Thread by @hillai

I hacked into a @bing CMS that allowed me to alter search results and take over millions of @Office365 accounts.
How did I do it? Well, it all started with a simple click in @Azure… 👀
This is the story of #BingBang 🧵⬇️

My research started when our Research Team at @wiz_io first noticed a strange configuration in Azure. A single checkbox is all that separates an app from becoming “multi-tenant” – which by default, allows ALL USERS to log in.

I found a Microsoft app configured like this, and… just logged in 🤷🏻‍♂️
My user was immediately granted access to this “Bing Trivia” page. Don’t let the name fool you – it controls much more than just trivia. In fact, as I came to find out, it can control ACTUAL SEARCH RESULTS 🤯

I started looking around to realize the app’s purpose and why I had access. I then found a section that contained some keywords and corresponding search results, which raised the question – could this app actually modify search results on Bing.com? 🔎

I tested this theory by selecting the “best soundtracks” keyword and switching the first result from “Dune (2021)” to my personal favorite, “Hackers (1995)”. I was surprised to see this result immediately appear on Bing.com!

I then checked for XSS viability, by adding a harmless payload into my new result. I refreshed the page, and my payload successfully executed! I quickly reverted my changes and reported everything to Microsoft, but one question remained on my mind – what can I do with this XSS?

When inspecting Bing requests, I noticed an endpoint being used for Office 365 communications. As it turns out, Bing is allowed to issue Office tokens for any logged-on user. I quickly crafted an XSS payload utilizing this functionality, tested it on myself, and it worked!

With this token, an attacker could fetch:

Outlook emails ✉️
Calendars 📅
Teams messages 💬
SharePoint documents 📄
OneDrive files 📁
And more, from any Bing user!

Here you can see my personal inbox being read on our “attacker machine”, using the exfiltrated Bing token:

@msftsecresponse quickly responded to our report, fixed the vulnerable applications, and introduced some AAD product and guidance changes to help customers mitigate this issue. For this, they awarded us with $40,000 bug bounty, which we will donate 💸

Read the full technical details here >>
wiz.io/blog/azure-act…

Check out our full attack flow here >>

Thank you to everyone who joined the discussion!

If you're interested in how we found this app, check out @shirtamari's thread: