Thread by @TrentTelenko

This is a "flaming datum" for the Lanchester Square Collapse of Russian national air defenses.

And it wasn't just 20 drones flying by.

Lanchester smiles at RuAF National Air Defenses🧵
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It was 80.

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And a high percentage of this Ukrainian propeller cruise missile stream hit their intended targets.

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Hundreds of American HARM anti-radiation and GMLRS missiles have been fired by Ukraine at Russian Buk, S-300 & S-400 batteries in occupied territories for over two years.

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Russia has systematically stripped Syria and it's national air defenses to feed into the high tech meat grinder that is occupied Ukraine because of it's below replacement rate air defense missile system production.


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Russia has been borrowing from its national air defense "Peter" to pay the occupied territories logistical "Paul" to replace the losses from the 18(+) months long Ukrainian PSU suppression of air defense (SEAD) campaign.

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So "Peter" - Russian national air defense - are bankrupt in the face of Ukraine's accumulated Shahed-136 class drones.

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We are now here (⬇️) in terms of Russian national air defense versus Ukrainian strategic bombardment with propeller cruise missiles.

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While Ukraine has been adapting to Shahed-136 assault drone attacks with it's mobile anti-aircraft gun and shoulder fired missile territorial defense groups, jamming and 5,000 plus smartphone sonic sensor network.

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Ukraine has also been analyzing Russian Shahed attacks and feeding them to an element inside the Ukrainian military like the Standoff Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at Barksdale AFB.

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8af.af.mil/Units/Standoff…

SMAC does evasive radar routing for integrated cross-service standoff munition attack profiles for all the US Military services when facing high end "Anti-Access Area Defense (A2AD) threats.

I did a 🧵on them in March 2022 on Pres Trump's 2018 Syrian missile strikes.

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This sort of missile route planning is downstream from digital mapping and "geospatial intelligence."

Much has happened since 10/2018 & A.I. is here.

That Ukraine has developed its own "SMAC" for attacks on Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, etc. is a given.

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Another given is that Russia will not be able to copy the Ukrainian mobile territorial defense forces gun-based anti-aircraft groups.

The Russian Federation simply lacks an improved road network dense enough to copy the Ukrainian TDF "Anti-aircraft technical" solution.

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Air Defense penetrating mission planning software has been around for decades via the late 1980's era F-117.

Western military analysts only began appreciating the spread of this software to drones in 2020 during the Azeri-Armenian War.

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The combination of low Russian improved road network density and AFU drone mission planning software means Ukrainian propeller cruise missiles/assault drone streams can be routed away from improved roads.

The next Russian mud season will be...interesting...for Russia.👿

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I did an open source 🧵almost 4 years ago in Oct 2020 on X/Twitter explaining much of this.

In 2024, we are two complete drone-computer technology generations from the Azeri-Armenian War.

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Ukraine's propelled cruise missile/assault drone strategic bombing campaign is now in the process of teaching the world what those two generations of advancement means on Russia's industrial and logistical infrastructure.

"Escalation Management" be damned.

17/17 End

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