I am starting a thread here of things that are interesting details in the Comp report on #Iran. Much of this was kind of known. But some details are interesting.
Starts with 1/ Lavisan-Shian.-1- "Natural Uranium was drilled, processed and used in the production of explosively-driven neutron sources (EDNS, also referred to as ‘neutron initiators’) at Lavisan-Shian on at least two occasions in 2003. These EDNS use small quantities of natural or depleted uranium and are"-2-

As we look ahead to Comprehensive Report on Iran's nuclear program, it's worth recalling how one of the four "outstanding" issues the @iaeaorg was dropped. It's illustrative really of how the IAEA has provided what some might consider uber cooperation compared to Iran's little-1- The IAEA told Iran in 2022 that they belived Iran had conducted at a site called Lavisan-Shian undeclared work involving drilling and processing of natural uranium in the form of a metal disc. IAEA said this work, which could have nuclear weapon applications, was "concerning."-2-

UK ambo to US Mandelson on the status of the Iran deal. He backs the Witkoff no enrichment stance. "On iran, very simply this. Iran since the theocratic revolution took place has never been in a weaker state than it is now. weakened yes by economic sanctions, weakened..." -1- "by the heavy pounding that its proxies have taken. Weaker because of the growth of public opinion, especially amongst young people in iran away from the regime. Iran is vulnerable. But it still retains enrichment facilities which can produce...a nuclear bomb"-2-

A further reflection on the Trump statement that Iran has "sort of" agreed to the terms of a nuclear deal. History fact check. In early August 2022, @enriquemora_ proposed what he called a final text for a deal to return to the JCPoA. Iran replied on Aug. 15 asking for some -1- very minor changes but not demanding the IAEA drop its probe into nuclear material found in Iran a few years back. A deal was almost there. Then on Sep 1, Iran sent another reply this time going back to its demand that the IAEA probe was killed. In other words, the final -2-

So let me get the facts right. Per @BarakRavid, who I hold in highest respect, the U.S. has just on Sunday put its first formal proposal on table for a solution. Iran put its presentation on table in round 3 because @SteveWitkoff wasn't ready for that in Round 1. And yet, we... are close to a deal and Iran has "sort of" accepted Washington's approach. After one proposal. After a couple of rounds at best of some technical talks. After 20 years. And we have Shamkhani comments which entirely fit with JCPoA -- remove stockpile, do LEU and inspections. -2-

There's a very interesting section of Netanyahu speech at JNS which shouldn't be overlooked in the debate over Iran's involvement in Oct. 7th. Here's what Netanyahu said. "The most important thing that we had to do was to stop the invasion, which we did. And as we stopped..." -1- "the invasion and continued to take the fight into their territory, and of course, into Lebanon, which joined Hezbollah, joined the day after we learned basically one simple truth. We learned that Sinwar jumped the gun. He jumped the gun. He deviated from the plan..."-2-

Iran stands its ground — for now. “Indirect” talks only possible. Trump wants direct. So a complete standoff? I suspect no. Here’s the kind of very plausible scenario that could resolve. I stress this is speculative not info based. -1-

https://twitter.com/irannuances/status/1908939324973859259

Iran and the US set a meeting in let’s say Oman which Iran says is going to be mediated by Omanis and not direct. Trump admin refuses to get drawn on format. Two+ day meeting, let’s starts in the indirect Biden admin format. -2-say.it

Let’s examine the facts. 1/ the JCPOA dealt with this issue though Tehran successfully limited scope of language on missiles 2/ i very much doubt there is any discussion of preventing Iran having missiles that can reach throughout its region.

https://twitter.com/yossarianr/status/1880582227899347107

3/ there is great concern and already sanctions on Iran giving missiles to militia groups and Russia. Iran can resist that pressure but to suggest it’s wrong for Europeans to push for including this is odd. The plan is a negotiation. Including a regional part. Each side will…-2-

"They are in a lot of trouble," @marcorubio on #Iran Rubio says he imagines there are two camps of people in #Iran regime. 1/ those seeking an “off ramp” and “buy ourselves some time.” 2/ Another camp saying we need to prove we are “a nuclear power or nuclear capable power.” He says “this is a tenuous moment in that regard.” -2-

In the first sign of serious engagement with the post-Assad #Syria, the EU is likely to ease some key sectoral sanctions on the country on Jan 26th, though as ever it will need approval by all 27 countries. The sanctions proposals are set up in a German paper, which... was circulated in Brussels. Reminder that @ABaerbock and @jnbarrot made a joint trip to Damascus last week. Until now, EU officials have been very tight lipped on when they might move on sanctions. And the Franco-German foreign mins trip didn't seem to move needle on this. -2-

These are days when Iran moves ever closer to the nuclear brink. Last week the warnings from French and British intel on Iran proliferation. Last night a US @ODNIgov report gives sharpest warning yet of nuke weapons risk. And today, the @rafaelmgrossi report on expanding HEU. -1- Out story wrapping up all the latest. With @mgordonwsj. -2-wsj.com/world/middle-e…

Ok. Winding back a bit here having seen the transcript. Not sure @JosepBorrellF remarks are quite as @joshrogin described. But to be fair his remarks are all over the shop. Here’s transcript. eeas.europa.eu/eeas/shangri-l…

https://twitter.com/laurnorman/status/1796872384525324716

He does clearly state that Chinese supplies are not in same category as Nkorea and Iran in sense that they are not military items per se but that there’s lots of non arms exports from China that have military use. -2-

Even as Iran became effectively a threshold nuclear weapons state in recent years, many officials and observers thought Khamenei and leadership saw the costs of going nuclear higher than the benefits for now. Has that changed? My latest. wsj.com/world/middle-e… There are different views on this and the consensus is probably that Iran sees building a bomb at this point as an unnecessary risk. But the Gaza conflict and Iran's attack on Israel suggest Tehran's risk gauge may have changed and that's testing old assumptions. -2-

A little footnote of G7 diplo wranglings in our story on Israel's next moves bylined by my excellent colleagues @DovLieber @cjkeller8 and @AnatPeled1 We got first draft of the G7 leaders statement on Saturday's Iran attacks. It underwent big changes. -1-wsj.com/world/middle-e… The original draft labeled Iran’s actions “reckless” and said Iran had “crossed yet another line” in destabilizing the region. It expressed “unconditional” solidarity with Israel and an “ironclad” -- the Biden phrase --G-7 commitment toward its security. -2-

Language for EU ammo target over the next 12 months for Ukraine is now looser. EU will be "aiming at" a million shells over the next year. But there is still a discussion over whether to allow purchases of ammo from foreign countries. That has not been fully settled yet. So that will go to ministers despite claims there is a deal. -2-

E3 Statement at IAEA Board: gov.uk/government/spe… -1- "We note that following discussions between the Director General and Vice-President Eslami, and that, due to the Director General’s efforts, a Joint Statement was agreed on 4 March where Iran agreed “on a voluntary basis” to “allow the IAEA to implement further appropriate" -2-

As I suspected on Saturday, @rafaelmgrossi narrative about what happened in Tehran last week is partially unravelling under questioning by @francoismurphy. His clear answers Sat eve about what was agreed are sounding much less certain today. #Iran -1- So on the Fordow inspections, the number of monthly visits remains at 11, as was agreed by DDG in previous trip. Went from 8 to 11. That's Grossi's 50% claim. But there was no agreement to raise it further in Tehran last week -2-

Behind @ZelenskyyUa tour of European capitals, some extraordinary diplomatic jostling took place behind the scenes, we report tonight. With @MaximColch & @bopanc wsj.com/articles/ukrai… @EmmanuelMacron @eucopresident -1- Michel had pushed for the trip when he was in Kyiv on Jan 19th. @ZelenskyyUa was reluctant because of perfectly reasonable security concerns. But he warmed to idea in recent weeks & was already leaning towards when EU leaders in Kyiv last week. -2-

Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia pressing today in a letter on use of frozen assets for Ukraine. "However in order to be credible on this matter vis-a-vis Ukraine, we must go beyond reiterating our commitment & accelerate our work in the Council right now." -1- "All assets should be used to cover the costs of Russian aggression against Ukraine, including to support Ukraine internally displaced people, as well as to the benefit of the future reconstruction of Ukraine." -2-

Just ran: Interview with @JosepBorrellF from Ukraine on the #Irandeal and its prospects. wsj.com/articles/eus-t… -1- On a secure train returning from an EU trip to Kyiv, @JosepBorrellF told @WSJ that critics of his efforts to revive the pact perhaps “don’t value enough” dangers of nuclear Iran. “As far as I know, there is not an alternative to this deal to try to avoid Iran becoming nuclear"-2-

@HankeVela @alanbeattie This really isn't unexpected. It's expected. It has been likely she'd go for a couple of weeks as I've tweeted. @HankeVela @alanbeattie Indeed, as i said earlier, one of the UK conditions was that a non-EU country host it next time and Britain was keen. It's a way of locking in their main concern -- that this becomes a mere EU+ Brussels dominated format.