The #Eurogroup has decided last night on the main features (in the form of a "term sheet") of the new #Eurozone budget aka BICC. It clarifies some parts (not exactly for the better) but kicks the can down the road on quite some important points.
Thread:
1/ The BICC is supposed to support public investment and reforms in member states. What exactly falls under this will be subject to "strategic guidance". My reading here would be: As long as you bring a good reason, you will get the money.
2/ Which means that the pre-allocation of funds is key: "[It] will be determined on the basis of a transparent methodology, taking into account parameters reflecting the overarching aim of the instrument and legal basis." This is Brusselese for "We have no agreement here yet."
3/ Furthermore, it says that "The available funds per country should be within an acceptable range of the contributions of that country." This is what we call "juste retour" in the context of the EU budget. But again here obviously no agreement on what an "acceptable range" is.
4/ Finally, member states will need to co-finance. But: "The national co-financing rate could vary based on a predictable and transparent commonly agreed procedure defined ex-ante involving euro area Member States." That's right, no agreement here either.
5/ So for the expenditure side, we only know that funds will be pre-allocated, a reasonable share of what countries contribute will need to flow back, and there might be variable co-financing rates. This sounds a lot like the EU budget today. And like a lot still tbd.
6/ On the financing side, most interesting is the complete absence of any reference to an intergovernmental agreement (IGA). This was supposed to open the door to allocating non-MFF-budget ressources to the BICC (see e.g. D-F contribution this February). sven-giegold.de/wp-content/upl…
7/ Instead, it seems funds will have to come completely from within the MFF. And even though the exact size will need to be determined, it's hard to see that this will go beyond what the Commission had proposed for its Reform Delivery Tool - about 17 bn for 7 years.
8/ Last week I argued that we should judge the new budget in terms of its scalability and flexibility. On scalability, without an IGA, this looks rather grim. On flexibility, the truth is we don't really know - a lot of relevant parts remain open.
9/ Where does this leave us? If I read that correctly, the #EuroSummit next week has no open issues to decide. Instead, the next round will be the Commission having to propose a legal act - and then a new fight over the details in the context of the MFF negotiations.
10/ It seems like we will get a fiscal instrument for the Eurozone. That's a good symbolic gesture. But given its likely design, I remain sceptical that it will be of any real use - while it will probably block the way for better solutions further down the road.
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FAZ reports that the federal president is consulting with the chancellor and the leader of the opposition on next steps if the coalition collapses.
Good moment to run you through the main options and steps that would follow if indeed it's over:
There are essentially two ways this could end. Lindner could just pull the plug. FDP ministers would resign from their posts. Or Scholz runs out of patience and asks the federal president to remove Lindner (and presumably also the other FDP ministers).
The government would have no majority in parliament anymore. But in Germany, you cannot force a chancellor or a government out of office by simple no-confidence vote. The Bundestag would need to elect another chancellor to do that. And there is no majority in sight for anyone.
Draghi hat seinen Bericht zur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas vorgelegt - und natürlich konzentriert sich die Diskussion in 🇩🇪 sofort auf die Frage neue EU-Schulden ja/nein/vielleicht.
Warum das ein Fehler und dieser Bericht eine große Chance auch aus Berliner Perspektive ist:
Der Bericht ist zunächst eine ziemlich schonungslose Standortbestimmung der europäischen Wirtschaft im globalen Vergleich. Und Draghi sagt: Es sieht nicht gut aus. Als zentrale Gründe macht er fehlende Produktivität und mangelnde Innovation aus.
Außerdem nennt er die Herausforderungen durch Fachkräftemangel, hohe Energiepreise und notwendige Dekarbonisierung. Und eben die globale, teilweise unfaire, Konkurrenz. Klingt alles bekannt aus der deutschen Debatte? Eben.
The Draghi report has just dropped - and it is surprisingly good and low-bullshit.
My initial takeaways:
Such reports tend to be boring to read: Because the authors are mincing their words, because of too many cooks in the kitchen, because the "outside expert" is not really allowed to say what they want or do not know what they want to say.
The Letta report suffered from several of these ailments. The Draghi report suffers from none thereof. The man obviously knows what he wants to say and doesn't mince his words. The report is refreshingly low-bullshit, puts fingers in obvious wounds and largely avoids euphemisms.
The 🚦 agreement is actually pretty good news for a number of Eurozone files, including the fiscal rules and EDIS.
Here are the main bits:
1/ Most importantly, the text says that the fiscal rules can be "developed further" to reach three goals: Secure growth, safeguard debt sustainability and foster green investment. They should also become "simpler and more transparent, also to strengthen implementation".
2/ This is pretty big. No red lines here, but an open and constructive opening position for negotiations that can very well include a change to the rules themselves. It will be now up to the Commission and other member states to take up the offer that is in that text.
Das @_FriedrichMerz-Interview im @handelsblatt ist beeindruckendes Anschauungsmaterial, wie sich ein Teil der Konservativen im europapolitischen Wald verirrt hat und jetzt nicht mehr herausfindet.
Warum das ein Problem ist:
1/ Es geht mit dem klassischen Motiv los, dass man höllisch aufpassen muss, den faulen Südeuropäern (hier stv 🇮🇹🇪🇸) nicht ihr Hallodritum zu finanzieren. Dass gerade diese Länder die ambitioniertesten Pläne zur Verwendung der EU-Gelder vorgelegt haben, bleibt natürlich unerwähnt.
2/ Es geht dann weiter zu den Schuldenregeln. Hier räumt auch Merz ein, dass die Einhaltung für viele Länder schwierig wird. Und dann wird es spannend: Er drückt sich extrem wortreich um eine Antwort herum, ob man die Regeln denn nun wirklich so einhalten sollte.
Commissioner @PaoloGentiloni announces in @SZ that the Commission will only present its proposal for fiscal rules reform once there is a consensus among eurozone countries. Here's why this is a wise approach and why we are still far away from that point: sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/eu-…
1/ A weird feeling has grown in recent months that an expenditure rule is the way to go to reform the SGP and that what we basically need now is a Commission proposal that the technocrats then can tweak so that everyone is happy. Everyone is now waiting for that proposal.
2/ In my view, this feeling is a trap and the Commission is now trying to avoid falling into this trap by basically asking member states to come to a consensus what they want before puttting out a proposal.