Post

Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Apr 13, 2019 • 39 tweets • 14 min read • Read on X

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1/ charge against Assange is violation of 18 USC 1030a. Indictment was filed on March 6, 2018 for incident on March 7, 2010, barely meeting 8-year statute of limitations. Despite clemency, Manning appealed her 1030a conviction. Issues seem relevant to charge vs Assange.

2/ 1030a, under which Assange was charged, is an anti-hacking law that requires that access to computer be "without access or exceeding authorized access".

3/ Manning didn't HACK into DoD computers. M had high-level clearance and was entitled to access the files delivered to Wikileaks. M's 1030a conviction - and this is little known - was on questionable technicality: use of widely available Wget to access files available on portal

4/ Judge didn't consider whether there would have been 1030a violation if M had used portal to download the 75 files retrieved using Wget, reaching decision on basis that use of Wget utility was "exceeded authorized access".

5/ See discussion in May 31, 2018 decision fas.org/sgp/jud/mannin…, Manning Appeal Brief Sep 5, 2018 eff.org/files/2018/09/… and Amicus Brief Aug 30, 2018 eff.org/files/2018/09/…

6/ M's appeal argued that Wget software didn't give M access to any files that M wasn't entitled to see, and that the court had made an error of fact to the extent that it thought that Wget evaded password authentication. (It doesn't). Case seems quite plausible.

7/ there is an important inconsistency between US circuits over meaning of "exceeds authorized access". Under "broad" interpretation, satisfied if use is improper e.g. leaking. Under "narrow" interpretation, satisfied only if access to information gained thru improper means

8/ M's military court stated that this was new issue for them and that federal Circuits were divided. They noted that Fourth Circuit (which governs EDVA) had adopted "narrow" interpretation. This would be helpful to Assange.

9/ Manning's downloading of State Dept cables is one of the key incidents in Assange indictment narrative. DoJ stated that Assange told M that "curious eyes never run dry" and that M subsequently accessed State Dept cables.

10/ M had legal access to State Dept cables thru portal. No evidence that Assange was involved in M's decision to access cables thru Wget (which is what M was convicted for - questionably.) M was clearly guilty of other offenses but the 1030a seems questionable.

11/ the other incident in Assange charge is his attempt to crack a password for M, but there's something curious here. Doesn't appear that password in question would have given M access to anything that M didn't already have access to (!) - only disguise as a different user

12/ Assange indictment observed that "army regulations" prohibited M from circumventing security mechanisms and from sharing passwords. Watch the pea. To extent that all/part of incident is breach of "army regulations", it was relevant to M, but not to Assange under 1030a

13/ my overall (interim) take: US success in Assange extradition case is not a gimme. US framed indictment narrowly in order to avoid arguing about their real beef with Assange. US-UK extradition treaty requires that case be limited to charges in extradition, but it seems

14/ implausible that US has any intention of limiting their interest in an extradited Assange to the password incident. More likely, as soon as Assange arrives in US, there would be barrage of superceding indictments, with US thumbing its nose at world opinion as it has elsewhere

15/ nor would UK government have much recourse once Assange was extradited. Not that quislings of May regime would be inclined to object anyway.

16/ however, there is an extant and distinguished legal tradition in UK. There are many UK judges who are acute enough to see what is really happening here. I expect that the Assange extradition hearing will be epic.

17/ here's a quote from Manning Amicus Brief from Fourth Circuit (>EDVA) decision WEC Carolina which pertains to password issue. Issue for 4th would be whether sought password gave M access to unauthorized material, or merely disguised. Indictment only pleaded disguise.

18/ ironically, I first used wget a few months ago in order to download from Wikileaks 😀. wget didn't give access to these documents; it is merely a way to download documents while preserving original modification-time metadata. Manning appeal re wget seems appropriate.

19/ here's another thought on curious fact situation on password. Based on premise that Manning was authorized to access documents, but wanted to disguise his identity when accessing documents which he was authorized to access. And that Assange's password help limited to disguise

20/ Assange's offer to help Manning crack a password to enter area to which he was authorized under fraudulent identity is an offense, but the offense is identity fraud (USC 1028 law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18…) not USC 1030a.

21/ while both are serious offenses, there's an important difference in statute of limitations. Under USC 2332b(g)(5) law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18…, USC1030a has an eight-year limitations, whereas USC 1028 is only five years (!).

22/ the distinction is highly relevant to extradition. Indictment only pled that purpose of breaking password would be to disguise identity, not to expand access to documents. 1028 was logical charge, but they needed 1030a for statute of limitations. As always, watch the pea

@bleidl

23/ in 13 above, I referred to principle in US-UK extradition treaty in which limits US right to pile on charges after extradition. (I've deleted prior tweet 23 in which I had lost track of reference and withdrew assertion.) But original point was right h/t @bleidl.

24/ however, Rule of Specialty is not a right which Assange can assert, only executive branch of UK government. (Courts not involved.) One can safely assume that quisling UK government will grant whatever US imperium demands. I.e. limiting extradition charge to single computer

25/ offence is nothing more than a charade by US and UK governments to disguise true intentions from UK courts.

26/ a battleground issue in extradition case is likely to be Article 4 of US-UK extradition treaty which states that UK courts shall refuse extradition if they determine that request for extradition was "politically motivated". Lots of evidence of this.

state.gov/documents/orga…

https://twitter.com/RickPetree/status/1116704236526555136

27/ thread on Rule of Specialty here

https://twitter.com/RickPetree/status/1116704236526555136

h/t @bleidl

None of the dozen or so commentators who I listened to on US news television today understood that neither Manning nor Assange HACKED into DoD computers. What a wasteland of false information.

https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/828229304949547008

28/ maybe this would be good time to re-mention Wikileaks' list of their 11 greatest hits ("interesting publications"): look who's mentioned 😀

https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/828229304949547008

Despite claim, Wikileaks had zero role in release of Climategate emails. News disseminated thru climate blogs.

29/ Intercept (unsurprisingly) makes same point as me about password incident. Greenwald has been following this for years.
theintercept.com/2019/04/11/the…

30/ Alexa O'Brien has enormous and essential set of Manning documents alexaobrien.com/manning

31/ In opening statement alexaobrien.com/archives/1283, prosecutor said that "evidence will show that Manning with the help of .. Assange attempted to devise a way to browse SIPRnet anonymously".

32/ Prosecutor says that Manning asked Assange "Any good at LM hash cracking?". Prosecutor added that "LM ..stands for Land Management."

33/ Manning prosecutor said that Assange replied: "We have rainbow tables for LM, " adding that an "LM hash is essentially the way that a Windows computer stores passwords"

34/ alexaobrien.com/archives/2325

35/ Manning's supervisor Stephen Lim testified that he sent SIPRnet link to Manning and that the diplomatic cables which were subject of M's 1030a conviction (Specification 13) had no password. No wonder they want to blame Assange.
alexaobrien.com/archives/1735

36/ violation of AUP was one of key points in Manning's 1030a conviction. However, prosecutors were apparently unable to locate AUPs for Manning (or his platoon). Strange.
alexaobrien.com/archives/2325

37/ Evidence from superior that Manning was allowed to "surf the SIPRnet".
alexaobrien.com/archives/2325

38/ Manning statement at trial is fascinating
alexaobrien.com/archives/985

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Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Aug 12

Here's a listing of Minority HPSCI Staff in early 2017. Most of the redactions in yesterday's release can be identified here.

In two of the 302s, WHISTLEB described the HPSCI Democrat system for exfiltrating secret information from a secure room in a three letter agency: presumably FBI, from which copies and notes were prohibited.

As a work-around, three HPSCI Democrat staffers would attend the Secure Room and, after each visit, "would immediately compose summaries" on a standalone computer set up in a back room by "committee's network administrator" for exclusive use by "Russian team" members. After the three Russian team members had completed their visit summaries, they briefed certain other staffers.

All of the names underneath the redactions can be plausibly identified from contemporary HPSCI Democrat staff rosters as shown below.

Here is a transcription of each of the two descriptions of the Russian team and secondary briefees, showing character counts.

The Russian Team had two 16s (at least one with LN8) and an 11. (number denotes character count of full name.)

The secondary briefees were a 6+5 (12), two 13s (one a 5+7), an 11, and the communications director (a 14). One of the 13s was a new hire.

Read 9 tweets

Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Jul 31

Durham Classified Appendix is almost entirely about "Clinton Plan". Unsurprisingly, nothing about the post-election events during which Russiagate collusion hoax actually metastasized under FBI and CIA into a national flesh-eating disease.
Emails from Lenny Benardo of Soros' Open Society Foundation feature prominently. Note that Benardo was mentioned in a Washington Post article by Demirjan and Devlin Barrett on May 24, 2017 (a few days after Mueller appointment) - archive archive.is/w43O2 reporting that the email had been dismissed by FBI as "unreliable". DWS, Benardo and Renteria said at the time that they had never been interviewed by FBI.

https://x.com/FOOL_NELSON/status/1658525717183725569

Fool_Nelson proposed Julie Smith as Foreign Policy Advisor-2 in Durham report at the time:

https://x.com/FOOL_NELSON/status/1658525717183725569

Here's a July 27, 2016 email (attributed to Benardo) which contains a detail relevant to the argument against @DNIGabbard's first drop, claiming that Russian interference concern was NEVER about election infrastructure, but always about DNC hack and Buff Bernie memes. Here Benardo talks about how to make Russia "a domestic issue" by raising the spectre of a "critical infrastructure threat for the election". Brennan subsequently did just that: raised concern about "infrastructure threat". ODNI played down that threat in their briefings and ultimately in the proposed post-election PDB of December 8, 2016 which was cancelled by Obama intervention.

Read 4 tweets

Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Jul 22

the ICA version in the recent DNI documents is a different version (dated January 5, 2017) than the released version (dated January 6, 2017). There were many changes overnight - some substantive.

Before editorializing, I'll laboriously go through comparisons - final version on left, previous day version on right. (I apologize for not marking this on each of the following slides.)

The Jan 6, 2017 version contained a preface entitled "Background... The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution", not present in the Jan 5 version (as shown). It has two sections.

The first section entitled "The Analytic Process" stated that these assessments "adhere to tradecraft standards".

"On these issues of great importance to US national security, the goal of intelligence analysis is to provide assessments to decisionmakers that are intellectually rigorous, objective, timely, and useful, and that adhere to tradecraft standards."

Now recall the dispute over inclusion of Steele dossier information in the ICA as an appendix and, as we recently learned, as a bullet supporting the assessment that Putin "aspired" to help Trump. Some IC professionals objected to the inclusion of Steele dossier information on the grounds that it did not meet tradecraft standards for inclusion in an ICA. Comey, McCabe and FBI insisted on its inclusion on the grounds that Obama had said to include "everything" - which they interpreted as mandating inclusion of Steele dossier information even though it didn't meet tradecraft standards.

Reasonable people can perhaps disagree on whether this was justified or not. What was not justified was the claim that the inclusion decision complied with "tradecraft standards". It was bad enough to include non-compliant material, but the claim that the included material "adhered to tradecraft standards" was miserably false. The recent Tradecraft Review should have addressed this fault.

The preface also included the following assertion:
"The tradecraft standards for analytic products have been refined over the past ten years. These standards include describing sources (including their reliability and access to the information they provide), clearly expressing uncertainty, distinguishing between underlying information and analysts’ judgments and assumptions, exploring alternatives, demonstrating relevance to the customer, using strong and transparent logic, and explaining change or consistency in judgments over time."

The "past ten years" here refers to the period of time since the savage tradecraft review by the WMD Commission, an excellent repot on a previous intelligence failure of similar scale to the Russia collusion hoax as an //intelligence failure// - which it was (even if non-criminal).

They state that "standards include describing sources (including their reliability and access to the information they provide)". Now apply that to the description of the Steele network in the classified appendix (declassified and released in 2020) shown below and transcribed as follows:
"the source is an executive of a private business intelligence firm and a former employee of a friendly foreign intelligence service who has been compensated for previous reporting over the past three years. The source maintains and collects information from a layered network of identified and unidentified subsources, some of which has been corroborated in the past. The source collected this information on behalf of private clients and was not compensated for it by the FBI".

This description does not remotely comply with the warranty in the Preface. We know that Steele (the "source") had told the FBI that his information was funneled through a "Russian-based sub-source" who Steele refused to identify. Steele did however tell the FBI that Sergei Millian was one of the sub-subsources to the "Russian-based sub-source". By mid-December 2016, the FBI had figured out that Steele's "Russian-based sub-source" was Igor Danchenko, an alumnus of U of Louisville, Georgetown and Brookings Institute, who lived in northern Virginia and had an American-born daughter. A fulsome description of sources IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WARRANTY IN THE PREFACE would have included these details and more.

It would have also stated that the FBI planned to interview the Primary Sub-Source as soon as possible. Given the importance of the document, the obvious question from any sane reviewer of the draft ICA would be: "uh, why don't you interview Steele's Primary Sub-Source right now? Today? " "And, by the way, why are you saying that he is 'Russian-based' when he lives in northern Virginia?"

If the reviewers had known that Steele's Primary Sub-Source had lived in northern Virginia and was available for interview, maybe they would have said: "uh, maybe we should hold off this ICA until we talk to Danchenko. This is a big document, maybe we should do some due diligence". But they weren't given that option, because Danchenko's location in northern Virginia was concealed from them. The warranty in the prefatory Background was false.

Subsequently, a few weeks later, when the FBI interviewed Danchenko and he revealed that there wasn't any "layered network" and that the key allegations were based (at best) on an anonymous phone call and that many of the sourcing claims in the dossier were untrue, the intelligence community had an obligation to fess up. To retract their claims about the Steele dossier, which, by the end of January, had emerged in public consciousness as the driving predicate of the Russia collusion investigation. Once the FBI knew that the sourcing claims were fraudulent, they had an obligation to disclose that to the rest of the IC and to publicly disown the Steele dossier, which had become important to the public precisely because of its endorsement in the ICA.

Read 9 tweets

Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Jul 14

Trump's latest tariff venture is a 50% tariff on copper, ostensibly for national security reasons. Copper markets are something that I analysed in the 1970s; so I know the structure of the markets and statistics. I was even been involved as a junior analyst in a trade case about US copper tariffs.

Under the US Defense Production Act, Canada is considered "domestic production" for the purposes of national security, but neither Trump nor the Canadian government seem to have had any interest in this legislation.

I remember the difficulties of trying to make long-term forecasts of copper supply and demand. Copper is also a market with voluminous statistics maintained consistently for a very long period. US Geological Survey for US consumption and primary production of refined copper for 1950-2024 are shown below. As someone who, in the 1970s, actually thought about what this chart would look like, it was interesting to re-visit.

In the 1920s and 1930s, US copper company were industrial behemoths: Anaconda, Kennecott, Phelps Dodge and Asarco, all now forgotten, were among the top 20 or top 50 US stocks back in the day. In the 1970s, they were still major companies. US accounted for about 25% of world production and consumption.

But, as you can see, since 2000, both US primary production and US refined consumption have declined precipitously. US refined consumption is now at lower levels than in the 1970s and US primary production is less than the early 1950s.

What will be the impact of a 50% tariff on copper imports? In the next post, I'll show how the changes in US market compare to world production.

although US copper production has declined since the 1970s, world copper production has almost quadrupled. US share of world copper refined production (here primary plus secondary scrap) has decreased from about 25% to 3%.

US copper production and consumption no longer dominate world markets - despite what the Beltway may imagine. An approximate 3% share doesn't get to dictate prices.

That means that the 50% copper tariff will be borne entirely by US copper consumers (i.e. manufacturers using copper). US producers will almost certainly increase their price to match the price of imports. So the tariff will be a bonanza for US domestic producers (e.g. Freeport McMoran) and a burden for US manufacturers.

the copper data also shows a vignette into the remarkable change in world economic geography since 9/11. In 2001, US still produced more copper than China. In 2024, China produced more than 13(!) times as much copper as USA. This isn't just production, but also consumption. Chinese manufacturers consume most of their copper production; their copper consumption is accordingly an order of magnitude greater than US copper consumption.

So when Trump puffs about the importance of USA as a market, this is simply not true of a basic commodity like copper. And I'm skeptical that it is true for other basic commodities.

Read 4 tweets

Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Jul 9

on first page: Brennan's lawyer, Robert Litt, was General Counsel at ODNI in 2016 and involved in some key events. Litt published an article in October 2017 lawfaremedia.org/article/irrele… which claimed that "The dossier itself played absolutely no role in the coordinated intelligence assessment that Russia interfered in our election." The recent Tradecraft Review, abysmal as it was, admitted that the dossier was cited in the classified ICA as a bullet support for the claim that Putin "aspired" to help Trump get elected.

@15poundstogo very Clintonian here

Brennan refers here to two press releases issued by William Evanina in July and August 2020. The Evanina statements were prompted in large part by the release of Biden-Poroshenko tapes by Ukrainian parliamentarian Andrii Derkach (who had previously in October 2016 published receipts showing that Hunter Biden was getting paid $1 million per year by Burisma). Shortly after Evanina's statements, "Trump" administration sanctioned Derkach. As a result of these sanctions, Derkach was de-platformed and the Biden-Poroshenko tapes were deleted from nearly all locations. One of the tapes showed that Poroshenko and Biden gloated in August 2016 about the removal of Manafort as Trump campaign chair as a result of Ukrainian interference (Black Ledger announcement.)

Read 11 tweets

Stephen McIntyre

@ClimateAudit

Apr 13

New thread on new information from redactions.

I just noticed that the information in Binder on Trump briefing in Aug 2016 was previously published by Grassley in July 2020, a few days after identification of Steele Primary Sub-source (and thus we, in this corner, were otherwise preoccupied).
grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…

The new version sheds light on a previous redaction. Katrina, Norm, Ted, John and Amir were mentioned. Just noting this for future reference.

something else that I'm noticing in the less redacted documents: Kevin Clinesmith was much more prominent in Crossfire Hurricane operation than we previously realized.

In real time, Hans, myself and others had vehemently and savagely criticized Durham's useless plea agreement with Clinesmith that had failed to use their leverage over Clinesmith to obtain a road map of the Russiagate hoax operation. Compare for example Mueller's use of leverage over Rick Gates to interview him about 20 times, If anything, there was more leverage over Clinesmith.

Durham's failure to lever Clinesmith looks worse and worse as we now see Clinesmith's name in multiple Crossfire documents that had previously been redacted.

For example, here is Clinesmith on August 30, 2016 - early days of Russiagate hoax - approving the reporting of FBI surveillance of Trump and Flynn while they were supposedly providing a counterintelligence briefing.

In this briefing, they failed to give Trump and Flynn the same warning about Turkey that they had previously given Clinton's lawyers.

here's an example where the "declassified" Binder contains a redaction not made in the version published by Grassley almost five years ago. the name of Edward (Ted) Gistaro of ODNI

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