Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 Profile picture
Jun 8, 2018 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Putin is meeting Xi Jinping for the 25th time, and 1st time in 2018. @SecretaryMattis may say this is unimportant because Sino-Russian ties are hollow, as he implied at #SLD18, but he is wrong on this. Let me explain why. 1/
Ties with China become increasingly important for Russia since 2014. "Pivot to China" that the Kremlin attempted following annexation of Crimea didn't bring quick gains, but with tightening of U.S. sanctions in 2017/2018 it becomes a necessity for many oligarchs and SOEs 2/
To be in the Kremlin's pocket or in Chinese banks' pocket - this is the question for increasing number of Russian oligarchs 3/
China is Russia's largest trade partner since 2010, and share of PRC in Russian trade continues to grow at the expense of traditional EU partners. Import substitution means buying more Chinese machines. In 2017 Russians bought more industrial equipment in China than in Germany 4/
Trade turnover stands at $90b in 2017 and is set to grow to $120 in 2018 according to RU economy minister. This figure looks realistic since oil price is high, and Russia pumps more oil to China remaining #1 crude supplier after SA for 2 years in a row 5/
Economic side of Sino-Russia ties is deeply asymmetrical. Moscow needs Beijing much more than the other way around. China's share in RU trade is 16%, while RU share in CN trade is less than 2% 6/
With all the increased flow of Chinese money into Russia since 2014, it's still mostly about political deals involving Putin's friends. Chinese investors don't like Russia: "Russians have Western arrogance and sky-hight prices, but investment climate is worse than in Africa" 7/
Nevertheless, Russian economic dependency on China will grow since Russia has few alternatives, and the Kremlin is ready to suffer economically questionable projects like Power of Siberia to make a point to the West (and help Putin's friends get richer along the way) 8/
Sino-Russian rapprochement is not about Trump, but about the U.S. Sanctions that pushed Moscow into Beijing's arms were introduced by @BarackObama, and CAATSA that has set them in stone was passed by the Congress against Trump's will 9/
For China, Russia is of no help in trade war against the U.S. But Russia's role is crucial in building a more capable and well-armed PLA. Since 2014, Moscow has resumed sales of cutting-edge weapons to China like S-400&Su-35, and I expect more to come 10/
Russia is also helpful to China on North Korea, both in the UNSC and in helping Kim to survive sanctions. Here is why: wsj.com/articles/china… 11/
This time the 3 important issues to watch on the economy are: FTA framework agreement, nuclear reactors deal, high-speed rail negotiations (and Putin&Xi will even travel together on 和谐 from Beijing to Tianjin) 12/
Economic cooperation framework agreement is 1st stepping stone to a FTA China-EEU that will include chapters on IP, investment, e-commerce etc. Long way to go, but impactful once concluded. China will manage to spread its regulation into Russia&EEU 13/
Will walk readers through the key documents and contracts once they are signed in Beijing today after formal talks conclude. END

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More from @AlexGabuev

Apr 25
The fact that 🇷🇺 will receive 28% less for its gas in 🇨🇳 than in Europe, but still seeks to expand gas sales to China, illustrates a dilemma Moscow faces in economic relations with Beijing. Simply put: amid war in 🇺🇦, there is no alternative to dependency on China. 🧵1/14 Image
2/ According to this excellent story in @business, 🇷🇺 government expects to earn 28% less in 🇨🇳 market for same amounts of gas than in EU & Turkey. For example, in 2024 it's $257 vs $320 for 1,000 m2. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ This reality shouldn't come as a surprise. As my @CarnegieEndow colleague @SergeyVakulenk0 has established in the best to date study on 🇨🇳🇷🇺 piped gas pricing formula, a discount benefiting Beijing is nearly pre-programmed in the devil's bargain. carnegieendowment.org/politika/89552
Read 14 tweets
Apr 9
The deepening of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 alignment is one of the most consequential geopolitical outcomes of Russia's war against Ukraine. How so, and why is this important? I wrote about it in a new essay for @ForeignAffairs. Some key takeaways in a🧵1/20 foreignaffairs.com/china/putin-an…
2/ Even before Crimea annexation in 2014 and February 24, 2022, Moscow and Beijing have been on a steady path to improve and deepen their ties. Driving forces include delimitation of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 border, economic complementarity, and deepening compatibility of the two political regimes.
3/ Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine has provided a qualitative leap to what has been an incremental qualitative improvement before 2022. China and Russia are more firmly aligned now than at any time since the 1950s. Why is that?
Read 20 tweets
Dec 11, 2023
As I argue in my latest piece for @WSJ, in Russia, the war against Ukraine is now the organizing principle around which most decisions are made, and at the core of Russia’s domestic, economic and foreign policy. Short summary in a 🧵 wsj.com/world/russia/r…
2/ On the domestic front: in their recent in-depth research paper into attitudes toward the war, my colleagues @AndrKolesnikov and Denis Volkov showed that about 75% of the population support it. Most of Russia doesn’t look or feel like a nation at war. carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…
3/ The elites, too, have demonstrated remarkable cohesion and the inability to challenge the Kremlin’s course. Even the infamous mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny earlier this year only strengthened Putin’s grip on power. ft.com/content/0960e7…
Read 14 tweets
Dec 7, 2023
It finally happened! 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade has surpassed $200b mark. Trade figures might be different in years to come, but the trendline is clear: as a result of Putin's war against 🇺🇦, Moscow and Beijing find themselves in a deepening asymmetrical economic interdependence. Short 🧵 Image
2/ Chinese customs has published November stats.
🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade Jan-Nov = $218.2b (+26.7% yoy)
🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 = $100,3 (+50.2%)
🇨🇳 imports from 🇷🇺 = $117.8 (+11.8%)
This means that the goal set by Putin and Xi for 2024 has been achieved.
customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ The pace of trade growth has slowed down compared to earlier in 2023, which can be attributed to effect of sanctions shock of spring 2022 for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade, as well as impacts of headwinds in the Chinese economy in Q3 (jury for Q4 is out).
Read 5 tweets
Nov 28, 2023
My colleague @AndrKolesnikov and @levada_ru's Denis Volkov have published a new @CarnegieEndow paper documenting Russian attitudes towards the war. Main conclusion: support for the Kremlin's disastrous course is undiminished. Key findings in a🧵1/ carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…
2/ In September 2023, @AndrKolesnikov and Volkov released "My Country Right or Wrong," which established that after 6 months of war, Russian society was confused, depressed and repressed. carnegieendowment.org/p-87803
3/ The new paper revisits the same issues a year later, and is based on nationwide @levada_ru polls and focus groups. The rationale behind respondents’ answers provides a more complex picture than the numbers alone.
Read 16 tweets
Aug 6, 2023
🧵
Does participation of Li Hui 🇨🇳 envoy on 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war, in Saudi-hosted peace consultations over the weekend mean that Beijing is about to abandon its tacit support for the Kremlin, as some people want to believe? Let's take a look. (Spoiler alert: hardly). 1/20 Image
2/ There is a lot of hope, as this excellent piece by @jamestareddy in @WSJ demonstrates, that Beijing's decision to send Li Hui to Jeddah signals China's growing frustration with Putin's war and desire to work with international community to stop it. wsj.com/articles/a-dra…
3/ The economic cost of war is rising, and so is Western criticism towards 🇨🇳 position on Ukraine. There was Wagner mutiny in 🇷🇺, and maybe Xi has buyers' remorse about "no limits partnership" with Putin, the hope goes. But let's take a step back & look at 🇨🇳 strategic interests.
Read 21 tweets

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