Thread by @amalsaad_lb

THREAD: Tomorrow, October 17, will mark one month since Israel launched its war on Lebanon, that was set off with the mass casualty terrorist attack on over 4000 pager users, and escalating to the carpet bombing of southern Lebanon, culminating in the assassination of Hezbollah's entire military leadership and Seyyid Hasan Nasrallah. Instead of causing the anticipated collapse of the movement, these very harsh blows which occurred in quick succession, only seem to have invigorated it, and demonstrated its anti-fragility. What was intended to weaken Hizbullah has spectacularly backfired, highlighting how Israel fundamentally misread the group and, even after 42 years of close surveillance, still clearly does not understand its enemy. 1/

Had any other state in the region, including Israel, been confronted with a similar scenario, it would have likely spiralled into chaos, civil war, and succumbed to invasion. Far from collapsing like many states would, Hizbullah’s asymmetric advantage enabled it not only to reconstitute itself organisationally and maintain its command, control, and operational continuity but also to inflict substantial losses on the Israeli military. 2/

These tactical victories include, among others, a strike on the elite Golani Brigade in Binyamina on Sunday, which killed 4 and injured 67, as well as today’s close combat clashes in the Ramia–Aita Al-Shaab–Qawzah triangle, where Hizbullah's ambush resulted in over 49 injuries so far. This is over and above dozens of similar incidents over the past few weeks which have resulted in dozens of Israeli casualties. All of this occurred while Hizbullah was still reeling from the impact of these monumental losses, and the displacement of most of its support base. 3/

Despite Israel’s efforts over the past two and a half weeks to invade South Lebanon—initially through small elite reconnaissance missions and later with larger mechanised divisions across multiple axes from east to west—it has failed to advance more than 1.5 km into Lebanese territory. Even if Israel eventually manages to advance and secure additional territory, it will likely struggle to maintain control for any significant length of time, let alone secure the 5 km required to establish a permanent buffer zone. 4/

After the 2006 war, Nasrallah emphasized the difference between traditional guerilla warfare, which liberates occupied land, and Hizbullah’s ability to prevent an occupation altogether, defeating the aggressor before it can seize territory. Yesterday, Sheikh Naim Qassem pointed out that while a resistance force isn’t typically expected to function like a conventional military and fend off an invasion, Hizbullah has done just that. In other words, Hizbullah has evolved from a movement that liberates land, to one that prevents occupation, and now actively thwarts invasions. 5/

Simply put, Israel's brutal campaign against Lebanon has only served to showcase the effectiveness of Hizbullah's "adaptive warfare" defensive strategy, a plan outlined by Nasrallah and others before the war, as recently explained by the head of Hizbullah's Media Office. In doing so, it has also underscored how Hizbullah possesses a deep understanding of its enemy through cognitive empathy, while Israel continues to fundamentally misunderstand and underestimate its opponent. 6/