(1/2) One common strategy is to isolate sensitive accounts into certain OUs. Consider this: we have two OUs, "Normal Accounts" and "Sensitive Accounts". Are there attack paths from the normal accounts to the sensitive accounts?
(2/2) With some cypher magic and #BloodHound's visualizations, we can discover, analyze, measure, and start to remediate those attack paths. Check out these attack paths from a real environment.
Of course, OUs aren't the only "groups" of nodes we can find attack paths between. Domains, geographic locations, business entities, subsidiaries, or a combination of any of those. It's crucial for defenders to enumerate, analyze, and mitigate such attack paths.
Setting any *other* OU as our starting point, we can see what objects from other OUs can compromise our "sensitive accounts", but this quickly starts to outgrow the #BloodHound interface. Combine this with a radial sankey diagram to see *all* attack path flows between *all* OUs.
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Azure App Service Web Apps are yet another #Azure service that supports managed identity assignments.
Here's how attackers can use #BARK to abuse those assignments:
There are at least 3 ways to achieve code execution on an Azure App Service Web App ("Azure Web App" from here on) instance:
1. The Kudu shell execution API endpoints 2. Poison deployment to include a web shell in the app 3. Find a cmd execution vulnerability in the deployed app
We'll focus on #1 - abusing the built-in Kudu shell execution endpoints.
This is the feature the Azure GUI uses as its "Debug Console" and is documented here: github.com/projectkudu/ku…
Defenders and vendors have to play catch-up whenever one of these novel C2 methods becomes popular.
I believe it's possible to proactively, semi-automatically discover these methods in existing and emerging cloud services. We can assess their attractiveness to attackers, vendors can make them less attractive and prioritize their own detection efforts.
Kerberoasting is an incredibly powerful and reliable attack against Active Directory. In some situations it can result in an attacker becoming Domain Admin nearly instantaneously.
Here's how to prevent this attack: 🧵
First we need to identify Active Directory users that are "kerberoastable" - possible targets for the attacker to choose to Kerberoast.
Kerberoast relies on a user having some value in their "serviceprincipalnames" attribute.
Find all of them instantly with no 3rd party tools:
dsquery has been built in to Windows Server since Server 2008. You also get it when installing RSAT.