Lucas Guttenberg Profile picture
Jun 14, 2019 11 tweets 4 min read Read on X
The #Eurogroup has decided last night on the main features (in the form of a "term sheet") of the new #Eurozone budget aka BICC. It clarifies some parts (not exactly for the better) but kicks the can down the road on quite some important points.
Thread:

consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press…
1/ The BICC is supposed to support public investment and reforms in member states. What exactly falls under this will be subject to "strategic guidance". My reading here would be: As long as you bring a good reason, you will get the money.
2/ Which means that the pre-allocation of funds is key: "[It] will be determined on the basis of a transparent methodology, taking into account parameters reflecting the overarching aim of the instrument and legal basis." This is Brusselese for "We have no agreement here yet."
3/ Furthermore, it says that "The available funds per country should be within an acceptable range of the contributions of that country." This is what we call "juste retour" in the context of the EU budget. But again here obviously no agreement on what an "acceptable range" is.
4/ Finally, member states will need to co-finance. But: "The national co-financing rate could vary based on a predictable and transparent commonly agreed procedure defined ex-ante involving euro area Member States." That's right, no agreement here either.
5/ So for the expenditure side, we only know that funds will be pre-allocated, a reasonable share of what countries contribute will need to flow back, and there might be variable co-financing rates. This sounds a lot like the EU budget today. And like a lot still tbd.
6/ On the financing side, most interesting is the complete absence of any reference to an intergovernmental agreement (IGA). This was supposed to open the door to allocating non-MFF-budget ressources to the BICC (see e.g. D-F contribution this February).
sven-giegold.de/wp-content/upl…
7/ Instead, it seems funds will have to come completely from within the MFF. And even though the exact size will need to be determined, it's hard to see that this will go beyond what the Commission had proposed for its Reform Delivery Tool - about 17 bn for 7 years.
8/ Last week I argued that we should judge the new budget in terms of its scalability and flexibility. On scalability, without an IGA, this looks rather grim. On flexibility, the truth is we don't really know - a lot of relevant parts remain open.
9/ Where does this leave us? If I read that correctly, the #EuroSummit next week has no open issues to decide. Instead, the next round will be the Commission having to propose a legal act - and then a new fight over the details in the context of the MFF negotiations.
10/ It seems like we will get a fiscal instrument for the Eurozone. That's a good symbolic gesture. But given its likely design, I remain sceptical that it will be of any real use - while it will probably block the way for better solutions further down the road.

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More from @lucasguttenberg

Nov 24, 2021
The 🚦 agreement is actually pretty good news for a number of Eurozone files, including the fiscal rules and EDIS.

Here are the main bits:
1/ Most importantly, the text says that the fiscal rules can be "developed further" to reach three goals: Secure growth, safeguard debt sustainability and foster green investment. They should also become "simpler and more transparent, also to strengthen implementation".
2/ This is pretty big. No red lines here, but an open and constructive opening position for negotiations that can very well include a change to the rules themselves. It will be now up to the Commission and other member states to take up the offer that is in that text.
Read 9 tweets
Sep 13, 2021
Das @_FriedrichMerz-Interview im @handelsblatt ist beeindruckendes Anschauungsmaterial, wie sich ein Teil der Konservativen im europapolitischen Wald verirrt hat und jetzt nicht mehr herausfindet.

Warum das ein Problem ist:
1/ Es geht mit dem klassischen Motiv los, dass man höllisch aufpassen muss, den faulen Südeuropäern (hier stv 🇮🇹🇪🇸) nicht ihr Hallodritum zu finanzieren. Dass gerade diese Länder die ambitioniertesten Pläne zur Verwendung der EU-Gelder vorgelegt haben, bleibt natürlich unerwähnt.
2/ Es geht dann weiter zu den Schuldenregeln. Hier räumt auch Merz ein, dass die Einhaltung für viele Länder schwierig wird. Und dann wird es spannend: Er drückt sich extrem wortreich um eine Antwort herum, ob man die Regeln denn nun wirklich so einhalten sollte.
Read 13 tweets
Sep 6, 2021
Commissioner @PaoloGentiloni announces in @SZ that the Commission will only present its proposal for fiscal rules reform once there is a consensus among eurozone countries. Here's why this is a wise approach and why we are still far away from that point:
sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/eu-…
1/ A weird feeling has grown in recent months that an expenditure rule is the way to go to reform the SGP and that what we basically need now is a Commission proposal that the technocrats then can tweak so that everyone is happy. Everyone is now waiting for that proposal.
2/ In my view, this feeling is a trap and the Commission is now trying to avoid falling into this trap by basically asking member states to come to a consensus what they want before puttting out a proposal.
Read 14 tweets
Jun 21, 2021
CDU and CSU are about to publish their election manifesto. On EU economic governance/fiscal policy, it is in perfect continuity with the Merkel line: No openings, no thick red lines.

Quick overview:
1/ CDU and CSU say they want a "stability and growth union". Who doesn't. They say they want to return swiftly to the fiscal rules but to "develop them further without watering them down." The also want sanctions to be applied and less room for judgment. No surprise here.
2/ On the Recovery Instrument, they insist that it is temporary and a one-off - which is true. They also say it cannot lead to a "debt union" and there cannot be a mutualisation of sovereign debt - both of which are not bound to happen. So no surprises here.
Read 7 tweets
May 18, 2021
The German Constitutional Court today pulled back from the brink and put the case on the ECB's PSPP programme finally to rest. The saga ends with a lot of damage on all sides and a number of open questions.

A first take:
1/ The Court really wanted the plaintiffs to know that it's game over for now. They first declared their request for an intervention inadmissible on formal grounds. But just to get the message through, they also then went into why it was not only inadmissble but also unjustified.
2/ In the original judgment, the Court had faulted the federal government and the Bundestag for not pushing the ECB to perform a proportionality assessment of its PSPP programme. See thread for the full story and for how these two reacted:
Read 15 tweets
May 17, 2021
Ahead of tomorrow's publication of Karlsruhe's decision on whether its judgment on the ECB's PSPP programme has been sufficiently respected, let's take a look back what happened so far in this season:
1/ On 5 May 2020, the @BVerfG delivered its surprise judgment. It is important to keep in mind what the Court actually said: The addressees of the judgment were the German federal government and the Bundestag. These two had violated the rights of the plaintiffs.
2/ How did they do that? Govt and Bundestag did not, in the eyes of the Court, sufficiently pressure the ECB to explain why the PSPP programme (the ECB's quantitative easing tool) was a proportionate measure. That's it, that was the judgment.
Read 20 tweets

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