1/ Russia's shortage of armoured vehicles and lack of an analogue for the M113 APC or M2A2 Bradley IFV has led soldiers to weld troop-carrying 'booths' onto rusting Soviet-era MT-LB armoured fighting vehicles. It highlights the Russian defence industry's failure to adapt. ⬇️
2/ The MT-LB, built in Ukraine, Bulgaria and Poland from the early 1970s, is designed to carry 11 men in addition to a driver and gunner. However, like other Soviet-era APCs, it suffers from low headroom and narrow exit doors which slow down disembarcation from the vehicle.
3/ This has often been a problem for Russian forces in Ukraine, as it leaves disembarking troops highly vulnerable to enemy fire. In one incident recorded by the Ukrainians, an entire Russian assault squad was wiped out in seconds as it exited its MT-LB.
4/ The MT-LB's light armour (only 3-14 mm thick) also makes the vehicle itself highly vulnerable to drones and direct enemy fire. It is incapable of resisting the Bradley's 25mm autocannon, let alone tank fire.
5/ As the Russian 'Military Informant' Telegram channel notes, "The production of new armoured vehicles is not capable of sufficiently covering the heavy losses incurred in them, and the number of vehicles removed from storage that are suitable for combat operations is becoming…
6/ …fewer and fewer – many types of equipment in the 1st and 2nd storage categories [i.e. in the best conditions, generally under cover] have already been exhausted, and those stored in less acceptable conditions require more and more time for major repairs and modernisation."
7/ Russian troops have frequently complained about the weakness of Russian armoured personnel carriers, calling them "complete shit that burns and kills our soldiers". They have attempted to upgrade existing vehicles with home-made armour.
8/ This is the result, as 'Military Informant' notes, of the Russian military-industrial complex's failure to adapt to the needs of the Ukraine war. As another Russian warblogger has commented, failed projects like the Armata tank have taken priority.
9/ "Over the years of war, neither the industry nor the Ministry of Defence have been able to give birth to a notional analogue of the M113 APC for these purposes, and the USSR did not produce such equipment at all, which excludes its presence in storage bases.
10/ "Due to the fact that there is simply nowhere to quickly get such equipment from, and no one is going to produce it, the role of assault APCs has to be played by the MT-LB, which is completely unsuitable for this.
11/ "[It is] not adapted either in terms of its armour, or in terms of mine protection, or in terms of the convenience of placing and landing troops."
12/ Additionally, as 'Military Informant' points out, drones have fundamentally changed the environment in which troops disembark:
"At the same time, due to the dominance of drones over the battlefield, the tactics of using armored vehicles have also undergone serious changes."
13/ "Now, APCs and IFVs do not fight together with infantry, but try to deliver them to the dismounting line as quickly as possible, and then leave the danger zone as quickly as possible so as not to become a victim of a drone."
14/ While in many cases this has been achieved by having the troops ride on the roof of the vehicle, this leaves the soldiers extremely vulnerable to drone and small arms attacks, which can wipe out entire squads before they can even disembark.
15/ The Russians have found a solution of sorts by welding a metal 'booth' to the top of MT-LBs, "by cutting off part of the roof and placing it on top of a higher structure, allowing the equipped landing force to be more comfortably accommodated, and, if necessary,…
16/ …quickly leave the vehicle under fire. Note that even this simple modernisation is carried out by repair units in the army and by the crews of the vehicles themselves, and not at factories."
17/ The booths have the advantage of allowing quick disembarkation and some protection from shell splinters and small arms fire. They are still very vulnerable to drones, however, and obliterate the MT-LB's low profile.
18/ As 'Military Informant' complains, this highlights the fact that military equipment makers "often do not care at all about what the front actually needs, and the leadership of the Ministry of Defence does not understand this."
19/ "We have long and often written about the current situation and the need in the army for both simple front-line armored personnel carriers and their heavily armored versions. But, unfortunately, the situation has not yet moved on from an impasse." /end
Sources:
🔹 t.me/milinfolive/14…
🔹 t.me/milinfolive/14…
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