Thread by @Jonpy99

1/ Time for the second BTRZ thread! This time we’ll take a look into the state of BMP refurbishment and production rate.

2/ Here’s the first thread about BTRZs:

3/ So, before taking a look into the facilities and their capabilities, we have to consider that for the last year Russia has decisively switched tactics to infantry and light vehicles intensive ones.

4/ Clearly the Russian high command doesn’t regard the lives of their own men enough, so these new tactics have proven more cost-effective at taking Ukrainian positions. Mobility is the key now, at all costs.

5/ This is not the thread to discuss such matters. Suffice to say that BMP losses have hugely decreased as a result.

6/ So Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before without losing as many. Like most types of heavy equipment, these means they’re holding it back. Whether to launch a big offensive in Ukraine or reconstitute their army in the long run is a different matter.

7/ And also as with most types of heavy equipment, only BMP-3s are still newly produced, in this case by Kurganmashzavod. Everything else is taken from Soviet stockpiles.

8/ So let’s start! First let’s take a look at the 103rd BTRZ. This one is mainly focused on refurbishing and modernizing old T-62s, but they also seem to have enough spare capacity for other AFVs.

9/ They appeared to have worked through their entire BMP-2 backlog (as well as almost everything else but T-62s).

10/ As with most BTRZs, there was a spike in late 2022/2023 related to the massive expansion in size of the Russian army. By now I think there are effectively 0 BMPs in the yards waiting to be refurbished: 49 in 2021, to 104 in 2022, 86 in 2023, 16 in 2024 and 0 in 2025.

11/ I say I think because these, which I counted as tanks, might actually be old scrapped BMP-3s untouched through the whole war, which would be very weird if true.

12/ Kudos to @DominikVra54631:

13/ Next plant to consider is the 163rd BTRZ. Just like the 81st for BTR-70/80/82s, this one might be actually working on repairing BMP-1/2s damaged in Ukraine rather than refurbishing stored ones, considering its location:

14/ The many broken hulls also point to this:

15/ Again, huge backlog in 2023, which must have been mostly cleaned up by now thanks to increasing capabilities: 209 in 2021, 198 in 2022, 488 in 2023 and 270 in 2024.

16/ Even the old scrapyard has been mostly emptied, and not just of BMPs, but also tanks and other AFVs:

17/ Regarding the 144th BTRZ, which is mainly focused on BMD-2s/BTR-Ds, it also held a few dozen BMP-1/2s from prewar, but it seems they mostly refurbished them all while barely receiving any more BMP, as that BTRZ is critical to maintain the BMD fleet.

18/ There were at least 23 BMP-1/2s in 2021, 35 in 2022, 31 in 2023 and 12 in 2024:

19/ The 61st BTRZ, as already explained in the previous thread, mostly works on tanks, specially T-72s and T-80s. However, there were also many other AFVs parked here and mostly looking horrible long before the war:

20/ Half the BMPs were gone by 2022, and since then they have slowly refurbished the rest while focusing on tanks: 114 in 2021, 63 in 2022, 47 in 2023 and 20 in 2024.

21/ Here too they were even starting to look into the old pile of scrapped hulls by 2024, both tanks and BMPs:

22/ The last proper BTRZ to analyze is the 560th, far away from Europe. This one seemed half abandoned by 2022, and it certainly looked more like your average storage base with decrepit stored armor than a BTRZ (and even BTRZs looked bad back then).

23/ This one doesn’t appear to have a notable capability to work through AFVs, unlike the other ones previously seen which have become more efficient as the war drags on.

24/ However, even here we can see that a lot of equipment is gone, specially BMP-1/2s, and they also seem to ship in BMPs from storage bases (later on):

25/ Tho also others like MT-LBs, BTR-60/70s and some tanks:

26/ The staff from the 560th seems to be doing whatever they can with the equipment they have to work with, but, unsurprisingly, that’s far from perfect from a Russian POV.

27/ Even then, this is one of the few BTRZs that we have footage of it delivering a batch of refurbished BMPs:

28/ BMPs here went down from 423 in 2021, 361 in 2022, 374 in 2023 and 324 in 2024:

29/ Finally, there are two other proper private companies we have to consider when it comes to BMP production rates: Rubtsovsky and Kurganmashzavod.

30/ Rubtsovsky had a contract to modernize old BMP-1s to BMP-1AMs, which greatly improves their combat capabilities. It also works on other projects like ARVs, but that’s not related to this thread.

31/ This plant has too seen a dramatic increase in its capabilities to modernize BMP-1s: Just take a look at the main yard where BMP-1s are parked to wait for their modernization:

32/ Numbers are the following: 30 in 2021, 28 in 2022, 77 in 2023, 136 in 2024 and 270 in 2025.

33/ Considering Rubtsovsky and the 349th storage base are near each other, the spike in stored BMPs at the 349th once the war started may be explained by that base being used as a parking lot for the future backlog of Rubtsovsky.

34/ Weird thing is, BMP-1AMs are very rarely seen and even more rarely lost in Ukraine. Either Rubtsovsky now mostly works on plain refurbs for old BMPs, or BMP-1AMs are another type of armored vehicle held back to reconstitute the Russian army.

35/ Finally, the cherry on the cake: Kurganmashzavod. While in the previous thread I mentioned that the rate of production of BMD-4Ms by Kurgan is not that notable, the same does not happen for BMP-3s.

36/ It has proven to be the most efficient Russian armor manufacturer. They have kept a steadily increasing rate of BMP-3 deliveries through the war. By 2024 the average was 30 a month, together with 8-10 BMD-4Ms. By 2025 it's probably 35-40 a month.

37/ In other words, 360 new BMP-3s in 2024, 400-480 by 2025. And there’s no lack of footage, unlike deliveries of batches of Russian equipment of any other type but tanks.

38/

39/ Not just that, but they also appear to have worked through their backlog of stored BMP-3s waiting repairs/modernizations: 13 in 2021, 18 in 2022, 100 in 2023 and 18 again in 2024:

40/ And Kurgan also refurbishes and modernizes BMP-2s. We can assume also at a pretty high rate:

41/ Even if Russia doesn’t lose as many BMPs as it used to be, many of them are BMP-3s, like in the most recent big Russian mechanized assault a few days ago when Russia lost another 6 BMP-3s:

42/ Which wouldn’t make sense without a high production rate based on prewar estimates of Russia fielding up to 700 BMP-3s in 2021 and having lost a minimum of 738 according to @Rebel44CZ: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

@Rebel44CZ 43/ Once again, this either points to Russia holding back equipment to reconstitute their ground forces.

@Rebel44CZ 44/ Finally, some storage bases like the 22nd or 2456th either preserved most of their BMPs in decent enough condition or have the means to repair them themselves:

@Rebel44CZ 45/

@Rebel44CZ 46/ And as I explain the previous thread, we also have to consider smaller, impoverished repair workshops and other minor facilities:

@Rebel44CZ 47/ Now, let’s consider some patterns we can notice at BTRZs: first, we can see huge piles of spares parts from cannibalized vehicles:

@Rebel44CZ 48/ This fits with visual proof of them also working on horrible-looking hulls, like these at the 560th:

@Rebel44CZ 49/ Considering that most of the decently preserved AFVs were sent straight to the front early in the war and now most storage bases have only shitty stuff left, BTRZs are as well off working on their own backlogs of broken hulls than on the ones from storage bases:

@Rebel44CZ 50/ Only when they're done working backlogs at their yards will storage bases once again send BMPs missing components to to try and repair them, as it probably just happened with the huge scrapyard at the 769th, after a year of low demothballing activity:

@Rebel44CZ 51/ Even with the bad technical state of remaining BMPs, we see increasing capabilities regarding both refurbishment and modernization and new production. Just compare these two pictures of the 103rd during 2024 to see the progression:

@Rebel44CZ 52/ Or these trainloads from the 560th:

@Rebel44CZ 53/ This means Russia is probably getting more BMPs than it is losing right now, and will probably replenish a lot of professional units depleted, like the 1st Guards Tank Army.

@Rebel44CZ 54/ Once stockpiles are gone for good, Russia will have replenished its numbers enough to hold on well for a good while, and even then new production will have picked up even more.

@Rebel44CZ 55/ Though anecdotal, this was seen at the 2025 Russian Victory Parade, where they show modern equipment, both in Moscow and also in other cities:

@Rebel44CZ 56/ So once again, no, a piece of equipment gone from storage is not the same as that same piece of equipment being lost in combat. At all.

@Rebel44CZ 57/ Finally, here is the table with refurb and production estimates (overall conclusions once all BTRZ threads are published):

@Rebel44CZ 58/ As always, kudos to to all those who helped, specially to @WillKnowler, @CovertCabal, @T_90AK (most pictures can be found on his account), @Rhaescuporis , @HighMarsed, @waffentraeger, @Ath3neN0ctu4 and many more!

@Rebel44CZ @WillKnowler @CovertCabal @T_90AK @Rhaescuporis @HighMarsed @waffentraeger @Ath3neN0ctu4 59/ See you in the next BTRZ thread!

@Rebel44CZ @WillKnowler @CovertCabal @T_90AK @Rhaescuporis @HighMarsed @waffentraeger @Ath3neN0ctu4 60/ As time passes there's ever more evidence of refurbs of all kinds of AFVs. For example, PRP-3/4 artillery support vehicles to BMP-like APCs:

@Rebel44CZ @WillKnowler @CovertCabal @T_90AK @Rhaescuporis @HighMarsed @waffentraeger @Ath3neN0ctu4 61/ Or BMP-1AMs from Rubstovk: