...after 2 weeks, the radar location operational patterns & terrain analysis related to what the radar is protecting lets drones have a huge advantage in killing radars without their own gun based point defenses.
And gun based air defense is so manpower expensive
Nov 28 • 23 tweets • 6 min read
I caught a lot of h--l because I said the 2022 RuAF were less prepared for trench foot and frostbite than the Winter 1944 US Army because of corruption
I remember all the accounts last year saying RuAF was better in winter protecting their troops because...they were Russians? 1/
...twice the number of Stugna ATGM Ukraine's military can give her two launchers per month.
And Ukraine builds Stugna for $20,000. That is 1/5th that of a US Javelin missile doing the same job.
The Stugna Launcher can be remote fired, but her crew still has to recover it. 2/
Nov 13 • 18 tweets • 6 min read
This is the 2nd of a so far series of three Strategypage -dot- com op-eds by Tom Holsinger on Biden Administration foreign policy.
And it has a nuclear clickbait opening paragraph I don't want to believe, lots of reasons.
The major problem that I have in _disbelieving_ that opening paragraph are the (in)actions of the Biden Administration with retaliating against Iranian proxy militias.
A Trump vs Wagner mercs in Syria sized curb stomping of Iranian proxies is required. 2/
2. The tactical trucks were 23-25 km back from the front line transferring their troops & material to UAZ/Loaf/Scooby Doo vans.
This says a lot about composition of the Russian wheeled logistical vehicle fleet after 20 odd months of combat attrition.
Nov 10 • 11 tweets • 5 min read
This report from @CovertShores is an extraordinarily important one for what it tells us about Ukraine's expanding anti-access area denial (A2AD) bubble it is building against RuAF logistics to occupied Eastern Kherson.
This graphic from @HamWa07 of an actual S-300 missile sites' radar coverage (left) near the Kerch Straits compared to the claimed S-400 system performance (right), based on drawing circles of missile range and claimed detection range, shows why the human factor matters.
The simultaneous Ukraine fielding new jammers of Russian FPV drones (below) and new longer ranged, cheap, EW hardened FPV's with a ~30 km range operating in the same electromagnetic battlespace over #Krynky to cover ferry operations is a demonstration of its E.W. mastery.
The map (H/T @secretsqrl123) and the quoted post below will give you the idea of the area of effect Ukraines simultaneous deployment of FPV Drone Jammers and new generation longer range & electronic warfare hardened FPV's to interdict RuAF vehicles.
It is more likely that a fully mobilized IDF will turn immediately upon Hezbollah after eliminating Hamas.
Then turn upon Fatah on the West Bank after that before going home, AKA once and done threat elimination.
@vtchakarova Those are the political-military-economic incentives of a full Israeli military mobilization.
The economic threat of Hezbollah completely shutting down the Israeli economy regularly with rockets, forcing another full IDF mobilization, is no longer tolerable after 7 Oct 2023.
Nov 5 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Gosh, reality is being utterly savage to all those X accounts that keep yipping & yapping how "hard and expensive" it is to harden drones from jamming.
They don't know neither jack nor jill about drones or electronic warfare.🤷♂️