Thread by @MassDara

Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵

Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2

Putin has instructed the FSB (+ its border troops) and Rosgvardia to defend the borders and assist this operation. He also told the military today that their main task is driving out Ukrainian forces from Russian territory and countering Ukrainian recon and sabotage groups /3

Who is responsible for what in Kursk? FSB Border troops and Rosgvardia have responsibility for the border and ensuring its defense. For the military: Kursk is located in Moscow Military District, but the troops forward deployed IVO Ukraine belong to the Leningrad MD. /4

The entirety of the area was formerly the Western Military District (2010-24). Russia decided to split it up in March-April 2024 to cope with NATO expansion. It named two commanders: Lapin (LEMD) and Kozovlev (MOMD). / 5

The Operational Group of Forces North received a name change and upgrade about 1-2 weeks before it attacked Kharkiv in May. Prior to May it was a territorial defense group. So for the past 3 months it's been transitioning from a defensive to offensive orientation, meaning /6

..that this Russian Op Group was much weaker than the others: from May - Aug it had a major reorganization, a new commander, and attacked Kharkiv early. It's MOD units are now bogged down in Kharkiv and that offensive is not making progress. / 7

Someone in Ukraine knew where to press. The AFU attacked a weak spot (Kursk) of the weakest Op Group. A C2 scramble between FSB border guards, Akhmat fighters, and any MOD forces that could rally ensued in week 1. /8

Russia has experience in creating a combined C2 structure that involves internal security agencies and the military from its experience in the second Chechen war. In the 90s, a joint command was established in what was then the North Caucasus MD HQ. /9
rand.org/content/dam/ra…

I raise this because Bortnikov and Gerasimov worked with this specific C2 arrangement in Chechnya. While today's situation is much different, they remember how to work together. Implementation is a different matter of course, but I note the experience. /10

I haven't seen a KTO headquarters established yet. Who could lead it? All military district commanders are dual hatted as operational group commanders and their forces are engaged. MOD options could be: Lapin, Kozovlev, Nikiforov, Gerasimov. /11

It's Lapin's AOR, but Op Group North is weak. The territory is Moscow MD, but Kozovlev and many of his forces are in eastern Ukraine. Nikiforov is Ground Forces commander and former op group commander, his name is circulating online. Gerasimov also given the stakes/12

Rosgvardia's tasks will be to set up cordons, roadblocks, and other barriers. FSB border guards in the area have been taken prisoner already, to include conscripts , a very politically sensitive issue for Putin. /13

FSB assets will be doing recon and trying to sweep up AFU teams, and interrogation. Russian forces are already taking small numbers of AFU teams as prisoner. Here I worry about what comes next because the FSB uses horrible torture methods. /14

Russia's MChS (Ministry of Emergency Situations) is also now engaging with evacuations of towns. Russia is showing videos of some armor moving and eventually I would anticipate more helicopter, VKS assets. They will probably use artillery especially if the towns are emptied. /15

This AFU operation has successfully exploited seams of responsibility between the FSB, Rosgvardia and MOD. I suspect targeted leaks will emerge between MOD/GRU and FSB over who is responsible for intel and defense failures. /16

AFU invaded Russia despite 2 years of partial mobilization in Kursk, 10 years of legislation to make power ministries coordinate better, and a 2023 offer from Prigozhin to help guard the border (Shoigu rejected it). Bardak as usual. Now the reaction begins. /17

This war has left Russia's borders weak, the army engaged in Ukraine and not immediately available to defend border regions, and FSB border troops not supported. The Russian system's instinct will be to overcorrect and swing harshly at Kursk. /end