Thread by @laurnorman

Thread #Irantalks: The 2013 vibes around #Irantalks are very strong right now. We have Iran, which insists its right to enrich uranium is a legal certainty, nonetheless extremely extremely keen/determined to get the Trump administration to recognise it. -1-

Hence all this talk in public from Araghchi and others about not taking one step back, warning that to do so, would be to signal retreat across the board. Pre-2013, Iran similarly refused compromise until its enrichment rights were recognised by U.S. -2-

That essentially happened during the secret talks in Oman in 2013. It was clear enough by the second formal track spring meeting in Almaty that something major had changed. It turned out that was essentially an understanding that Iran's enrichment right was recognised. -3-

Once the U.S. did that, it paved the way for the JCPOA but it also significantly increased Iran's leverage. It didn't seem so at the time and the diplomacy could have gone wrong. But essentially, was then essentially a question of which formula to use to get Iran to 1-year -4-

breakout time. (centrifuge numbers/type produced and installed, stockpile limit, enrichment level & inspections). All that process took two years.
But there were absolutely critical variables left over: the duration of the accord. The extent of inspections. And missiles/region-5-

As the nuclear formula talks advanced, Iran was able to approach each of these variables from a position of strength. The U.S. wanted a full deal. They were worried that a breakdown in talks could make Iran nuclear program a massive crisis. They were making progress in talks. -6-

So Iran largely held its ground on those other crucial issues. Region was largely dropped. They won the fight over ballistic missiles restrictions (no strict obligations, just called on to restrict.) And the duration of the core deal was in effect 10-15 years. -7-

I won't enter into minefield of saying whether that was a good or bad deal for U.S. But I think the evidence is pretty clear that while it might have been a pathway to a solution, there was really no certainty the JCPOA blocked Tehran's possible pathway to a nuke over time.-8-

Over the last decade, it's seemed to me ever clearer that Tehran in 2015 had no intention of ending its
pursuit of a nuclear weapon. The archives. The stowed away old equipment. The weaponisation-related work etc. I accept that others disagree. -9-

But why is any of this ancient history relevant. Because it holds a very powerful lesson for the current adminstration if they are serious about obtaining a deal. Inching away from zero enrichment may be the only path to a deal. -10-

But if, as Iran is pushingvery hard for, they acknowledge Iran's enrichment right upfront, they should think very very hard about what that is tied to. They really won't get a second chance at this. -11-

My personal priority would be the length of any agreement and particularly of the tight constraints on Iran's enrichment. For me, that  was the biggest flaw in the JCPOA. I know some people around the talks have been talking about 25 years-plus. Possibly with a break moment, -12-

where those constraints could be re-addressed only by mutual accord. (Various circumstances where that might be relevant, for example the fall of the current regime.) Locking that in now, when Iran wants recognition of its right to enrich, is the best chance US will get. -13-

Then a decision needs to be made about how intrusive inspections will have to be and on missiles. And whether it's possible to get real concessions on this from Iran as well as on duration of nuke constraints. That might be hard. I don't know if it would be impossible. -14-

But I am absolutely convinced that if serious nuclear talks get under way and Tehran goes into those knowing its enrichment rights have been secured, they will hold the upper hand again on all of these variables. -15-

I totally understand that some people will see any enrichment right for Iran as being the road to failure. The argument is simply that if Tehran has nuclear infrastructure in place for enrichment, it can gear it up at any time to produce HEU within a matter of months. In that-16-

sense, Iran will continue to have a threshold-ish nuclear program, which many are deeply uncomfortable with. And that may be precisely what makes Tehran potentially open to a deal. I won't take a view on whether zero enrichment should be insisted upon. -17-

That's for the negotiators to decide. I see the arguments on both sides. But I think we are seeing from Iran clearly enough that there is no deal without enrichment -- military threat or not on Iran's borders. -18-

But my key point remains. If Washington does shift to accepting a minimum or modest level of enrichment from Iran either immediately or in 2/3 years time after a pause, they will never have more leverage than now for linking that to the key variables of a deal. END -19-

(Ps similarly, I can’t imagine these talks will get far without Iran demanding some clarity on what kind of sanctions relief is on the table. The 3 issues: enrichment acknowledgement/sanctions/key variables fit together logically)