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Trent Telenko Profile picture
Trent Telenko
@TrentTelenko
Married father of four great kids, Retired US DoD Civil Servant, Section 22 Special Interest Group list admin, Chicagoboyz-dot-net history blogger
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Dec 10 • 20 tweets • 5 min read
It is time for another Russian casualty thread. This thread's objective are as follows:

1. Statistical analysis of Ukrainian reporting of Nov 2023 RuAF casualties.

2. A historical comparison of RuAF Nov 2023 casualties per 1000 to a pair of US Army campaigns in WW1 & WW2

1/ Image I ran an SPC control chart for the Nov 2023 data set.

The Upper Control Limit is 1,501
The Mean is 932.
The Lower Control Limit is 362.

There are no 'out of control signals' in the chart.

2/ Image
Dec 10 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
A lot of different accounts have posted this video, but most have missed the logistical point.

This Russian mobik is eating snow because his logistics can't deliver potable water to the front lines.

There are good reasons for this.

RuAF Logistics🧵
1/ Ukrainian FPV drone reasons for this.

Even Russian ground resupply drones can't get through Ukrainian FPV drone interdiction.

There are larger operational implications in this.

2/
Dec 9 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
The Houthi have more than just maritime radio with which to contact merchant ships.

Yemeni cellphone coverage overlaps the straits, so any sailor with an active cellphone can be pinged, tracked or contacted.

There are drone guidance implications in this fact.

Drone Tech🧵
1/
Image David Axe had a very interesting piece recently on the Russians using Ukraine's 4G network for navigation of it's Shahed-136 drones.

The Russians taped a cellphone with a Ukrainian SIM card into the navigation system.

2/
 forbes.com/sites/davidaxe…
Image
Nov 29 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Between satellite radar interference tracking (SRIT) and software predicting radar line-of-sight visibility, most radars are horribly vulnerable in the age of drones.

You have to tactically relocate radars several times a day because of SRIT.

However,
1/2 ...after 2 weeks, the radar location operational patterns & terrain analysis related to what the radar is protecting lets drones have a huge advantage in killing radars without their own gun based point defenses.

And gun based air defense is so manpower expensive

2/
Nov 28 • 23 tweets • 6 min read
I caught a lot of h--l because I said the 2022 RuAF were less prepared for trench foot and frostbite than the Winter 1944 US Army because of corruption

I remember all the accounts last year saying RuAF was better in winter protecting their troops because...they were Russians?
1/ The hidden picture above of one such Russian casualty in 2023 reflects the poor footwear the Russian military procurement system provides to its troops & the lack of NCO's in it's units.

(H/T @secretsqrl123)
2/
Image
Image
Nov 26 • 13 tweets • 5 min read
What you are seeing here in these Black Sea storm are wind fields causing a mass casualty event with Russian VKS rotary wing aircraft in Crimea, S. Ukraine & S. Russia.⬇️

Any rotary wing craft w/o a hanger & unable to fly out before the storm will be heavily

Storm damage🧵
1/ ...damaged.

The historical example here is the 1989 Mother's Day Microburst that destroyed the US Army helicopter fleet at Fort Hood.

A microburst disabled 2/3 of all the AH-64A Apaches in the world with that one weather event.
2/
Image
Nov 25 • 13 tweets • 5 min read
Just...no.

The issue with precision guided artillery projectiles like the laser guided Copperhead & current Excalibur is they cost 2 or 3 times what a non-tube artillery guided projectile cost.

Copperhead was $60K in late 1980's money while a Paveway II kit was $15K

Drone🧵
1/ Image A GPS guided Excalibur is around $73K a round versus $21K for a JDAM kit plus the price of the bomb of between $4K & $16K in 2020 money.

Ukrainian long range FPV drones are running $1K to $5K depending on the sensor.

And these cost ratios are only the tip of the cost iceberg
2/ Image
Nov 19 • 20 tweets • 7 min read
Oh boy, the manifold RuAF artillery supply chain logistical failures shown in the @secretsqrl123 post & the telegram video.😱

It is time for us all to visit "The Myth of the Russian Artillery Ammocopia: North Korean edition."

1/
 t.me/warhistoryalco…

Image Let's start with the fact we are looking a North Korean D-20 152mm howitzer with dry rotted to nothing wheels, using North Korean 152mm ammo.

This underlines four things true in every war:
1. There are never enough artillery shells
2. There are never enough tires
3. There

2/ Image
Nov 15 • 21 tweets • 8 min read
This is one of the most poignant testimonies as to why FPV drones are replacing direct fire ATGM on the battlefield.

Only drones can provide the necessary mass of precision guided munitions for a modern battlefield.

Lt. Chornovol is buying 4 drones a month because it is

1/ ...twice the number of Stugna ATGM Ukraine's military can give her two launchers per month.

And Ukraine builds Stugna for $20,000. That is 1/5th that of a US Javelin missile doing the same job.

The Stugna Launcher can be remote fired, but her crew still has to recover it.
2/ Image
Nov 13 • 18 tweets • 6 min read
This is the 2nd of a so far series of three Strategypage -dot- com op-eds by Tom Holsinger on Biden Administration foreign policy.

And it has a nuclear clickbait opening paragraph I don't want to believe, lots of reasons.

1/
 strategypage.com/qnd/israel/art…
Image The major problem that I have in _disbelieving_ that opening paragraph are the (in)actions of the Biden Administration with retaliating against Iranian proxy militias.

A Trump vs Wagner mercs in Syria sized curb stomping of Iranian proxies is required.
2/
Nov 12 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
I reported another video of this AFU strike, but this one tells us a great deal about RuAF logistical operational patterns.

1. The RuAF tactical trucks were escorted by armored mobility vehicles through Ukraine from Crimea to protect it from Ukrainian partisans/Special Forces
1/ 2. The tactical trucks were 23-25 km back from the front line transferring their troops & material to UAZ/Loaf/Scooby Doo vans.

This says a lot about composition of the Russian wheeled logistical vehicle fleet after 20 odd months of combat attrition.

2/ Image
Nov 10 • 11 tweets • 5 min read
This report from @CovertShores is an extraordinarily important one for what it tells us about Ukraine's expanding anti-access area denial (A2AD) bubble it is building against RuAF logistics to occupied Eastern Kherson.

Watercraft Fuel Logistics 🧵
1/
 The Ondatra & Serna-class landing craft are roughly the equivalent of a WW2 era US Navy LCM.

Gen. MacArthur's Engineer Special Brigades use them to move troops 100's of km. in the S. Philippines campaign shore to shore in the Victor & King operations
2/
Image
Nov 10 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
This graphic from @HamWa07 of an actual S-300 missile sites' radar coverage (left) near the Kerch Straits compared to the claimed S-400 system performance (right), based on drawing circles of missile range and claimed detection range, shows why the human factor matters.

1/


Image
Image
Image It takes trained human skills to get the best out of any weapons system.

Surface to air missile battery performance is heavily dependent on the staff work in properly placing the radars and telecommunications relaying radar data to missile launchers.

This is always a game
2/
Nov 8 • 16 tweets • 5 min read
Anti-Access Air Denial, Jammer & FPV based Ukrainian Air superiority over the Dnipro.

It's time to acknowledge that air superiority is less & less based on crewed high performance aircraft.

Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is air superiorities' most important element
1/ And we are seeing that right now with Russian complaints at #Krynky .

This is because observed artillery fire with precision guided artillery projectiles have in part replaced crewed airpower in retail close air support and battlefield interdiction

2/
Nov 7 • 17 tweets • 4 min read
The simultaneous Ukraine fielding new jammers of Russian FPV drones (below) and new longer ranged, cheap, EW hardened FPV's with a ~30 km range operating in the same electromagnetic battlespace over #Krynky to cover ferry operations is a demonstration of its E.W. mastery.

1/ The map (H/T @secretsqrl123) and the quoted post below will give you the idea of the area of effect Ukraines simultaneous deployment of FPV Drone Jammers and new generation longer range & electronic warfare hardened FPV's to interdict RuAF vehicles.

2/
Image
Nov 6 • 20 tweets • 7 min read
In watching the current Israeli - Hamas War, very few have tried to analyze Israel's strategic dilemma & what happens to Gaza Palestinians after Israel militarily exterminates Hamas.

I've just found an article that does...and it's going to be a dystopian Sci-Fi horror show.

1/ Image This section of Holsinger's article makes the right comparison to the US battle to liberate Manila from the Japanese in early 1945 to get reasonable estimates for IDF losses.

I posted on Manila before & hope he's wrong on civilian casualties in Gaza 😱
2/
Image
Nov 5 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
@vtchakarova Ms. Tchakarova,

War has a horrible inertia all of its own.

It is more likely that a fully mobilized IDF will turn immediately upon Hezbollah after eliminating Hamas.

Then turn upon Fatah on the West Bank after that before going home, AKA once and done threat elimination.

1/ @vtchakarova Those are the political-military-economic incentives of a full Israeli military mobilization.

The economic threat of Hezbollah completely shutting down the Israeli economy regularly with rockets, forcing another full IDF mobilization, is no longer tolerable after 7 Oct 2023.
2/
Nov 5 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Gosh, reality is being utterly savage to all those X accounts that keep yipping & yapping how "hard and expensive" it is to harden drones from jamming.

They don't know neither jack nor jill about drones or electronic warfare.🤷‍♂️

This 🧵shows easy it is to stop GPS jamming.⬇️
1/ This, BTW, doesn't make me an expert on either subject.

I'm a historian of Gen MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters & I got a few years experience sticking inspection mirrors into new production RQ-4B wings in North Texas.

Plus, like any US Dad, I'm "daddy drone care"...

2/ Image
Nov 4 • 24 tweets • 8 min read
Do you all remember that guy on X talking smack to me about how expensive electronic warfare hardened FPV drones would be?

Ukraine has proven his near term analytical powers to be highly flawed on the subject of the high procurement costs EW hardened FPV drones.🤣🤣🤣⬇️

Drone🧵 Sadly, the DoD is filled with these kind of guys whose worldview of drones is as a ROBOCOP class procurement/budget threat to their crewed "ED-209's" (F-35/LCS/M1299).

2/
Image
Image
Nov 3 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
So, this device protects a circle 1.2 km across from drones & jams GPS/Glonas. That is the coverage of a platoon position in Ukraine, ~25-to-40 men

How many platoons are there in a battalion?

Usually there are 9 for line infantry, plus another 4-to-9 for US Mech Bn "tail"
1/ There are usual 9-to-10 battalions of tanks, infantry, & reconnaissance in a division.

In addition, there are usually 3-to-4 battalions of artillery with 18-to-24 guns each in 3-to-4 batteries of 4-to-8 guns.

Gun batteries will need a minimum of 2 jammers each while using
2/
Nov 1 • 11 tweets • 4 min read
This is one of those glass half empty/glass half full posts about the Russo-Ukraine War.

People wanting to see Russian power, see Russian air superiority.

When I look at Oct 22 report, it tells me that the RuAF has run out of trucks to support their artillery.

Logistics 🧵
1/ The Russians are using the VKS to deliver firepower to the Left bank of the Dnipro in lieu of artillery.

So where are they getting the fuel?

How are they moving & distributing it?

2/