Popasna is a north-south & east-west rail switching yard.
Russia's drive into Popasna marked a changed operational pattern by the Russian Army in Donbas. The changed pattern was the Russian Army had sufficient artillery ammunition tonnage to make headway against Ukrainian
May 17 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
If true, this UK Guardian article is seriously important at the political-military level.🧵
Putin is playing troop commander instead of President of the Russian Federation.
1. Putin is not doing his job as President. 2. Putin is not paying attention to his own personal security. 3. Putin is preventing competent Russian military commanders from doing anything right.
May 17 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
@TheStudyofWar The Russian lack of infantry dismounts in their heavily mechanized & "Ghost Soldier" ridden Motor-Rifle Regiments means they cannot hold back wide front Ukrainian infantry infiltration that has superior Western night vision gear.
In the day the Ukrainians use drones to spot
1/@TheStudyofWar ...Russian AFV check points. Then at night the Ukrainians infiltrate where Russians are not.
Then the next day Ukrainian infantry use drone directed artillery to kill the check points. Thus forcing Russian vehicle movement into the infiltrated missile teams.
This magical thinking is akin to the Russian assumption that a 70% manned MR-Regiment could generate two 100% BTG
1/@HN_Schlottman@KofmanMichael@KC_Guy@teuraskarju Since two fully manned BTG are 66% of a nominally 70% manned regiment, Russian doctrine was B.S.
The sort of load & unload rates US Army trucks achieve is through the heavy use of boxes, pallets, flatracks, containers, and mechanized material handling equipment built into trucks
May 16 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
This is a pretty important question I'll try and answer.👇
@RandomAcademic@sjellmann If you have not read Lester W. Grau & Charles K. Bartle's "The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age." Now is the time to go look it up with an internet search.
UAV artillery spotting tactics are universal, and the Ukrainians are better at it than the Russians. 1/ @RandomAcademic@sjellmann This is mainly because the existential threat of Russian invasion focused the Ukrainian military on "good enough today" is better than "perfect next year."
That means Ukrainian artillery spotting drones cost between 1/10th and 1/100th what a similar drone costs
May 14 • 30 tweets • 7 min read
This thread🧵 will be my Ukraine War overview.
Russia is losing 2/3 of a battalion combat group of equipment a day and we are into day 79.
That's over 52.6 full battalion equipment sets out of the 120 initially sent into Ukraine & ~180 over all in the Russian Ground Forces
IOW, 43% of the total committed Russian mechanized combat vehicle fleet and likely the best 29% of the total Russian combat vehicle fleet have been destroyed or captured.
Percentage casualty rate wise, this is the institutional equivalent of the III Armored Corps in Ft Hood 2/
May 13 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
This video tells you a lot, and not just about the vulnerability of a fully loaded T-80.🧵
Look at the road damage where the T-80 exploded and where it's turret landed.
That is going to require significant pavement replacing and repairing section where the turret landed. 1/
This Ukrainian road is raised above the countryside because the soil under the road had to be engineered/graded in several layers of rock, gravel & sand to support that road weight & not to melt into the countryside during a mud season.
May 12 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
If you are not watching developments in Sri Lanka. Start now.
This is what "food insecurity" really means.
This is why Russia's invasion of Ukraine has world wide effects, because losing Ukraine's grain exports prices food too high for poor folks less developed nations. 1/
The Ukrainians are big believers in "Shaping Operations," that is, small military operations that open up options of further military operations later.
For example, the destruction of Moskva and it's S-300F long range surface to air missiles by a Neptun cruise missile strike
May 9 • 41 tweets • 13 min read
This is going to be a long thread🧵 on Ukraine's unique 21st century fighting style based on Uber style C3I software, why Western intelligence is plug ignorant of it due to CROWDSTRIKE cybersecurity firm, & the implications of SpaceX's Starlink satcom for the future...
...of warfare & politics. This is going to be a wild thread, so buckle up.
First we need to talk about Ukraine's "GIS Art for Artillery" software package written by Yaroslav Sherstyuk.
@ksuwildkat What I am saying is western intelligence failed the two step process for all data, verification & validation.
Let's start with Russian BTG doctrine which says a 70% strength motor rifle regiment will generate two BTG.
@ksuwildkat You verified Russian doctrine. It says two BTG.
Now the validation part, two full strength BTG is 66% of the Regiment's combat strength.
Keeping out conscripts automatically means the two BTG will be understrength.
Additionally, there will be zero unit cohesion.
May 7 • 22 tweets • 8 min read
It is too early for a real "lessons learned," but this latest Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown a lot of things which impact the modeling & design of post-WW2 mechanized combat wargames, thread🧵
The three things that have jumped out for me are the following:
1/1. The complete lack of mechanized logistics in the Russian Army 2. The horrible vulnerability of Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles compared to equivalent Western vehicles 3. The arrival of small drones in the artillery spotting role as armored vehicle killers