the IISS, told Reuters (Feb 15th)./10

Ukrainians are equipped & training w/ NATO modern vehicles. Very soon UKR will have three brigades of modern mechanized forces in addition to its well-trained veteran infantry now holding the Russians at bay./11
english.elpais.com/international/…

While UKR will receive older versions of NATO tanks/IFVs, the effect will be much like the US forces fighting similar equipment of the Iraqi Repiublican Guard. 73 Easting battle is famous and could be replicated in UKR./12

The impression of the war as stagnant is soley because of the weather that requires vehicles to use only the roads. As the mud dries out, everyone expects a new UKR offense - full of surprises- to dislodge the Russians./13

The Russian defense is spread out of many hundreds of miles and is under-manned. UKR will have every modern device to blow thru that defense./14

"“Manning Russian frontline fortifications with these less effective, less organized, and poorly equipped and supplied personnel could lead to them collapsing or falling back faster than Russian military leadership may have planned,"/15 understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…

General Keane, who has been more accurate than most in his estimates from the beginning of the war, predicted that the Russian defense could not stop the UKR offense. See e.g. 73 Easting./16

UKR objectives will be to cut-off Crimea and to exploit deep penetration of the Russian lines. There are systemic reasons why the Russians have been struggling in a war that many thought would be brief & decisive./17

UKR has been equipped with not only the combat vehicles, but mine-cleanign vehicles and specialized engineering eqpt to cross trenches. UKR only needs to breech a handful on spots on the extended line./18
newsweek.com/russia-second-…

Russian failures in training, equipment, coordination, adaption, tactical awareness, and commiunication between units will decide the battle. I agree with General Ben Hodges, former NATO commander:/19

Zelensky has asked for more artillery assets before the offensse begins. Those will be forthcoming from NATO and only the breakdown of will in the West (totally likely) will stop the spirng offense./20

MOD Estonia:
"We have to understand that when the front door is open, then everybody is vulnerable inside the house. When the front door is locked, then everybody can feel safe inside the house. So this is why we have to keep the front door of NATO protected."/21

The frontline NATO allies who understand the htreat better than anyone have followed their words with action./22