Thread by @JKleinschmidtIR

So, time to write my own thread on the case of Viacheslav #Morozov. Though I can't add much to the things already said by colleagues who knew him better, IR scholars might use this case to reflect on some important issues. 1/
theguardian.com/world/2024/jan…

I first met him in 2019, when I already had read and cited some of his work, which struck me as creative and relevant for my own research. Sharing an interest in current approaches in international historical sociology, we often participated in the same section at conferences. 2/

We went to conference dinners twice. He was an agreeable person, with whom I only discussed theoretical topics, AFAIR. From his writings, I got the impression that he was critical of #Putin, but also shared some of the chauvinistic attitudes common among liberal Russians. 3/

Other colleagues have had more pronounced disagreements with his work.
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Ultimately, the question of his individual character and politics are close to irrelevant to the question of whether or why he became a spy for Russia. The below article sums it up: It is a story of systemic cruelty.

5/ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/12008…

Russian services will use any method to coerce individuals into their schemes, e.g. kompromat or threats of violence against next of kin. Regular travel to Russia is therefore, unfortunately, a real counterintelligence risk. @KuldkeppMart gets it right:
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At the same time, we need to understand that International Relations as an academic field is of great relevance to the intelligence services of autocratic states. This has several reasons: IR academics often have useful contacts in government or military circles, and...
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...academic or think tank events allow operators to approach potential target persons without generating suspicion. Also, IR scholars often train students who will become the next generation of political leaders, military officers, or intelligence officials.
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In this context, it is important to know that Russian intelligence services are very large organizations, which often recruit potential spies according to their potential, not according to their current position. This article has some details:

9/euromaidanpress.com/2023/12/01/you…

The history of the Cambridge Five is a good reminder of the relevance that academia may have for intelligence activities, and how Russian services recruit "hopefuls" according to their career prospects:
10/independent.co.uk/news/people/ne…

This is also why for me, Viacheslav was the second encounter with a Russian spy (that I am currently aware of). The first had a cover as an Embassy Secretary at the Russian Embassy in #Bogotá, #Colombia, where I then worked as a professor of IR. He showed up at an academic...
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...event on Russian military issues that I was participating in (not an implausible event to show up at for a Russian "diplomat"). He asked a question that was remarkably neutral in the face of the strong criticism of Russian positions that had been voiced at the event.
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He left before the social component of the event had concluded, so his presence may only have served as part of his cover as a diplomat. Some time later, he and another Russian were declared persona non grata for espionage:

13/eltiempo.com/politica/gobie…

I remember thinking then that his ill-fitting suit made him look more like a bouncer at an Omsk night club rather than a diplomat... Here's more details about Russian espionage in Colombia, including the diplomat who turned out to be a GRU operator:

14/financecolombia.com/caught-red-han…

Here's more in Spanish. Apparently, they were collecting intelligence on critical energy infrastructure, and may have attracted attention when they started traveling to marginalized areas of Bogotá in expensive cars, which no Colombian would ever do.

15/elespectador.com/mundo/mas-pais…

This demonstrates two important facts that scholars should know:
1) Someone may be driven to become a spy for autocratic countries irrespective of their personal qualities.
2) Academia, and IR specifically, is an important operating environment for intelligence services.
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Here's some other threads that contain useful lessons regarding the case:
@michaeldweiss has a fascinating thread on #Estonian #counterintelligence:
x.com/michaeldweiss/…
@EHunterChristie with more thoughts on the case and on rule of law in Estonia:
x.com/EHunterChristi…
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@Horbyk with more thoughts on espionage and academia: x.com/Horbyk/status/…
@MattLightCrim with excellent thoughts on Russian espionage in academia, and on what scholars might want to do: x.com/MattLightCrim/…
@OTsekhanovska on the same issue:
x.com/OTsekhanovska/…
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And here is @IlvesToomas on another personal experience with Soviet spies:

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Finally, I'd like to add that of course, Viacheslav Morozov is innocent until proven guilty.
I hope he will be able to clear his name.
I also have complete confidence that the Estonian judicial authorities will proceed with the high standards that they are known for.
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Given the current geopolitical climate, I'd say we should calmly reflect on how we, as a scholarly community, can become a harder target for the intelligence services of autocratic countries.
If you have suggestions to that end, I'm open to participate in any activities.
21/END