Next up, one talk I feel is huge and monumental and will impact the car hacking movement #BHEU
@ToyotaMotorCorp infotec team opening up about vehicle security. The glorious and sexy world of ECUs and CAN. CAN has no concept of security at all, and was never developed with it in mind
Toyota and other car companies now actively researching and preparing for cyber security attacks. There’s a blatant lack of cyber security engineers who also understand the automotive industry. #carhacking
Today’s cars have overly large attack surface areas. Thankfully stellar efforts have been made to get people interested. @CarHackVillage but what exists is a harmless real car for people to test and to learn
What is needed is an attractive platform for vehicular cyber security . One that is open and valid. So @ToyotaMotorCorp have created PASTA.
The ability to write to ECU firmware is huge. You can create more, explore more and do so in a safe environment. #carhacking
And this is PASTA AND I JUST MANGASM’D
Very compact and made in Japan.
There are 4 ECUs that allow writing and modifying using C. OBD-II, clipping area and a junction box. This helps with physical access attack simulation and defence. Junction boxes help with addition of new ECUs. This adds to in-vehicle networks (think adaptability and making new)
They based it around the RX63N microcontroller by Renesas. Toyota designed the ECU from scratch and will release full schematics and code to @github
Then they are opening up the CAN protocol to all, no more secrets like other car manufacturers. Yes Toyota!!!
A key design choice was making this adaptable. Couple it with a model car. Oh my hat
Full interaction with simulators, which means you can test how a potential attack will impact the safety and operability of the car
This being blackhat, let’s pwn a car. Inject malicious CAN packets. Manipulate steering
To date, NO car manufacturer would even attempt at doing what Toyota has just done. I couldn’t praise Toyota enough here. This industry has adopted security through security for too long. This is what @BlackHatEvents is all about. #BHEU
Roadmap will include full support for LIN, CAN FD, IVI, wireless I/F. It’s a joint initiative with Yokohama University. They want to force discussion about the critical nature of automotive security and get everyone involved
I stand by my initial comment: this will hopefully now change the fact that vehicular security has not been taken seriously and been a closed club for few. Massive respect. github.com/pasta-auto@pasta_auto@ToyotaMotorCorp#BHEU
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It's a sunday and many friends sent me this paper by Maryam Motallebighomi and Aanjhan Ranganathan delving deep into their security assessment of Shimano's Di2 wireless shifting architecture and hardware
Needless to say, with the football on, I delved deep into understanding it a bit more
1: Replay Attacks - let me change gear for you
2: Targeted Jamming - now you can't change gear
3: Information Leakage - gear selection leakage (meh dude i can SEE this
Ok they are meh bugs
The researchers were able to execute replay attacks from a distance of up to 10 metres using software-defined radios without amplifiers
They note that beyond this distance the signal falls outside the effective range
I'm going on a web app security rant, so bear with me.
23 years ago OWASP was formed and it tried to help the web application space and those building apps to do so in a secure way. Session management was one of them.
If you had a token, in a header/cookie, make it secure
We've evolved this over the decades, we collectively got better with understanding the nuances and complexities of this identity being thrown around and the consequences of not doing it right.
and yet, even with all this VC cash thrown at people wearing Patagonia vests and wearing apple watches, I still see most SaaS solutions doing stuff we did when Rain Forest Puppy was hurting SQL
Patch ALL teh things we constantly tell CISOs and CIOs.
Thing is, let's be honest with each other right? we can't and this graph is telling.
Patching is a pain, we get it and we do need to revolutionise the approach. Two years ago, @LargeCardinal wrote a phenomenal paper
where, in essence, the idea was to prioritize patches by expressing the connectivity of various vulnerabilities on a network with a QUBO and then solving this with quantum annealing.
Strap in, we's going on a ride, a static analysis ride. I recently came across this paper, which looked at a wide variety of SAST tools against a number of Java apps.
Java being the choice of enterprise, and often not the best Java approaches out there, so it's a good choice
First up, what did they use and what did they benchmark it against?
They looked at free tools, tools that specifically supported Java and most importantly, are being actively maintained.
The target was the @owasp project, a good choice imho. They also looked for Java apps with bugs with disclosed CVEs which was around 680 programs.
Bugs happen but it's rare you see a bug that grabs you so hard and makes you nod like a little dog..
CVE-2023-44487 did that for me
good god what a bug and here's why
First up is understanding the key differences between HTTP 1.1 and 2, especially how requests work
HTTP 1.1 is a text-based protocol that uses a single connection for each request/response pair. Every time you request the / from , it will be a diff request NSA.gov
for each element of that page (CSS, images etc)
HTTP 2 is a binary protocol that utilises multiplexing, which allows multiple requests and responses to be sent simultaneously over a single connection
An interesting new feature found in @Apple’s latest privacy and security report is that of Link Tracking Protection and I’ve not stopped thinking about this
First up it’s pretty cool. My views on the pervasive nature of the tracking industry are not something I’ve hidden away: it’s an ugly industry with no real oversight, so any efforts to put a finger in their eye is one to applaud
The approach by Apple is interesting
First up is the deeper inspection (I’m assuming client only) that intercepts any url and does a regex on it to strip out utm and other crap added to the url
If it works like that, I’m impressed. However, how much stuff will it break in the process? I guess time will tell