Thread by @JominiW

1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1008): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, since November 5, the ZSU has managed to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors of the Strategic Front while effectively transitioning to a delaying operation in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction. This thread provides a general overview of events in the Northern and Donbas Strategic Directions of the Ukrainian TVD since early November. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #VelykaNovosilka #Kurakhove #ChasivYar #Siverek

2/ Operational Terms. To assist in comprehension of the thread's graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (Note: I am still refining and updating this list. Please bear with me as I do. Thank you.)

3/ Northern Strategic Direction: After approximately 104 days since offensive operations started in Kursk, the Biden Administration (with the governments of France and the United Kingdom closely following suit) has finally been compelled to lift restrictions on the use of long-range strike weapons (like ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP) on targets within the Russian Federation. However, the United States has not committed to President Zelensky’s request for Tomahawk cruise missiles and other long-range missile systems. Due to the limited quantity of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP stockpiles, ZSU strikes on logistics facilities, airfields, and command posts inside the Russian Federation have been limited in scope and have had negligible effects on VSRF operations.

In the Kursk OD, VDV-led counterattacks continue to pressure ZSU defensive lines. Although there has been anecdotal reporting from Ukrainian troops in the Kursk lodgment stating they have engaged in combat with DPRK forces, there has yet to be credible footage to substantiate these claims. Russian efforts to mask the location of DPRK units by atomizing units (i.e., only deploying small units, likely company and below, within SVRF battalions) and dressing them in Russian uniforms appear successful. Obfuscating the location of DPRK units allows them to gain the necessary experience to operate as an effective independent force.

4/Russia's Response to ATACMS & Storm Shadow/SCALP: Russia’s response to the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP on targets inside their territory has been underwhelming, employing a single RS-26 Rubezh intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), redubbed as the Oreshnik. The RS-26 Rubezh was first developed in 2011, with procurement frozen in 2018. With a demonstrated range of 5,500-5,800 km, the RS-26 was likely chosen as a low-cost minimal risk to Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) actual stockpiles of strategic weapon systems, as the RS-26 is still a prototype system that is not in service.

The IRBM launched at Dnipro’s industrial sector likely contained six banks of six small inert warheads each, relying on the kinetic force of a Mach 10 orbital reentry to maximize damage. The need for so many redundant warhead banks is due to the RS-26's lack of precision in deploying conventional warheads. The effect of RS-26 warheads is more akin to that of cluster munitions impacting at an extreme rate of speed. The effect of the Oreshnik has likewise been inert, as the Ukrainians, the United States, or European Powers have not been coerced into halting ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP inside Russia. #Oreshnik

5/ Operational Direction Kursk: OUV Kursk retains initiative over OTU Siversk(?). Although the first and second OUV Kursk counteroffensives into the western flank of the Sudzha Lodgment regained half the ground lost to the initial ZSU incursion of early August, the reduced size of the ZSU lodgment improved OTU Siversk(?) ability to defend against large-scale Russian attacks. Shortened interior lines of communication have allowed ZSU units to provide more effective mutual support and rapid response for reserves to block penetrations of defensive lines. Concurrently, a more compact lodgment perimeter has shortened resupply cycles, casualty evacuation, and unit movement in and out of the Sudzha Lodgment.

The redeployment of the 106th Guards Airborne Division from the Siversk Operational Direction to Kursk was completed by late October. This provided OUV Kursk (along with the integration of an estimated 8,000 to 12,000 of the DPRK's XI “Storm” Corps) with an effective force to spearhead a third counteroffensive. Overall, the 106th Airborne Division’s counteroffensive failed to break ZSU defenses. However, Ukrainian units along the Snahist River are hard-pressed, and Russian forces have a foothold on the south bank. A renewed assault here threatens to break into the ZSU rear area and cut the 38K-30 & H07 lines of communication.

6/ Operational Direction Kharkiv: There is no significant change to the assessment of Kharkiv as a low-priority Operational Direction. Russian attacks remain small in scale. ZSU activity is limited chiefly to localized defense supported by indirect fire attacks, FPV strikes, and positional assaults when opportunities arise. The 18th Guards Motorized Rifle Division is still focused on retaining control of Hlyboke while the 69th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operate jointly from Shebekino. Fixing forces in the Northern SD creates opportunities for Russian forces in the Donbas Industrial Area to exploit exhausted defenses before newly formed ZSU brigades are deployed to critical sectors of the strategic front. Russian control of the Kharkiv Oblast territory is enough to produce and sustain the desired strategic effects.

7/ Donbas Strategic Direction: There is no change to the assertion that the Donbas Strategic Direction (SD) is the decisive SD of the Ukrainian TVD. The SVRF will maintain its Main Effort toward Pokrovsk. However, the focus of operations will be the penetration of the strategic flank of OSUV Tavriya between Selydove and Velyka Novosilka. OSV Zapad will continue reinforcing its success in the Kolisnykivka, Pershotravneve, and Terny areas. OSV Yug will place priority effort in the Chasiv Yar area, reinforcing the success of the 98GABD assault into central Chasiv Yar while threatening Kostyantynivka by advancing SW on H32 HWY. In the Siversk area, elements of OSV Yug will continue to improve positions to the east of Hryhorivkaand north of Verkhnokamyanske. OSV Tsentr and OSV Vostok will almost certainly continue to coordinate offensive actions in southern Donetsk Oblast to complete the conquest of that area.

8/ Operational Direction Kupyansk: 1st Guards Tank Army has completed a well-coordinated multi-division offensive along a line of operations at the seam of the OTU Kupyansk and OTU Staroblisk areas of responsibility. with the lead elements of the 47th Tank Division now positioned on the OskilRiver at Kruhlyakivka, OSV Zapad has tactically isolated OTU Kupyansk and OTU Staroblisk. As the 47th Tank Division reconstitutes its combat power from its drive to the Oskil, priority of effort will likely be placed with the 4th Guards Tank Division as it assaults Ukrainian defenses around Lozova and advances west towards Borova. 2d Guard Motorized Rifle Division’s attack into northern Kupyansk was limited in scope and scale due to detaching most of its units to the 47th Tank Division for its drive to the Oskil. The attack on Kupyansk demonstrated that Ukrainian defenses in this sector of the front are vulnerable to infiltration. However, the 2GMRD does not have the combat power to execute or sustain a division-sized attack to seize the city.

OTU Kupyansk is not likely to conduct a withdrawal from the east side of the Oskil but will seek opportunities to counterattack and collapse the 47th Tank Division’s narrow Pishchane salient. To the south, OTU Staroblisk will need to stabilize its lines in Zahryzove, Lozova, and between Zelenyi Hai and Shyikivka before it can commit to a significant counterattack to regain lost ground. Critical to the defense of the Oskil is the need for effective coordination with OTU Lyman defending in the Kreminnaarea. With both its strategic flanks threatened, OSUV Khortytsia will continue to be hard-pressed to prevent the defensive integrity of the Donbas Strategic Direction. OSUV Khortytsia cannot allow both strategic flanks to crumble. If the strategic flanks do collapse, the ZSU will enter 2025 at a significant operational disadvantage in the TVDs decisive SD.

9/ Operational Direction Kreminna: Operational-Tactical Group (OTU) Lyman(?) has centered its defense along the Zherebets River, focused along the barrier presented by the Lymanskyi Reservoir between Novolyubivkaand Torske. The 3d Motorized Rifle Division will defend Makiivka and Nevske as it rebuilds combat power. The 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 67th Motorized Rifle Division will likely continue coordinated attacks to seize Terny and breakthrough to the west side of the Lymanskyi Reservoir. The 67th Motorized Rifle Division will likely complete the capture of Torske before the end of 2024 and then pause for refit and reconstitution before resuming operations in the spring of 2025. OTU Lyman will hold its positions in Ternyand only withdraw is it is operationally necessary. Ukrainian forces could likely counterattack in the Makiivka and Nevskeareas. However, they will require bridging equipment to assault on a broad frontage. Positional engagements will continue in Serebryanski Forest.

10/ Operational Direction Donetsk: The Donetsk Oblast is the decisive Operational Direction for the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation (SVRF). The conquest of southern Donetsk Oblast is the main effort of OUGRV-Ukraine operations.

OSV Tsentr remains the main effort for OUGRV-Ukraine. OUGRV-Ukraine will continue to coordinate the offensive actions of OSV Tsentr and OSV Vostok to complete the conquest of southern Donetsk Oblast. OSV Tsentr will focus efforts to breakthrough OTU Krasnohotivka’s defense of the T-0515 Highway line to advance towards Novopavlivka before conducting a turning movement north to assault the lightly fortified areas south and west of Pokrovsk. The 41GCAA will likely transition to an operational pause in Toretsk while OSV Yug will focus on degrading OSUV Khortytsia logistic capacity in western Donetsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriya will likely complete its delay withdrawal from the Kurakhove area and establish a new defensive line in west Donetsk and prep for counteroffensives.

11/ Operational Direction Siversk: Siversk has been a pivot of operations since the fall of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Popasna. It is a central position within the OSUV Khortytsia area of responsibility and a coordination point between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk for the defense of the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, the decisive strategic point of the Donbas SD.

OSV Yug will continue to focus on degrading the logistical capacity of OTU Luhansk throughout the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate. 3d Guards Combined Arms Army will transition to the defense along the Vymika-Ivano-Darivka-Spirne line while engaging in limited actions to improve its tactical positioning in the Verkhnokamianske area. Russian forces will likely continue small-scale assaults to infiltrate and shatter ZSU defenses in Fedorivka & Pereizne. The ZSU 10th Mountain Assault, 54th Mechanized, and 81st Air Assault Brigades, along with the VTO 118th Territorial Defense Brigades, will continue to defend in sector.

12/ Operational Direction Chasiv Yar: OTU Luhansk(?) has managed to operationally block OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka, which would threaten to unhinge OSUV Khortytsia’s defense of central Donetsk Oblast. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal has been an effective barrier inhibiting Russian maneuver, made more so by constructing field fortifications in successive belts to the west of the canal and north of Toretsk. However, in recent weeks, the 98th Guards Airborne Division has made notable gains along the breath of the Siverskyi-Donets Canal opposite Chasiv Yar. Specifically, VDV-supported forces have established a sizeable bridgehead over the canal south of Chasiv Yar along the H32 highway.

Torestsk or Chasiv Yar will likely not come under Russian control before the end of 2024, though there is a roughly even chance the VSRF will be able to seize these points before spring 2025. The 98th Guards Airborne Division will likely transition to small-scale assaults and reconnaissance-in-force missions to improve positioning in central Chasiv Yar throughout the 2024-25 winter season. There is a roughly even chance 3d Army Corps will expand its foothold on the west bank of the Siverskyi-Donets Canal between Ivanivskeand Klishciivka to set conditions for an advance towards Kostiantynivka. OTU Luhansk will defend in sector and is not likely to conduct a withdrawal to secondary fortifications around Kostiantynivka. ZSU forces will seek opportunities to regain the initiative.

13/ Toretsk/Nui-York Operational Direction: Although the Torestk Operational Direction has been under intense SVRF assault, the ZSU has been able to prevent a deep penetration of defensive lines along this critical sector. With winter fast approaching, an assault through the city will be a long and difficult fight; there is no indication Russian forces will be able to take the city before the 2024-25 winter season sets in, leaving the likely timeframe the Russians can accomplish this to be sometime in the spring of 2025. However, if the Russians can seize control of Toretsk during the 2024-25 winter season, they will have new operational axes to exploit. The first is to advance northeast and attack Chasiv Yar from the SW. The second is a direct assault against the lightly fortified southern avenues of approach to Kostiantynivka. The third is to advance north and turn southwest down the H32 highway to support the isolation of Pokrovsk from the north. Either of these options may have dire impact on the ZSUs ability to maintain a coherent defense of central and western Donetsk Oblast.

14/ Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction: OTU Donetsk has effectively transitioned to conducting a Corps-sized delaying operation. OTU Donetsk does not have enough forces within its Area of Responsibility to defend Kurakhove and the Sukhi Yaly Riverline effectively. It is trading space for time in-depth to slow down OSVs Tsentr and Vostok momentum without becoming decisively engaged. While coordination between ZSU brigades has been challenged by the atomization of brigade cohesion and hasty task organization, it has still been effective enough to force the Russians to repeatedly concentrate forces to fight through a series of defensive positions, exposing them to mass sUAV / FPV strikes and artillery barrages. Although the 36th Combined Arms Army is posing a serious threat to the strategic flank of OSUV Tavriya in the Velyka Novosilka area, the continued threat posed by units defending west and north of the town, as well as saturating the area with FPV strikes, is forcing the Russians to adjust their axes of advance, delaying meaningful progress constantly. The Russians may reach the Solona River and the western border of the Donetsk Oblast during the 2024-25 Winter season, but OTU Donetsk will have set conditions for its own spring offensive.

Operational Group of Forces Center (OSV Tsentr) will continue their assault west to seize Pokrovsk and set conditions for further offensive action in western Donetsk Oblast. The 90th Guards Tank Division will very likely remain OSV Tsentr’s main effort, attacking West and SW fromSelydove along the rail line towards Novotroitske. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division will continue to focus on fixing OTU Pokrovsk in Myrnohrad. Supporting OSV Tsentr, the 51st Guards Combined Arms Army of the Operational Group of Forces South (OSV Yug) will continue its attack towards Kurakhove to possibly link-up with the OSV Vostok south-north attack from Bohoyavlenka. OSV Donetsk will likely reposition defensive lines along the Solona River anchored on Novopalivka and Velyka Novosilka.

15/ This open-source operational summary of the Ukrainian TVD is based on information from the ZSU & VSRF daily operations briefs, various Ukrainian & Russian Telegram channels, western intel agencies public statements, military analysts, & my own professional experience. Any errors in the information and translation presented here are strictly my own and will be corrected in the following update.