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Today's meeting between Putin and Xi before opening of BRICS summit is like an iceberg - the invisible part under the water is much bigger than the one meant for outside observers. However, there is an interesting detail in the Kremlin's otherwise laconic readout... 1/7 2/ ... and it's the list of people present from both sides. For some reason, Xi is accompanied not only with top figures of his national security team (Cai Qi, Wang Yi etc.), but he has also brought to Kazan some of the key members of his economic team. kremlin.ru/supplement/6214

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Is China distancing itself from Russia economically, as the West urges Beijing to do amid war in Ukraine? Not really, if you look at this week's travel of Ding Xuexiang, one of Xi's top economic lieutenants. 1/15 2/ This year 🇺🇸 has invested a lot of effort to choke off Chinese support for the Russian war machine, including threats of sanctions against 🇨🇳 banks involved in trade, and tightening the screws against landmark projects like Arctic LNG-2. Is it working?

Why is China not attending 🇺🇦 Peace Summit in🇨🇭? What may be 🇨🇳 plan for diplomacy around the war started by Xi's partner Vladimir Putin? Some thoughts in a new @ForeignAffairs piece, and more details in this🧵
foreignaffairs.com/china/why-chin… 2/ Roots of 🇨🇳 decision to skip 🇨🇭 summit can be traced back to last August, when Xi's special envoy Li Hui 李辉 appeared in Jeddah, which sparked expectations that Beijing is ready to engage in multilateral diplomacy based on @ZelenskyyUa peace formula. wsj.com/articles/with-…

What does a cabinet reshuffle in Russia mean for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties? It's about continuity, deepening, and long-term. Also, as Beijing and Moscow expand their defense industrial cooperation, Putin has elevated high-caliber professionals with China experience. 🧵 2/ Putin's government set to be appointed by Duma today is an old-new cabinet, with very few changes. This is a quite competent team that has worked together for 3+ years. They have weathered COVID, war, and sanctions - much better than Russian generals perform on the battlefield

Is 🇺🇸 recent push to choke off 🇨🇳 supplies of dual-use goods to 🇷🇺 having an effect? It looks like it, according to the newest Chinese customs data. But I'm not holding my breath: over the last 2+ years Beijing and Moscow have found ways to adapt to U.S. sanctions. Short 🧵 2/ Newest customs statistics is out, and it shows that Beijing's exports to Russia continue to decline for a second month. April shipments to 🇷🇺 are $8.3b, down 13.7% compared to April 2023. This is bigger than yoy exports drop to 🇺🇸 (-2.8%) or 🇪🇺 (-3.6%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…

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What lessons are Chinese leaders learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine? They may be the opposite of those the @WhiteHouse wants them to learn. Some thoughts from a @WSJopinion piece, in a short🧵
wsj.com/articles/xi-ji… 2/ The demonstrative effect of Western reaction to Putin's aggression was very much on U.S. policymakers' mind very early on. Here is how @SecBlinken is talking about it last year in Helsinki. ru.usembassy.gov/secretary-blin…

The fact that 🇷🇺 will receive 28% less for its gas in 🇨🇳 than in Europe, but still seeks to expand gas sales to China, illustrates a dilemma Moscow faces in economic relations with Beijing. Simply put: amid war in 🇺🇦, there is no alternative to dependency on China. 🧵1/14 2/ According to this excellent story in @business, 🇷🇺 government expects to earn 28% less in 🇨🇳 market for same amounts of gas than in EU & Turkey. For example, in 2024 it's $257 vs $320 for 1,000 m2. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

The deepening of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 alignment is one of the most consequential geopolitical outcomes of Russia's war against Ukraine. How so, and why is this important? I wrote about it in a new essay for @ForeignAffairs. Some key takeaways in a🧵1/20 foreignaffairs.com/china/putin-an… 2/ Even before Crimea annexation in 2014 and February 24, 2022, Moscow and Beijing have been on a steady path to improve and deepen their ties. Driving forces include delimitation of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 border, economic complementarity, and deepening compatibility of the two political regimes.

As I argue in my latest piece for @WSJ, in Russia, the war against Ukraine is now the organizing principle around which most decisions are made, and at the core of Russia’s domestic, economic and foreign policy. Short summary in a 🧵 wsj.com/world/russia/r… 2/ On the domestic front: in their recent in-depth research paper into attitudes toward the war, my colleagues @AndrKolesnikov and Denis Volkov showed that about 75% of the population support it. Most of Russia doesn’t look or feel like a nation at war. carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…

It finally happened! 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade has surpassed $200b mark. Trade figures might be different in years to come, but the trendline is clear: as a result of Putin's war against 🇺🇦, Moscow and Beijing find themselves in a deepening asymmetrical economic interdependence. Short 🧵 2/ Chinese customs has published November stats.
🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade Jan-Nov = $218.2b (+26.7% yoy)
🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 = $100,3 (+50.2%)
🇨🇳 imports from 🇷🇺 = $117.8 (+11.8%)
This means that the goal set by Putin and Xi for 2024 has been achieved.
customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…

My colleague @AndrKolesnikov and @levada_ru's Denis Volkov have published a new @CarnegieEndow paper documenting Russian attitudes towards the war. Main conclusion: support for the Kremlin's disastrous course is undiminished. Key findings in a🧵1/ carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt… 2/ In September 2023, @AndrKolesnikov and Volkov released "My Country Right or Wrong," which established that after 6 months of war, Russian society was confused, depressed and repressed. carnegieendowment.org/p-87803

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Does participation of Li Hui 🇨🇳 envoy on 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war, in Saudi-hosted peace consultations over the weekend mean that Beijing is about to abandon its tacit support for the Kremlin, as some people want to believe? Let's take a look. (Spoiler alert: hardly). 1/20 2/ There is a lot of hope, as this excellent piece by @jamestareddy in @WSJ demonstrates, that Beijing's decision to send Li Hui to Jeddah signals China's growing frustration with Putin's war and desire to work with international community to stop it. wsj.com/articles/a-dra…

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Sinification of Russia's economy goes into overdrive, according to the newest Chinese customs data for 6 months of 2023.
Trade in Jan-Jun +40.6% ($114.55b)
🇷🇺 exports to 🇨🇳 +19.4% ($62.26b)
🇷🇺 imports from 🇨🇳 +78.1% ($52.28b) ❗️❗️❗️
Source: 1/customs.gov.cn/customs/302249… 2/ 🇷🇺 also turns out to be an important bright spot for 🇨🇳 otherwise bleak trade statistics, with overall exports -3.2% & imports -6.7%. Trade with ASEAN -1.5% ($447.33b), 🇪🇺 -4.9% ($399.17b), 🇺🇸 -14.5% ($327.26b). 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade is now more than 1/3 (!) of 🇨🇳🇺🇸 trade volume.

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Today Putin has sent Xi Jinping greetings on his 70th birthday. Rapport between two leaders is important, as both regimes get increasingly personalistic. But 🇨🇳🇷🇺 high-level ties are institutionalized and extend beyond Putin-Xi bromance. Who's in charge? Let's take a look. 1/ 2/ Moscow and Beijing have a mechanism for regular meetings between PMs. They meet at least once a year (and there have been 27 meetings since the format was established). Mikhail Mishustin & Li Qiang first in-person meeting just happened on May 24. government.ru/news/48557/

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There’s a perception that Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow was little more than a show of public support for Putin, since no major new agreements were announced. That perception is wrong, I argue in my latest piece for @ForeignAffairs. 1/16 foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… 2/ The public outcome of the visit is the tip of the iceberg. The truly significant developments were concealed beneath the surface—or in this case, behind closed doors, in private negotiations between Putin, Xi and their teams.

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War in Ukraine and Russia's economic isolation have created a new reality: an unconvertable yuan is becoming not a global, but a regional reserve currency in northern Eurasia. In this piece for @opinion I explain how it works. 🧵
bloomberg.com/opinion/articl… 2/ Because of 🇨🇳 capital controls RMB can't become a global currency, as my wise @CarnegieEndow colleague @michaelxpettis rightly points out. But as a result of the war in Ukraine and ensuing Western sanctions against Russia something else is happening.

https://twitter.com/michaelxpettis/status/1631149518619308033?s=20

🧵Was the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine predestined? Just as Putin's paranoia, Russia's failure to seize historic opportunities and develop a visionary, pragmatic foreign policy is among root causes of the tragedy, I argue in @ForeignAffairs. 1/
foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia… 2/ The Ukrainians are the primary victims of the Russian aggression, but the war will have a horrendous costs for 🇷🇺 too. Apart from thousands Russians killed and wounded, and the mounting effect of the sanctions, it will foreclose a unique window of foreign policy opportunity.

While 🇨🇳 supplies of lethal weapons to 🇷🇺 still remain an eventuality with many details still unknown, it’s trade that helps Beijing to support Moscow amid its war against 🇺🇦. Newly released Chinese customs data illustrate this well. A short 🧵 2/Freshly released Chinese customs data points to a steady growth in 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade, both exports and imports, in January and February 2023 - despite impact of oil price cap etc. customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…

We're 10 days into publication of 🇨🇳 position on 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war, sometimes mistakenly dubbed as a "peace plan." As a result, peace is not an inch closer, but the global reaction to the document serves Beijing's main goal. Brief thoughts based on my recent piece for @CEIP_Politika🧵 2/ China’s supposed "peace plan" for Ukraine is nothing more than a list of familiar Beijing's talking points about the war: pro-territorial integrity & anti-unilateral sanctions, expansion of U.S.-led military alliances etc. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_6…

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Recent data on 🇷🇺 oil exports contains some unexpected revelations on who/what was really pushing the Urals price down (spoiler: not Western sanctions or boycotts), and who benefitted from it. 🧵 based on analysis of my new @CarnegieEndow colleague @SergeyVakulenk0 1/ 2/ @SergeyVakulenk0, an energy veteran with 25+ years of experience in oil&gas who has recently joined @CarnegieEndow team, has dug into data, and found that price cap and Western embargo on 🇷🇺 oil don't work the way published price for Urals would suggest carnegieendowment.org/politika/89052

This @WSJ article is very helpful in documenting how 🇷🇺 war machine gets some critical components from 🇨🇳. The picture is very complex, and it puts some important questions for analysts and Western policymakers. Will break it down in a short 🧵. wsj.com/articles/china… 2/ In this terrific piece @IanTalley & @anthonydb track shipments of key components for the Russian military industry, including to sanctioned entities, from China. Key to the piece is Russian and Chinese customs data provided to @WSJ team by @C4ADS.