Thread by @SlavAesthetics

Su-24's in Afghanistan
by: Виктор Марковский (Viktor Markovsky)

Counter-guerrilla warfare has always been a difficult task for regular army units, and this was once again confirmed in Afghanistan. Combat operations in the absence of a "full-fledged" enemy were not suitable for modern jet aircraft either. However, the iron logic of the war dictated a constant increase in efforts, including, like a snowball, the scale of the Air Force's work increased. With chronic failures in the hunt for the enemy slipping through their fingers, "hostile" villages, or even simply uncontrolled gorges and valleys, were declared targets. The main measure of aviation activity was the amount of spent ammunition: if in 1983, 23,900 bombs were dropped (excluding aviation work from airfields along the border), then by 1986 this number had more than quadrupled and reached 106,800.

The need to quantitatively compensate for the low effectiveness of bombing attacks prompted a proposal to use front-line bomber aviation (FBA/ФБА). A certain jealousy of the FBA command also played a role, remaining aloof from the "real case", in which it would be possible to demonstrate their strength in a real situation and test weapons.

In 1984, Su-24 bombers entered the scene. The aircraft began to enter combat regiments shortly before the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. It was more than twice as powerful as all front-line aviation vehicles in combat load, lifting up to 7,000 kg of bombs "without strain", had an enviable flight range of 2,400 km and a perfect PNS (Nav/Attack System), which allowed the use of the "twentyfours" from the airfields of TurkVO (Turkestan Military District) and SAVO (Central Asian Military District).

A specific reason for the involvement of the FBA was the planned operation in the Panjshir Valley during the spring and summer of 1984. In general, for this period, the headquarters of the 40th army was preparing 22 major operations (almost twice as many as in the previous year), but the "Big Panjshir" was unprecedented: according to Lieutenant General F. G. Shkrudnev, such forces and means were involved in it, "which our Armed Forces have not had since 1945.". Ahmad Shah's patrimony, which remained a state within the state, was the object of almost annual offensives, but the desired success could not be achieved.

"A strong-willed and energetic person. He is certainly smart, and stands out among the other Mujahideen leaders with the talent of a military organizer, as General Boris Gromov described the owner of Panjshir and Charikar. Massoud also proved himself to be a prudent diplomat - he willingly made contacts with the Soviet command, but flatly refused to deal with the Afghan government. Through his envoys, he proved to the officers of the 40th army that "we are not your enemies, you were deceived by those whom you brought to power". Officials of Kabul could no longer tolerate this, and among the most important tasks of the 1984 campaign was there was included not only "the cleansing of the central provinces from gangs and the establishment of legitimate authority there," but also "the physical elimination of Ahmad Shah and his inner circle".
(Pictured in center: Ahmad Shah Massoud; General Boris Gromov)

Until April 21st, a truce formally continued with the "Panjshir tiger", and according to the commander of the 40th army, "with rare exceptions, Massoud fulfilled his obligations and agreements." However, the mechanism for preparing the operation had already been launched, and for surprise, the operatives proposed "to strike the first blow before the expiration of the truce." An aviation group deployed at border airfields, which outnumbered the Air Force of the 40th Army, was supposed to provide massive air impact. In addition to local units on the MiG-21's and Su-17's, it included Tu-16 long-range Aviation, as well as Su-24's of two regiments: the 149th Guards Red Banner BAP (Bomber Aviation Regiment/Бомбардировочный Авиационный Полк) from Nikolaevka near Almaata, and the 143rd BAP from the Georgian Kopitnari (Kutaisi-1) airfield. The 149th The BAP was the only one in Central Asia that had new bombers, and the involvement of the 143rd BAP was justified by the fact that it was on the basis of this regiment that 'military tests on the combat use of the Su-24 in mountainous areas' were conducted. The "Georgian" regiment was transferred to the Khanabad airbase near Karshi, and the Nikolayevets were stationed at the fighter airfield in Kokaity.

The 143rd BAP had Su-24M's equipped with upgraded PNS-24M "Tiger" (pictured), as well as having an increased combat load of up to 8000kg and an expanded range of weapons. The planes of the 149th Regiment were older. This unit entered the war with a pure military unexpectedness. On April 15th, exercises were held in Nikolaevka, and 30 crews led by the commander of the regiment, commander S.A. Boka, flew to Kokaity. No one was going to stay there - they planned to fly back after lunch, so they didn't even take their toothbrushes. However, in the dining room, the Su-17 pilots, who had been working in the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) from the "frontline" Kokoity for several days, greeted the guests with words: "Guys, take your time. Have you seen the piles of bombs at the airfield? Until you unload all this across the river, you will not return home." And indeed, by the evening it turned out that the Su-24 crews "will have to perform several sorties with practical bombing practice for specified targets".

To utilize the strike attack that was concentrated on Soviet airfields, particularly careful preparation of intelligence was required, for which, on the eve of the operation, the 263rd reconnaissance squadron of the 40th Army Air Force was hastily re-equipped with modern Su-17M3R. Together with an An-30, they photographed areas of future combat operations, giving abundant material about planned targets, including their exact coordinates. What followed was already a matter of technique - the Su-24 PNS could automatically take the plane along a given route and drop bombs on the target. (Photographed below: 1. Antonov An-30 aerial cartography system. 2. Su-17M3R with a KKR reconnaissance pod. 3. Su-24 Fencer Cockpit)

The operation began at dawn on April 19th with a massive bombing attack by five regiments, which lasted two hours. Afghanistan has not seen such a thing yet: the Panjshir Valley, 12 km wide and about 70 km long, was swept by wave after wave of aircraft approaching from the north. Not everything went according to plan - the weather did not allow the 40th Army aviation to be used, but the radar screens at Bagram Air Base were already rippling with tags. All Su-24s took off from Kokaita. The vehicles of the 1st squadron carried four "five hundreds" (FAB-500's) , and the 2nd and 3rd - twelve FAB-250's (this type of armament was retained in subsequent sorties). All tasks were performed with two PTB's (Drop tanks/Подвесной топливный баки). Crews worked from a height of 5,000m across the grids, covering defensive lines in the areas of Obdarah, Tavah, Chimalvarda, Hisarak and Guvat with a bombing "carpet", or even just suspicious mountain ravines, cavern towns and ancient fortresses where enemy units could be located.

During the entire flight, communication with the base was coordinated from the An-26RT by Chief Navigator N. V. Kositsyn, seconded from the Air Force headquarters of the SAVО. When the roar of aircraft engines over Panjshir subsided, bomb explosions were replaced by an artillery barrage, during which the planes were prepared for a second attack (following the route to the area of operations took the Su-24 less than half an hour). After a new airstrike, helicopter landings were made in the valley, followed by troops. They did not encounter serious resistance, but bomb attacks continued along the path of the advancing units. The use of the Su-24 was not particularly intensive: both regiments flew about 10 group sorties, working in units, eights and squadrons. Crews went to the next target no more than once every one to two weeks. Before departure, they handed over all documents and even small change from their pockets, received two "lemons" (F-1 Grenades), a pair of pistols (Makarov or Stechkin) and flares. In the flight books, the tasks were recorded as completed according to the Combat Training Course. The reasons for such secrecy remained unclear, but this was jealously monitored by special officers, and one navigator, who dared to record a combat mission, was subjected to a terrible dressing down. (Pictured: Tu-16's over the Central Military District; FAB-1500s being dropped in the Kandahar area. It is clearly visible that the sighting mark lies away from the dunes, on the border of the sands near the Dori River)

There were no special successes - the troops needed more direct support from helicopter pilots and attack aircraft, who knew the area well and interacted with aircraft designators, rather than covering an entire area with a rain of bombs. The Su-24 was created for war over relatively flat Europe, and here it could not realize its capabilities, primarily with the use of guided missiles and guided bombs. Independent search for targets using the Orion-A forward-looking radar (RPO), capable of detecting even small-sized tank-type targets, was hampered by the radar lack of contrast of local objects. It turned out to be extremely difficult to identify targets in the chaos of rocks and rocks, even with the help of the Chaika-1 optoelectronic sight. The use of PNS over the mountains also caused considerable problems, and an inconspicuous flight around the terrain - one of the most important advantages of the "twenty-fours" - was not at all possible because of the ridges and gorges.

The effectiveness of the strikes remained low: if the direct hit of the "five hundred" broke up the duval (clay and brick walls common in Central Asia), then even after close breaks, the thick adobe walls looked untouched from a height. ODAB-500 was used several times (when suspended, the liquid contents "squished" inside, which at first caused concern), but they did not give proper results due to the same low accuracy. They decided to increase efficiency by hitting from a gentle dive, although there were concerns about how the aircraft would behave when pulling out if the suspensions did not come off. The Commander of the 149th Regiment with Navigator P/P-K (П/П-К, Подполковник/Podpolkovnik, about equal to a Lieutenant Colonel) Kovalev worked out this method of bombing the weapons options used, giving the go-ahead to the rest of the crews. During attacks on real targets, the dive angle of 20-30° and the intervals in the units increased to 1 minute were maintained. In a dive, the Su-24 lost a couple of thousand meters, falling into the zone of anti-aircraft fire. Some pilots, who saw the smoky clouds nearby for the first time, did not immediately understand their nature, but the pilots were more careful after dropping the handle so intensely that they jumped out at 9000-10000m, ignoring the order of battle. (Pictured: explosions from FAB-1500's)

However, the enemy offered very little resistance. A few weeks before the start of the operation, Massoud, who was nicknamed "happy" for good reason, received its plans and maps through his informants in Kabul. Combat detachments and a significant part of the population were withdrawn from Panjshir, and only a few local formations and self-defense detachments remained there. There was no one to defeat, and Marshal Sokolov's report to Moscow that "during the fighting in Panjshir and Andarabskaya valleys... the enemy has suffered a serious defeat," turned out to be hasty. By the end of the summer, with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the "people's power" fell back to its original positions. In mid-July 1984, after a not too impressive debut, the Su-24 also returned to their bases, after which they did not appear in the DRA's sky for several years.

With the decision to withdraw from the now hopeless war, the role of aviation has only increased. In many ways, it had to replace the actions of ground troops, systematically deterring the enemy with strikes. By that time, there were more than enough worthy targets for aviation - the opposition, which had gained strength, relied on large base areas, having equipped warehouses and workshops, fortified points, shelters and extensive systems of firing positions. The activity of the Air Force was increasingly reduced to daily bombing attacks on planned targets, where intelligence indicated enemy activity. In addition to bases and camps, they became places for overnight stays and days, unloading caravans, as well as the caravan trails themselves. Most of these facilities were in the planning tables day after day. Since there was nothing for the Mujahedeen to do in the deserted mountains, airstrikes usually hit villages that sheltered the "soldiers of Allah" and turned, in military parlance, into "places of concentration of enemy manpower". How was the work of this period assessed, as said by sub-commander of the Kokaity Regiment, - Lt. Col. Yuri Rudakov, "combat sorties were of the nature of constant psychological impact - more in order to keep 'spirits' (Soviet nickname for Mujahedeen fighters) in a black body (Russian phrase meaning to harass/deny someone of anything needed to work or operate) than to solve any specific tactical or operational tasks" (the Americans in Vietnam with even greater frankness called this style "intimidation tactics").

Another factor determining the tactics of the Air Force was the increase in the number of anti-aircraft weapons and the qualitative change in air defense. In 1987, the GRU of the General Staff reported on the admission of 600(!) MANPADS of the Stinger type to the Dushman detachments, which was confirmed by the capture of 102 missiles among the trophies in the first half of the year alone. The "Stingers" appearing everywhere drove the planes higher and higher, and by 1988 it was forbidden to descend above the impact site to less than 4,500m, the height of the approach to the attack gradually rose to 7,500-8,000m. The accuracy of bombing, especially from horizontal flight, has turned into a fairly conventional value - there have been cases when pilots "smeared" (bombed) even onto villages. Proper work efficiency could only be achieved by increasing the bomb tonnage, massive pressure from the air.

The consumption of ammunition and the number of sorties for such an impact required serious ones. It was not possible to "skip" them through the overloaded airfields of the 40th Army: by the summer of 1988, 164 Soviet aircraft and 331 helicopters were operating there, which already had to takeoff fifteen times a day. For every ton of kerosene and ammunition for them, they had to pay in blood, pushing convoys through the Dushman ambushes, or spend almost the same amount of fuel, delivering it by air. The situation worsened with the beginning of the withdrawal of troops, when Kandahar and its Air Base were abandoned by August. The northern regions of Afghanistan were regularly processed by MiG-21s from the 115th GIAP (Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment), as well as Su-17s from the 136th and 156th APIB (Aviation Regiment of Fighter-Bombers), operating from the airfields of TurkVO. However, the most tense situation was in the central and eastern provinces, where they could not reach. The only way out was to involve the FBA again: according to the navigator's calculation, the Su-24 with 3-4 tons of bombs, taking off from a border airbase, could go to the most remote targets, up to the Pakistani border.

By this time, these aircraft were, as they say, at hand at the Khanabad airfield, 150km from the border. In accordance with the adopted strategy of strengthening the southern direction, the local 735th IAP Air Defense was transformed into an IBA Regiment in the spring of 1981, and three years later, retaining the number, became a bomber unit as part of the 34th Chirchik ADIB (Aviation Division of Fighter-Bombers) in the TurkVO. Although still a fighter regiment, they occasionally took part in the Afghan events, escorting VTA (Miliary Transport Aviation) aircraft. In 1988, the 735th BAP had 31 Su-24s, and, like the neighbors from Nikolaevka, these were far from new aircraft. They came from the leading aviation units of the "front edge" - the western districts, which were switching to more modern Su-24M. Two squadrons (aircraft of the 18th, 19th, 25th and 26th series) came from Brandt (GSVG, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) and Starokonstantinov (PrikVO, Carpathian Military District), while the third was recruited "from the world by thread". Ironically, it was the "rear" regiments that had the chance to test their Su-24 in battle.

By the summer, not all crews had completed retraining, but there was no need to wait. To speed up the process, in July, the regiment was replenished with a unit of experienced pilots from the GSVG, who mastered all types of combat applications to the niceties, and training flights were organized in two shifts. The regiment had to work in a "bomber" style, from high altitudes and horizontal flight. Based on the capabilities of enemy air defense, safe echelons were determined to be at least 7000m. However, the standard altitude of the Orbita-10 onboard computer was limited to only 5000m. Having raised the "ceiling", the functioning of the "Orbit" was checked at a test site with real bombing from 7000m. The equipment worked reliably, and the accuracy of hits in the "crosses" satisfied everyone. In general, great hopes were pinned on the Su-24 on-board complex, since it provided accurate navigation and targeted bombing in dense clouds and at night, which is usual for this time of year, whereas work in the dark for other front-line aviation aircraft was constantly prohibited due to low efficiency and increased risk.

On the night of October 25th, the first flight took off, led by the pilot-inspector of the combat training service of the 73rd VA (Air Army), Regiment Commander Bogdan and Commanders Assistant of the Regiment, Lt. Col. V. Lamzin. Their goal was long-range - mountain trails near the besieged Mujahedeen Kandahar. Lamzin and his navigator, Maj. S. Voskoboynikov, and later, more often than others, led groups to strike. They were often led by the commander of the regiment, Col. S.V. Yanshin, and his assistant for flight training, Lt. Col. V.V. Sorochenko. Before departure, in addition to checking the systems, refueling and suspension of bombs, the Su-24 training included flight software: intelligence received from the headquarters of the Air Force of the TurkVO indicating the position of targets was transferred from a rectangular grid of coordinates to a geodetic one and entered into the "memory" drive of the PNS. The task was set for the crews just before departure, while the pilots were not informed of the nature of the targets, and only by the area on the map and the suspended ammunition could they guess what kind of object intelligence had calculated: RBK's (Cluster Bombs) went to the ramps of opposition detachments and places of unloading caravans, BetAB's (Concrete Bombs) - to shelters, caves and warehouses, and ordinary land mines - anything, from hostile villages to the area "sleepy" mountains and gorges. Little could be seen from the air either - the whole first month I had to work at night and in a frequent "complexity".

Taking off at 40-second intervals, the bombers caught up with the leader, gathered in battle formations and, according to the report of the last one, the whole "flock" increased their speed, going to the route. The position within the formation was maintained with the help of an RPO, raising its antenna by a couple of degrees to view the air situation and keeping with a 10-20 second "gap" from the one in front (it was risky to approach less than 2-3km in the dark). Radio conversations were minimized: in addition to the report of the last about taking his position, the the leader reported with a code on the KP (onboard computer) about passing the turning points of the route and returning ("205" meant "passed the PPM (Route Waypoint)", and "328" - "work completed"). In case of radio interception, the digital reports were changed from time to time. After the first sorties, carried out by fours or several units, more and more large groups began to take part in the strikes, up to the full composition of the regiment (usually 20-24 bombers). They processed one object or were divided into 3-4 groups according to the number of closely located targets. Sometimes the regiment dispersed squadron by squadron in different directions.

Strengthening the FBA grouping, it was decided to send 24 Su-24s from the 149th BAP to Khanabad. For the personnel of the unit, including its regiment commander V.N. Boyko, everything happened as suddenly as in 1984. Flying off on the eve of the exercise and landing around midnight, the crews went home, but were immediately alerted. At the headquarters, they learned about the upcoming assignment. They were given 8 hours to rest, and on the morning of October 28th, the regiment went to help its colleagues. The planes flew over ready for immediate operation, carrying six FAB-250's and two PTB-3000's each. Later, another unit joined them.

After two days of training, having studied maps and intelligence reports, on October 31st, the Nikolaev group went on a combat mission without any familiarization flights. The target was Maidanshahr, which lay behind the ridge near Kabul. According to intelligence data, the abandoned and deserted city was used by the Dushmans as a base camp. Later, strikes were carried out on targets in the mountainous areas near Kabul, Bagram and in the Charikar "greenery", where there were camps of nomadic gangs and rocket launchers firing at cities. At the limit of the Su-24's reach, they went beyond Kandahar and Jalalabad to smash the positions of the besieging detachments.

On November 2nd, the crews of the 149th BAP worked out a raid with a "jump" through Kokaity, landing there with six "five hundreds" and PTB's for refueling. The landing of the loaded Su-24 was not easy, and in the future this option was repeated only once. And the airbase itself, which faithfully served as an advanced airfield throughout the war, was by this time overflowing with troops being withdrawn. The Nikolaev bombers had to visit there again in an emergency situation: the planes returning from near Kandahar had run out of fuel and were rushing to Khanabad when Maj. Makhovsky's aircraft, which was landing first, "clipped her gear" on the approach and the wheel brakes caught fire right on the runway. While it was being extinguished and dragged away, the remaining 11 "left hanging" were given the command to go to the alternate airfield, and one by one, with almost dry tanks, they "sprinkled" into Kokaity by nightfall . There, the pilots had to refuel and prepare the planes themselves, and as the night passed in the hassle, they no longer began to carry out the second flight on this shift. In the rush, they did not have time to pick up the braking parachutes, and one of them was immediately "swallowed" by an Il-76 steering wheel. The transport worker got up for a joke to replace the engine, a scandal broke out, and relations with the local authorities turned out to be spoiled.

Providing the necessary pace of combat work (two, and then three departures per shift per aircraft), we trained replacement pilots and navigators. Technicians worked at airfields in teams, which were replaced every other day. Work on the ramps was in full swing all night. The planes of both regiments were very often sent to the same target, the groups rose with an hour interval between the takeoffs of the leaders, so as not to "flood" the airfield upon return. This "gap" allowed ordnancemen and refuelers to meet the returning group, prepare it for departure and immediately receive the next one.

From time to time, there were "unloading days" when the regiments went on assignments alternately every other day. The work was carried out without holidays and weekends, only a couple of times according to the weather and on New Year's Eve there were "gaps". The "red day of the calendar" was supposed to be November 7, and in anticipation of the holiday, the crews went to the sauna. In the evening, when their resting was in full swing, the departure team suddenly came. They got to their planes happy, flushed, although many did not have time to wash.
The whole formation confessed to the commander that they had already celebrated, but the willingness to fly was just as unanimous. The cabins caught their breath with oxygen, and the "festive" flight passed without comment.

The targets were almost always dispersed, and several points in the bombing area were "sewn into the drives with a difference of 300-1000m or with a difference in angular minutes of coordinates on different aircraft. Going out to the designated area in the dark of night, the navigator, using the RPO, checked with the picture of the radar image of the area drawn in advance on tracing paper and looked for noticeable highlights on the indicator - a contrasting bend of the river, a bridge or a mountain. In long-range raids, when the accumulation of errors in the navigation system and the computer became significant, the position was adjusted according to a characteristic landmark. The starting points were usually the Naglu hydroelectric dam and Surubi Lake, lying to the east of Kabul, the Darunta dam near Jalalabad, from where the distance to most targets remained small, and it was possible to bomb even without additional aiming, autonomously according to the calculations, which gave an accuracy of up to 300-400m. In an area devoid of radar "signatures", the correction was introduced using the RSBN (short range radio navigation system) on the radio beacons of the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.

Bombs of three main calibers were used: 250kg, 500kg, 1500kg of various types and models, suspended in a variety of versions. When working in the northern regions of the "inner circle", which lay 400-450km from the base (Faizabad, Kunduz and Talukan), they dispensed with PTB and took a pair of FAB-1500 for center-wing nodes and up to six 250 kg bombs for the remaining suspension points. Everything was at hand, just to load the holders completely. The kit could include bombs, OFABs, BetABs and thick-walled bombs of different calibers and with different ballistic characteristics - for work on area targets, their spread was insignificant. They always got rid of the combat load in one go, building a calculation for bombs of the largest caliber, and the rest went after the flight. At the site of the rupture of the "half-truck" carrying 675kg of explosives, a real volcano with a powerful mushroom cloud broke out, against which the explosions of the "five-hundreds" seemed only clouds of dust. The "additive" was often placed by setting fuses with a slowdown for different times, up to a day. To maximize the load capacity of the machines, center-mounted two-post pylons were used, with which the Su-24 took up to eight "five-hundreds", and six-post multi-lock racks MBDZ-U6-68, loaded with 12-18 "quarters". The hail of bombs turned out to be impressive, because the regiment could bring down a hundred "five-hundred" or 200-250 FAB-250's on the target. However, the plane, hung with "clusters" of bombs, became unstable at altitude and literally hobbled as if on a cobblestone pavement. Even after dropping the bombs, it did not behave too pleasantly, clinging to the air with locks and stops of a dozen racks. The disadvantage of the MBD was also the complexity of suspending a large number of ammunition and the troublesome conversion to other options. Therefore, only ten aircraft carried the MBD's in the 149th Regiment. Loaded to the maximum, the Su-24 did not really like flying at altitudes above 7000m, accompanying it with shaking and trying to break off during sharp maneuvers, which is why beginners were advised to "add a roll with a tilt of the head, not a handle, so as not to fall off." Avoiding critical situations, they went to the target at 4600-6000 m and, having already unloaded, "emptily" jumped up to the recommended 7000-7500m, at the same time lining up with the return route.

The Su-24 pilots preferred the powerful FAB-1500. They were sometimes suspended in threes, because they created much less resistance than the "bushes" of bombs of a smaller caliber. Most of the tasks were performed with the ventral PTB-2000, while taking a couple of "half-dozen" or 4-6 "five-hundred". Two underwing PTB-3000s were used to work on remote targets, and the bomb load was reduced to one FAB-1500, or 2-4 FAB-500 or FAB-250. Less often, RBК's went into action, mainly half-ton ones with SHOAB-0.5 "balls" or small fragmentation bombs of 2 and 10 kg calibers, which could be adjacent to land mines on the group's aircraft and even on the same plane. Usually, such a set was struck at villages in the "greenery" and targets in the open. At the same time, the FABs were the first to reach the ground, their explosions swept away the walls of the duvals, and the surviving manpower was already covered by the "trifle". So, with the help of RBK's, in December, the environs of Jalalabad and Kabul were processed, from where these cities were shelled, as well as the Mangwal area, where maps were full of many dots marking Dushman camps (in the daytime flight on December 24th, "balls" dropped from planes of the 149th BAP, completely mowed down the palm forest sheltering Dushmans under Mangwal). For a more dense "seeding", the RBCK's were dropped from heights of about 4000m, and the fuse of the explosive charge was set with a delay so that the cassettes opened 1,500 m above the ground. A huge sparkling ellipse crumbled under the plane at night - each RBK-500 covered an area of about 400 by 600m with deadly illumination, cutting everything into dust with hundreds of thousands of steel 5.5 mm balls.

The daily consumption of ammunition reached 250 tons, and the bombers would empty the district warehouses in a few weeks. Therefore, until this happened, ammunition began to be shipped from all over the Union, unloading every 3-4 days by echelon. In addition to the usual bombs of the 1954 and 1962 model, "stale goods" of old types, including those with brands of 30-40 years, were used. Such ammunition had insufficient stability on the trajectory when bombing at high speeds and from high altitudes, however, "limping" ballistics was considered satisfactory for hitting areas. Among the old bombs, there were samples with a three-coil suspension that did not fit with modern holders. However, by that time, any ordnanceman with Afghan experience knew the secret of getting rid of an extra lug: at the base of the red-hot steel knot, they made a couple of notches with a file and famously knocked it down with a sledgehammer.

Bombs were dropped in a series on area targets and along gorges, setting intervals and the order of descent from locks to the on-board weapon control system. If it was necessary to work on a compact object or across a mountain ravine, the payload was dropped in a volley by timing by the bomb compartment of the leader or aiming independently. In case of equipment failure on the leader's aircraft, the "reverse" method was used: the wingman found the target and, taking into account the interval in the formation, gave the command to the leader. Bombing on the instructions of weapons systems officer, the most effective for direct support aircraft, remained isolated for to Su-24: it was difficult to provide target designation for high-altitude bombing, and guidance was not possible at night. In most of the remote places already abandoned by the Soviet troops, there was no one to indicate the targets at all.

One of the raids on the call of the 735th BAP was carried out at the end of November, when the task was set to strike the fortified area southeast of Kandahar. The navigator, Capt. P. N. Klevetenko, who participated in it, described the incident as follows: "Having pulled up to the area where the Su-17 and Su-25 carousel was already spinning, we heard a hubbub on the air and desperate calls from the ground to hammer more and more, otherwise they (Dushmans) won't leave. In response - "We are not flying by TZ (technical specification)!" When the main noise subsided, our group commander requested work. The gunner, hearing an unfamiliar call sign, became alert: "What kind of "storks" are there, when there are "rooks" ready for another whole day of work?" He did not know us, and his instructions were of little use - the infantry had maps with a rectangular grid, and we needed other coordinates. We had to bomb it ourselves. When the first "half-truck" gasped, the gunner roared louder than a sawmill: "What are you doing there?! What are you throwing? Mountains are flying out from under your ass!" The commander replied to him: "Stop yelling. Tell me if they threw it there, the strike group is behind me." When he came to his senses, he gave the command to unload half a kilometer to the south. Then he thanked them for their work and finally hung up on the approaching stormtroopers: "Sabbath, you have nothing else to do here."

During combat operations near Pakistan itself, especially near Jalalabad and Kandahar, the planes passed along the border and immediately turned away into the depths of Afghan territory after the strike. Bombing the road to Peshawar, where the targets lay 3-5km from the "ribbon", the crews passed over the highway all the way to the border, and the Su-24 happened to "strike it with a wing" in a curve. The threat of Pakistani interceptions was warned by the MiG-23 unit from Bagram, which was on duty near 2000-3000m above the bombers. Sometimes the "Birch" (SPO-15S, Radar Warning Reciever) squeaked on airplanes, but the countermeasures were not deployed, because such fireworks in the night sky would immediately betray the groups presence. A very radical plan was prepared to protect the bombers from the detection of an unknown radar station. The strike group was to be accompanied by an aircraft with anti-radar weapons, which would fix the location of the radar with an on-board direction finder "Filin" and attack it with homing missiles Kh-58 (SEAD). However, such a decision was abandoned, considering it too likely that the radar and beacons of the Afghan airfields in Khost and Kandahar would be hit. Diplomatic complications were also highly undesirable, which would not have to wait long if the attacked target turned out to be in Pakistan.

Despite the secrecy of night high-altitude sorties, the command began to take additional security measures. To deceive enemy observers, they began to program a "curved" exit to a designated point or a lapel in front of it for bombing from an unexpected direction. Avoiding ambush air defense positions on mountain peaks, the return was built along a detour route and necessarily changed course when hitting the same target again.

There was no hope for PSS (Search and rescue service) helicopters when working in distant "corners"; in an emergency, they had to rely on their own luck and a supply of ammunition. The mandatory set, in addition to the regular PM with four magazines, including an AKS-74U, four magazines for it, a pair of F-1 "lemons" and RGD-5 grenades. The machine gun, as the most valuable, was hidden on the chest under the parachute suspension system, not trusting the nose under the seat, and the rest of the supplies were stuffed into pockets. It was extremely inconvenient to carry them there - the angular iron bulged out from everywhere, quickly tore pockets and tried to fall out. It was not possible to get special unloading vests (combat vests), even helicopter pilots in Afghanistan did not have enough of them, and they began to cut "bras" for automatic magazines and grenades on their own in the shelves. At Nikolayevets, the head of the PDS (Production and Dispatch Service) A. Solovyov, who acted as a "trendsetter", built a light vest with straps from old covers and parachute slings, and local pilots were fitted by their own wives.

In combat operation, the Su-24 turned out to be a completely reliable machine, cases of failure of the airframe and engines were isolated and related mainly to the control systems of the power plant, mechanization and hydraulics. Once there was an engine surge on the plane of the squadron's deputy commander, Maj. Rybak. Flashes in the nozzle were noticed by his wingman, after which Rybak had to turn off the faulty turbofan engine, get rid of the suspended munitions and return home. The Su-24 dropped to a risky altitude, but flew safely. There were repeated failures of fuel pumps in the PTB's, and the defect turned out to be all the more unpleasant because after pressing the emergency reset button, the bomber got rid of all the suspensions, and there were no extra tanks. Scolding the "Zionists who invented the plane", scarce PTB's were kept in the shelves, switching off the discharge channel by switching off the electrical equipment so that only bombs would leave the locks. The inevitable failures of complex electronics initially came in waves, in particular, the BTsVM (БЦВМ/On-board digital computer) did not work on every third or fourth aircraft, but gradually the system was "worked on" and there were fewer malfunctions. Due to the haste in preparation, programming errors occurred, and those simply confused the storage units when installed on airplanes. However, by this time there were practically no Soviet troops south of Bagram, and "complaints" did not come until in early December, during the bombing of a mountainous area north of Kabul, explosions sounded on the outskirts of the city. The OKSV (Ограни́ченный континге́нт сове́тских войск/Limited Contingency of Soviet Forces) paratroopers were killed, and suspicion fell on the 735th BAP. Army General V.I. Varennikov, who arrived to investigate Karshi, brought with him fragments with preserved markings. There were no such bombs at the airfield warehouses, and the charge was dropped, writing off the incident as a Dushman sabotage.

The Su-24 regiments did not suffer combat losses over Afghanistan, but intense fatigue, multiplied by a nocturnal lifestyle, gave their results. The weather also played a significant role in the two accidents that occurred. On a damp foggy night on December 13th, the Nikolaev crew consisting of pilot B.Markin and navigator K.A. Savelyev taxied to the start. In their haste, they did not notice that the consoles on the plane were folded, the mechanization was removed, and the gestures of the launch team inspecting the bombers before takeoff were not seen through the fogged glass of the lantern and drizzle. For the raid on Kandahar, the aircraft was refueled "under the traffic jam", carried two PTB-3000's, a FAB-1500 and two FAB-500's. Due to such a load, the prolonged separation did not seem suspicious at first, but the bomber did not want to take off at the end of the tarmac. At a speed of 350 km/h, the Su-24 jumped onto the ground and, lifting its nose, rushed on. The main landing gear withstood, and the aircraft broke off only in front of the nearest actuators, demolishing the antennas and the fence post on it. Both racks with dangling clusters of barbed wire were normally removed, and the pilot went up, raising the angle of attack to an exorbitant 27°. The plane reached its target, bombed out and returned safely, but had to land again without releasing the flaps and slats, the control unit of which ripped a column that passed through the fuselage. The crew was once again rescued by the structural strength of Sukhoi's machine and the flat surface of the desert (as they said, "he could have run all the way to Afghanistan"). There were no organizational issues - the winners were not judged, giving them three days of rest, after which they were again connected to flight work.

A week later, on December 20th, another case ended tragically. A young pilot of the 735th BAP, Sr. Lt. V. Shostenko with navigator Capt. A. Chernetsov flew a retransmission, providing communication with the strike group. When the bombers turned home, the repeater went down. A side wind was blowing at a speed of up to 15 m/s, and the pilot did not release the braking parachute so that the aircraft would not be pulled to the side. The pilot acted strictly according to the instructions, and in his actions, subsequently, not the slightest deviations from the instructions were found. However, the Su-24 was blown off the runway on the run and thrown onto the ground, where the main strut broke in a hole that broke through the fuselage and tanks. Shostenko managed to get out of the lying plane. The right wing of the lantern jammed, and while the navigator was getting rid of the straps and climbing into the pilot's seat, a puddle of kerosene spread around the aircraft. He had to jump into a sea of fire. Those who ran up with overcoats knocked down the flames from the captain, but it was too late - that same night Andrei Chernetsov died in the hospital...

Since the second half of December, a significant number of sorties have been carried out in squares along the withdrawal routes, preventing enemy hideouts and from creating "safety zones" near the roads. To increase the accuracy of strikes carried out near the location of their troops, raids were increasingly carried out during the day. Another reason for this was to ensure more intense and uniform work around the clock. Daytime bombing took up about a quarter of the total volume and was carried out in the same way. Only occasionally, on infrequent clear days, the Chaika-1 optoelectronic sights were used. Photo control of the results of each strike was assigned to the scouts of the 87th ORAP.

From time to time, during daytime raids on targets in familiar areas, the crews could observe the consequences of their strikes: the "greenery" sprinkled with craters, split rocks, sinkholes in place of mountain ledges with trails ending in an abyss, stone crumbs at the bottom of gorges in which roads were lost. Many villages remained only on maps, and in their place were barely discernible dusty ruins. A war-torn country lay below. The continued withdrawal of troops aroused doubts: What kind of road to peace is accompanied by a wave of bombing? The enemy for the aviators working "from across the river" remained a faceless point on the map, which often turned out to be villages among gardens and crops, not at all similar to the "fortified areas" listed in the orientations. People began to ask questions, and now the intelligence representative happened to assure the crews that the villages to be bombed were "abandoned by the inhabitants and depopulated". There were a lot of dissatisfied people, some began to shy away from flights, referring to their health and neglecting the payment due "for a combat day". The pilots remained faithful to the oath, but the foundations on which the country stood were shaken. In the 149th BAP, the crews refused to fly to the bombing three times, stating that "they are ready to give their lives for their Homeland, but they will not participate in this dirty business". Two pilots were persuaded by the joint efforts of commanders and special officers, but one refused outright and was dismissed from the army. This did not solve the issue: many during the sorties simply dropped bombs past the villages.

The crews of the 149th BAP went on a combat mission for the last time on January 11th, 1989, having worked on targets near Jalalabad. Over the entire period, about 140 regimental sorties were carried out (an average of two per day per aircraft) and 7,500 tons of bombs were dropped. For another week, the residents of Mykolaiv remained ready until the baton was taken by the 143rd BAP from Transcaucasia, who replaced them. There was talk in Kopitnari about the upcoming work, believing that "it definitely won't do without us," but the rumors were confirmed only in mid-January, when the commander of the regiment, Col. V. Nikulin, announced an imminent flight. All the preparation was reduced to the issuance of maps and the laying of a distillation route. 26 Su-24M's were sent to Khanabad, which flew in several groups, led by the commander of the 1st Squadron, Lt. Col. Moiseev, the 2nd - Lt. Col. Derban and the 3rd - Maj. Mosolov. Only excellent crews flew in combat formations, young pilots were transferred to replace them along with the technical staff. The flight was not without adventures: during the intermediate landing in Kirovobad, the leading commander of the regiment happened to attach his plane with his tail on concrete, cutting off the emergency fuel drain pipes. Their replacement was required, which is why only the next day, January 18th, the "Georgian" regiment arrived at its destination.

They were already given weapons on the spot and dressed in camouflage instead of the "ceremonial" blue overalls. Suitable sizes had been taken by that time, and the "latecomers to the war" got mostly huge jackets and suits, which made the pilots in new clothes look like natural orphans in someone else's shoulder bags. The experience of the past years has taught the suppliers little: it was not possible to wait for the issuance of "bras", which have become an indispensable attribute of military fashion, and the changing crews were in no hurry to share their own, reasonably believing that "the war is not over yet." The seasoned pilots of the 143rd Regiment still had old vests of the 1984 model, while the rest again had to cut them out of improvised materials or put magazines and grenades in their bosoms and pockets. To speed up the commissioning, the delayed commander and the head of intelligence of the 149th BAP conducted classes with them, who shared their experience. A representative of the intelligence department of the 73rd VA actively participated in the preparation, who delivered from Tashkent many photographic plates of targets, "portraits" of the most frequently processed objects in day and night (thermal) images, radar views of the terrain when leaving different courses (in the mountains, the same place changes beyond recognition when viewed from different directions, differing like the face and the back of the head). The intelligence efficiency deserved the highest assessment: within an hour after receiving the combat mission, photographic plates were spread out in front of the crews, reports on the activities of the opposition in the area for a day were read out, characteristics of air defense systems and other details were given.

The prospects in case of emergencies looked bleak: the PSS groups remained only in Kabul, Bagram and Kunduz, and even there they curtailed their work, preparing for the flight to the Union. By the end of January, the preflight instructions directly said: "If anything, pull to Pakistan and jump there. You have no one to rely on over Afghanistan, and from there we will be able to redeem or exchange."

On the afternoon of January 20th, the regiment in full force went on its first combat mission. The targets in the Puli Khumri area were located along the Kabul-Hairaton highway. The crews bombed through the clouds from an altitude of 6000-6600m with a correction according to the RSDN (long range radio navigation system). At dusk, the FAB-1500 and FAB-500 strikes were repeated. Later on, day and night sorties alternated in approximately equal proportions, both for short-range and long-range targets. In the dark, in addition to ANO (Aerial Navigation Lights) and SPO (RWR), the automatic jamming of the APP-50 was turned off on the Su-24M, which reacted to radiation and illumination on the ground and in the sky, perceived by sensitive electronics as missile launches. A false signal could be any glare, a bright moon coming out from behind the clouds, or the operation of the radar of neighboring aircraft, to which the system immediately responded with a volley of pyropatrons with dipole reflectors and countermeasures. Somehow, on one plane, they forgot to turn off the automation of the machine, and just before the target it worked, coloring the night darkness with real illumination, according to the pilots, "amazing, but not at all appropriate." The spectacle was stopped by the regimental commander, who went on the air with a set of strong and clear instructions to the gawkers.

On January 21st, a task of special importance was received: intelligence managed to find the hideout of the elusive Ahmad Shah in a gorge near Karabat, north of Kabul. According to B. Gromov, Massoud was guarded by another "mutually acceptable agreement", but he did not want to miss the chance to end his long-time opponent. At night, the 143rd and 735th BAP carried out two regimental sorties each, but the Panjshir Lion left again, however, this was only the beginning. Under pressure from Kabul, for which the continuation of the war remained the only chance to maintain power, Operation Typhoon began on January 23rd, which was reduced to three days of artillery, rocket strikes, and air raids, chosen as "the main method of defeating Massoud's formations in Panjshir and the southern foothills of Salang". Finally, the aviators had to "slam the door" in the following days, and the pilots were explained that they were not bombing Ahmad Shah, but "unconscious gangs who did not want reconciliation," as proof of which they made several sorties to Panjshir with propaganda bombs-cassettes stuffed with leaflets. It is not known how Massoud's fighters assessed them, but in one case, agitation and propaganda turned out to be a real force: they reported from a nearby checkpoint that "they leafed through successfully, and even killed one spirit in the village with a cassette."

In the 143rd Regiment, they tried to use the corrected KAB-500L and KAB-1500L aerial bombs in caves and shelters in the mountains, but without success. Independent search for small objects, even with the help of a powerful television sight, followed by illumination with a laser beam from heights of about 6000-7000 m, turned out to be ineffective, and it was not necessary to count on targeting from the ground in snow-covered mountains. In addition, the bombs, when dropped from high altitudes, where their rudders "did not have enough air," were poorly controlled. It was not possible to achieve the required accuracy, and crumbling rocks with "sledgehammers" worth tens of thousands of rubles was expensive. Effective high-altitude bombing of point targets in the mountains remained a very big problem. At the beginning of February, impressive forces were attracted to destroy two hijacked Afghan helicopters that landed without fuel in the northeast in the gorge near Miandakh - two links of "Georgian" Su-24s, Karshi neighbors and DA (Democratic Afghan) aircraft. They worked with conventional bombs, none of which covered the target. The "fans" (helicopters) looked convincingly intact from above, and the Bagram "rooks" (Su-25's) had to finish them off.

The Su-24 sorties continued until the last days and hours of the 40th Army's stay in Afghanistan. The strikes mostly targeted roadside areas and "bandit" Charikar, Bamyan and Panjshir. Remote Afghan garrisons, which were practically cut off from the center, were also supported by bombing. As the navigator of the squadron of the 143rd BAP, Capt. N. Baryshnikov, recalled, "in one of the sorties, the purpose of which was assigned to the "weapons depots" near Bagram, a cluster of tents was indeed found in the specified place. The sight clearly showed red crosses on them and figures of people rushing around - they must have been refugees from a bombed Salang. The hand did not rise and, without collusion, we took the aiming marks aside with the whole link ...". The rejection of the war took its toll: even with the lack of fuel from the outboard tanks, which happened three times in the 143rd Regiment, the pilots tried to drop them without hitting the villages.

The Pakistani fighter pilots had a similar attitude to the war, avoiding skirmishes and limiting themselves to patrolling their side of the border. Working these days in the gorges near Asadabad, from where Pakistan is just a stone's throw away, the Su-24 crews have repeatedly observed the silhouettes of F-16 in the distance. Despite the fact that MiGs from Bagram went home at the end of January, they did not rush into battle and limited themselves to observation, marking themselves at night with ANO and flashing beacons.

Finally, the Su-24 struck on February 13th and 14th, carrying out two regimental sorties during each day. The bombers "cut tails" after the departing troops, working in Salang, Charikar Valley, areas from Kabul and all the way to Panj. These days, they bombed exclusively with "halftrucks", which caused real earthquakes in the snow-capped mountains with avalanches and landslides.

Thanks to the journalists covering the withdrawal of troops, the Su-24 flashed on television screens: the news commentator, pointing to the inversion tails of "the last Soviet planes leaving Afghanistan," was clearly in a hurry - the departing army was moving north across the bridge, and the contrails in the sky stretched in the opposite direction...

Despite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, they were in no hurry to curtail the presence of the air group. The regiments remained ready to support the Najib government, and in case of an immediate threat to the capital, it was supposed to transfer bombers of the 143rd BAP close to the border to the Kalai-Mor airfield and from there repel the assault on the city. The crews received detailed maps of Kabul, divided into squares, in which each had specific goals and objectives. The KAB-500L and KAB-1500L, as well as guided missiles Kh-25 and Kh-29, were planned to be used in "street battles". The 735th Regiment had to solve similar tasks, working from its air base. The preparations lasted three weeks, but the opposition did not storm the capital, choosing the usual tactics of exhausting shelling and sabotage. On March 6th, the "lights out" was given, and the bombers of the 143rd regiment, "closing their mission," returned to Kopitnari.

Thank you for reading. Tune in next week for another poll on translated stories of Soviet Cold War Aviation. Again, massive thank you to @heatloss1986 for the recommendation to use Obsidian to collect my threads a little better without risking losing it due to internet. But until next time, goodnight, and God bless!