1/ Welcome to the Circle $USDC files.
$420M+ in alleged compliance failures since 2022, including fifteen cases of the US-regulated stablecoin issuer taking minimal action against illicit funds.
2/ Circle operates USDC, a centralized stablecoin pegged 1:1 to USD, marketed as a regulated company with a robust compliance program.
Its token contract includes a freeze/blacklist function, and its terms of service explicitly state it reserves the right to restrict access for suspected illicit actors "in its sole discretion".
The company is incorporated in the US, currently headquartered in New York City, and subject to US federal / state financial regulations.
3/ On April 1, 2026, Drift Protocol was exploited for $280M.
The exploiter used CCTP to bridge 232M+ USDC from Solana to Ethereum across 100+ transactions over six consecutive hours. 10+ additional DeFi protocols across the Solana ecosystem were indirectly impacted.
Despite the attacker laundering funds over six consecutive hours across Circle's own native bridge, no USDC was frozen.
The attacker has been linked to DPRK by Elliptic.
Theft address:
HkGz4KmoZ7Zmk7HN6ndJ31UJ1qZ2qgwQxgVqQwovpZES
4/ On January 25, 2026, SwapNet was exploited for $16M. 3M USDC sat in the exploiter's address for two days.
Both law enforcement and private sector experts submitted temporary freeze requests to Circle for the theft address. Both were unsuccessful.
One victim pursued a New York court order. The funds were swapped hours before the TRO was granted.
Theft address:
0x6cAad74121bF602e71386505A4687f310e0D833e
5/ On May 22, 2025, Cetus Protocol was exploited for $223M.
The exploiter used CCTP to bridge 61M USDC from Sui to Ethereum across 60+ transactions over 1.5 hours.
Both the Cetus team and private sector experts requested Circle to freeze the theft address. Circle blacklisted the address one month later, after the USDC had already been converted to ETH.
Theft addresses:
0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06
0x89012a55cD6b88e407C9d4ae9B3425F55924919b
6/ In October 2022 Mango Markets was exploited for $110M.
The exploiter transferred $57.5M to his Circle deposit address on Solana and withdrew the funds to Ethereum. He was later charged by the SEC.
Despite the connection the funds were never frozen onchain.
Theft address
yUJw9a2PyoqKkH47i4yEGf4WXomSHMiK7Lp29Xs2NqM
7/ In August 2022 Nomad Bridge was exploited for $190M.
~45M USDC sat freezable for 30-45 min in three exploiter addresses before being fully swapped out.
Despite the large hack being widely reported, the addresses were never blacklisted by Circle.
Theft addresses
0xbf293d5138a2a1ba407b43672643434c43827179
0x56d8b635a7c88fd1104d23d632af40c1c3aac4e3
0xb5c55f76f90cc528b2609109ca14d8d84593590e
8/ In April 2024 I published a report on Lazarus Group detailing how funds from 25+ hacks were laundered and converted to fiat.
Law enforcement submitted freeze requests to four stablecoin issuers: Circle, Tether, Paxos, and Techteryx for two addresses in relation to the report.
The other three issuers acted promptly. Circle took 4.5 months longer to freeze both addresses (verifiable onchain).
9/ In December 2023 Ledger, the largest hardware wallet company, fell victim to a supply chain attack which resulted in a phishing drainer being added to its Ledger Connect kit and $600K+ in assets stolen.
USDC sat in the theft address for 3+ hours without action from Circle. Tether froze the stolen USDT in the same address.
Theft address:
0x658729879fCa881D9526480B82aE00EFc54B5c2d"
10/ On July 9, 2025 GMX was exploited for $40M.
9M USDC sat for 2+ hours and was partially bridged from Arbitrum to Ethereum via CCTP.
While the exploiter later returned assets minus a $5M bounty, the USDC was not frozen during the 2+ hour window.
Theft address
0xDF3340A436c27655bA62F8281565C9925C3a5221
11/ In September 2023 Remitano was hacked for $8.5M from its hot wallets on multiple chains.
441K USDC sat in theft addresses for 8 hours without action from Circle.
Tether froze 1.4M USDT in the same addresses.
Theft addresses
CznNhNTBduDTbAUsFbJrCfLCrgzpyNWZwXpbVSkH7p3u
0x74530e81e9f4715c720b6b237f682cd0e298b66c
12/ In November 2022 a DeFi builder had ~$20M stolen by a threat actor from multiple wallets on various chains.
513K USDC sat in a theft address for one month and no freeze was executed by Circle while a request was sent out.
Tether froze stolen USDT in the same address.
Theft address
0x741564f5563abbe85f1b091eb39e38c000cb3e70
13/ In July 2025 I published research on DPRK IT workers infiltrating crypto businesses.
Between October 2022 and January 2025, Circle users withdrew USDC to three IT worker payment addresses. These addresses were three hops from a DPRK forfeiture address and two hops from an address previously blacklisted by Tether.
The DPRK ITW addresses in the cluster were never blacklisted by Circle.
Circle withdrawal address
0x241d2b20f2c26a2541a0f121d6a33c29cb4cfe69
0x3131f63378cedc21a9c2fdf6574248a8cb7eec7a
0x5c411cb174c2e163f6465252ae895f3e3e5a8792
14/ In June 2025 a US DOJ civil forfeiture complaint was filed in relation to a $225M USDT seizure linked to a Southeast Asian pig butchering syndicate.
1.7M+ USDC linked to the illicit funds was transferred through intermediary addresses to a Circle deposit address.
Circle deposit address:
0xb4875c44fa2b00291637793196f077b197daaa87
Civil Action No. 25-cv-1907
15/ In October 2024 Radiant Capital was hacked by Lazarus Group (Apple Jeus) for $58M.
The attacker drained USDC from victims via open approvals and chainhopped from Hyperliquid to Arbitrum using USDC.
Multiple instances had USDC sitting in theft addresses for hours with no freeze action from Circle.
Theft addresses
0x52263cAEc2e144C3A84cc16d014157360Ac85A89
0x00E1559184Bf1da0256a495ae9BAec11BCA60eb7
0x7997e80F4bD9563d61EE4D06108f7D6cEB23Ab21
0x60ABA279E49E5A05DC7e3c84F2204a6Afb032119
0x5b10daEdC2D7B5CE47f6B3072188f758f1b14481
0x34aa91e574aa963675107011DcF0392C5521005a
0x348FC4DfdCD3427D8A4B43Ad965B4443d55CF955
16/ In March 2025 law enforcement from multiple jurisdictions seized Garantex infrastructure. Garantex had been OFAC sanctioned since 2022.
Tether froze $22M in connected addresses. Circle took no action on 200K+ USDC in the same addresses.
Garantex address:
0xb271036d95b205a26bae5cb2d4eb922c000903a2"
17/ On February 21, 2025, Bybit was hacked by Lazarus Group for $1.5B, widely reported across mainstream media.
On February 28, 106K USDT and 338K USDC consolidated to theft address 0xDa2.
Law enforcement, Bybit, and private sector experts submitted freeze requests to both Tether and Circle.
Tether froze the address within hours. Circle took 24 hours longer to act.
Theft address:
0xDa2e12E94060720581994eEc870F83d9C7200c2c
18/ Circle builds good products and I hold USDC myself. This isn't a post about hoping they collapse.
But the decisions they've made around compliance have had real consequences for real people.
Nine figures lost from the ecosystem because of repeated inaction across three years, law enforcement requests, private sector requests, and their own infrastructure.
The $420M+ figure only accounts for major public cases. The real figure is likely significantly higher.
They have every tool and resource available to do better. They just haven't.
So I'll leave you with one question: who is Circle actually serving?
A US-regulated public company owes it to its users and the broader community to do better than this.
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