Putin is meeting Xi Jinping for the 25th time, and 1st time in 2018. @SecretaryMattis may say this is unimportant because Sino-Russian ties are hollow, as he implied at #SLD18, but he is wrong on this. Let me explain why. 1/
Ties with China become increasingly important for Russia since 2014. "Pivot to China" that the Kremlin attempted following annexation of Crimea didn't bring quick gains, but with tightening of U.S. sanctions in 2017/2018 it becomes a necessity for many oligarchs and SOEs 2/
To be in the Kremlin's pocket or in Chinese banks' pocket - this is the question for increasing number of Russian oligarchs 3/
China is Russia's largest trade partner since 2010, and share of PRC in Russian trade continues to grow at the expense of traditional EU partners. Import substitution means buying more Chinese machines. In 2017 Russians bought more industrial equipment in China than in Germany 4/
Trade turnover stands at $90b in 2017 and is set to grow to $120 in 2018 according to RU economy minister. This figure looks realistic since oil price is high, and Russia pumps more oil to China remaining #1 crude supplier after SA for 2 years in a row 5/
Economic side of Sino-Russia ties is deeply asymmetrical. Moscow needs Beijing much more than the other way around. China's share in RU trade is 16%, while RU share in CN trade is less than 2% 6/
With all the increased flow of Chinese money into Russia since 2014, it's still mostly about political deals involving Putin's friends. Chinese investors don't like Russia: "Russians have Western arrogance and sky-hight prices, but investment climate is worse than in Africa" 7/
Nevertheless, Russian economic dependency on China will grow since Russia has few alternatives, and the Kremlin is ready to suffer economically questionable projects like Power of Siberia to make a point to the West (and help Putin's friends get richer along the way) 8/
Sino-Russian rapprochement is not about Trump, but about the U.S. Sanctions that pushed Moscow into Beijing's arms were introduced by @BarackObama, and CAATSA that has set them in stone was passed by the Congress against Trump's will 9/
For China, Russia is of no help in trade war against the U.S. But Russia's role is crucial in building a more capable and well-armed PLA. Since 2014, Moscow has resumed sales of cutting-edge weapons to China like S-400&Su-35, and I expect more to come 10/
Russia is also helpful to China on North Korea, both in the UNSC and in helping Kim to survive sanctions. Here is why: wsj.com/articles/china… 11/
This time the 3 important issues to watch on the economy are: FTA framework agreement, nuclear reactors deal, high-speed rail negotiations (and Putin&Xi will even travel together on 和谐 from Beijing to Tianjin) 12/
Economic cooperation framework agreement is 1st stepping stone to a FTA China-EEU that will include chapters on IP, investment, e-commerce etc. Long way to go, but impactful once concluded. China will manage to spread its regulation into Russia&EEU 13/
Will walk readers through the key documents and contracts once they are signed in Beijing today after formal talks conclude. END
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Today's meeting between Putin and Xi before opening of BRICS summit is like an iceberg - the invisible part under the water is much bigger than the one meant for outside observers. However, there is an interesting detail in the Kremlin's otherwise laconic readout... 1/7
2/ ... and it's the list of people present from both sides. For some reason, Xi is accompanied not only with top figures of his national security team (Cai Qi, Wang Yi etc.), but he has also brought to Kazan some of the key members of his economic team. kremlin.ru/supplement/6214
3/ Among them are Pan Gongsheng (PBOC), Zheng Shanjie (NDRC), Lan Foan (minister of finance), Wang Wentao (minister of commerce). Interesting contrast to the fact that samae officials (Pan & Lan) have skipped a BRICS ministerial in Moscow just a week ago. reuters.com/world/top-bric…
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Is China distancing itself from Russia economically, as the West urges Beijing to do amid war in Ukraine? Not really, if you look at this week's travel of Ding Xuexiang, one of Xi's top economic lieutenants. 1/15
2/ This year 🇺🇸 has invested a lot of effort to choke off Chinese support for the Russian war machine, including threats of sanctions against 🇨🇳 banks involved in trade, and tightening the screws against landmark projects like Arctic LNG-2. Is it working?
3/ 🇨🇳customs statistics shows that breakneck pace (+26.3%) of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade growth in 2023 has slowed down to just 1.8% in Jan-June 2024. Key here is a visible drop in 🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 by 0.8% (imports have grown by 3.9%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
Why is China not attending 🇺🇦 Peace Summit in🇨🇭? What may be 🇨🇳 plan for diplomacy around the war started by Xi's partner Vladimir Putin? Some thoughts in a new @ForeignAffairs piece, and more details in this🧵 foreignaffairs.com/china/why-chin…
2/ Roots of 🇨🇳 decision to skip 🇨🇭 summit can be traced back to last August, when Xi's special envoy Li Hui 李辉 appeared in Jeddah, which sparked expectations that Beijing is ready to engage in multilateral diplomacy based on @ZelenskyyUa peace formula. wsj.com/articles/with-…
3/ However, after Li sat through the discussion and had brief conversation with @JakeSullivan46 & Toria Nuland, China's conclusion was that it shouldn't engage in next rounds. The agenda is set by @AndriyYermak, the peace formula doesn't change to include 🇨🇳 suggestions, and...
What does a cabinet reshuffle in Russia mean for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties? It's about continuity, deepening, and long-term. Also, as Beijing and Moscow expand their defense industrial cooperation, Putin has elevated high-caliber professionals with China experience. 🧵
2/ Putin's government set to be appointed by Duma today is an old-new cabinet, with very few changes. This is a quite competent team that has worked together for 3+ years. They have weathered COVID, war, and sanctions - much better than Russian generals perform on the battlefield
3/ For 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties, this continuity is very important. Since Xi's state visit to Moscow in March 2023, the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai have invested serious effort in order to get senior officials on both sides to know each other well.
Is 🇺🇸 recent push to choke off 🇨🇳 supplies of dual-use goods to 🇷🇺 having an effect? It looks like it, according to the newest Chinese customs data. But I'm not holding my breath: over the last 2+ years Beijing and Moscow have found ways to adapt to U.S. sanctions. Short 🧵
2/ Newest customs statistics is out, and it shows that Beijing's exports to Russia continue to decline for a second month. April shipments to 🇷🇺 are $8.3b, down 13.7% compared to April 2023. This is bigger than yoy exports drop to 🇺🇸 (-2.8%) or 🇪🇺 (-3.6%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ Russian exports to China are growing ($11.5b in April), but the drop of imports is significant and it builds on nearly 16% drop in March - the first such decline of 🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 since summer 2022. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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What lessons are Chinese leaders learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine? They may be the opposite of those the @WhiteHouse wants them to learn. Some thoughts from a @WSJopinion piece, in a short🧵 wsj.com/articles/xi-ji…
2/ The demonstrative effect of Western reaction to Putin's aggression was very much on U.S. policymakers' mind very early on. Here is how @SecBlinken is talking about it last year in Helsinki. ru.usembassy.gov/secretary-blin…