Thread by @Wood_House76

In contrast to the government narrative - and popular belief - New York City ambulance data show people were NOT avoiding healthcare and were calling 9-1-1- for medical help.

Oddly, dispatches rose AFTER the Feds said "15 Days to Slow the Spread."

🧵

Meanwhile, in Chicago, calls to EMS did NOT spike - they dropped a bit and stayed within a "normal" range.

Are we to believe that New Yorkers are THAT much more intense than Chicagoans -- and that Trump's announcement had a differential impact?

🤔

I was living in Cook County at the time, in south Evanston - mere blocks from the Chicago border.

Tension was high.

I've also spent a good amount of time in NYC (for work and on personal trips).

This difference doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

Despite the increase in total NYC ambulance dispatches, dispatches that transported patients (e.g., to the hospital) were initially normal and then went DOWN, not up.

Orders to EMTs show urging to keep patients away from "overwhelmed" hospitals. cc: @snorman1776

It's a truly bizarre picture in during a "spread" emergency:

🚩Ambulance dispatches UP
🚩Emergency Department visits DOWN
🚩Ambulances transporting patients DOWN

And no "signal" until 15 Days to Slow the Spread

cc: @jeffreyatucker do you see this?

A good portion of the dispatch rise were dispatches which "ended" in Refused Medical Aid (RMA)

Calls by type & severity level suggest that some of these calls were "worried well"

Many others were not.

Nearly 20,000 of the RMA calls were coded as severe in nature (severity code 1 or 2).

It makes no sense that New Yorkers with severe medical issues (or their loved ones or bystanders) called 9-1-1 and then refused treatment & transportation* to a hospital.

*Treated & Transport and Treated, Not Transported are both different dispatch codes in the dataset.

“Medical aid”  could have taken on additional meanings with successive orders issued to EMS.

For instance, if a patient refused a breath-actuated nebulizer (March 6) or surgical mask (March 17), or resisted use of an alternative airway (March 20), it may have been grounds to code the dispatch as RMA.

A March 27 bulletin from FDNY loosened oversight for RMAs, including in instances where the patient had received medication or was at high risk of severe outcome.

Such an allowance being made for patients in need of a hospital during an emergency is troubling.

Some anecdotal evidence raises the question of whether - in some cases - it was first responders who refused medical aid when it should have been given.

Not far from the city, in northern New Jersey, paramedics reportedly refused to take a man with liver condition to the hospital and relented under pressure from the man’s wife when they came back a second time. michaelsimonson.medium.com/covid-isnt-the… @msimonson19

Similar instances were documented nearby. nytimes.com/2020/04/01/hea…

Back to the data...

The city's massive rise is Home deaths is corroborated by ambulances dispatches that ended in the patient being pronounced dead on the scene (PD).

Note: There is NOTHING going on with PD before "15 days" is announced.

SUPER DUPER SUS 🚩🚩🚩🚩

If we overlay PD dispatches with daily NYC deaths occurring at Home, we again see nothing happening until "15 Days" - and then a trend reversal.

What. In the World. Was Happening?

And Why?

Are these data a real-time representation?

Much of the initial spike in dispatches pronounced dead is cardiac arrest calls

THIS is the OG #DiedSuddenly event that NO ONE is talking about....

Ain't no way this is SARS-CoV-2 or panic.

Note the trend stays elevated after the jarring drop.

For me, this is one of the most disturbing views of key data.

What triggered - and contributed to - that cardiac arrest event?

A permitted/intentional release of carfentanil-charged drugs & medications?

EMT withholding lifesaving measures?

Both? Something else?

Call data from an FDNY study show a drop in psych-drug calls concurrent to the cardiac arrest calls in the first month of [what the authors refer to as ]the COVID-19 period 🤔

Not only is that strange, it's also one reason I've speculated that the alt meaning of the O in COVID = "opioid"

A different study with some of the same FDNY authors that's focused on OHCA (& uses March 1 - April 25 🤔) shows a 180%+ increase in patients dead on ambulance arrival and 257% increase in failed resuscitations.

WHAT HAPPENED HERE????

This was also the period during which the Medical Examiner was "too overwhelmed" to conduct a baseline number of autopsies on deaths occurring at Home

I don't see that being a DeBlasio or Cuomo or OCME decision in actuality. 🚩

Paging the Feds...

Not only did the number of autopsies conducted on deaths at home drop, the number of Autopsy Unknown increased.

The Cook County (Chicago) ME seemed to do just fine....

As I told @HousatonicLive on his show, Chicago also didn't see a sudden or massive spike in heart-related deaths at home.

Where's the federal inquiry? @SenRonJohnson @SenRand

@HousatonicLive @SenRonJohnson @SenRand Does COVID-19 mean something more - or something different for NYC spring 2020 - than we've been told?

Sudden COVID-19 death at home is suspicious no matter what.

But how were 40% of Home Deaths blamed on COVID-19 in the first six weeks of the "emergency" in NYC? 🚩

Does SARS-CoV-2 infection increase the chances of cardiac arrests presenting in asystole?

Was there a lightning strike?

Is there another explanation that doesn't involve cocaine, fentanyl, drug poisoning, etc?

MSM reported at the time that the National Guard was retrieving human remains in teams of 2 Guardsmen and an ME staffer washingtonpost.com/national-secur…

NG press release later said the Guard "helped retrieve the remains of 2,822 New Yorkers from homes and facilities."

[Homes where? Which facilities? Retrieved over what timeframe?]
nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2…

In summary....

U.S. government narrative & popular perceptions around the NYC home death event are contradicted by city and federal data.

You can find the info I've posted - and a link to my discussion with @HousatonicLive about it -- here: woodhouse76.com/p/did-strategi…

@HousatonicLive Contemporaneous reports are very strange.

One example

UPDATE: I realized there is another Cardiac Arrest call type in the EMS Incident dataset: ARREST FC (Cardiac Arrest [with Fever/Cough].

Adding those pronounced dead dispatches to the Pronounced Dead ARREST dispatches increases the magnitude of the cardiac arrest event.

@HousatonicLive It also extends the duration of the cardiac arrest event


Consistent with the pre-March 16 baseline, most Pronounced Dead dispatches were classified the final call type as cardiac arrest

cc: @Halgrenj @jengleruk woodhouse76.com/p/did-strategi…

The argument that New York City's home death event is largely attributable to sudden panic/fear on the part of the populace is (for me) unpersuasive for three reasons:

1) New Yorkers are intense but this ⬇️ much more intense than Chicagoans? Really?

2) The timeline suggests the event "trigger" was DJT declaring 15 Days to Slow the Spread. Why would that announcement have a sudden - and differential - impact on New York vs Chicago?

3) I don't dispute that panic/fear can or did have deadly consequences (e.g., Broken Heart syndrome)- especially for the elderly and those already in poor health. Indeed, I made that argument in @PanData19 presentations last year.

But I would expect to see such fear manifest itself more gradually in the data. NYC announced its first case on March 1, 2020. So, that announcement didn't increase fear but "15 Days" sent people into cardiac arrest? That doesn't make sense to me.
x.com/Wood_House76/s…

Manhattan was apparently following the Chicago plan...

Interesting difference between total daily dispatches in that borough vs the other four.

Staten Island didn't rise as much as Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx.

Is water protective?

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