The same persona posted the same story to multiple platforms. The Facebook account started in March 2015; an account with the same name and profile picture was on LiveJournal in early 2014.
It tied in with operation assets in other languages too. That's especially interesting, because it allows us to trace the op's multi-language approach at least as far back as 2016.
Take this piece on NATO "bioterrorism," for example.
The Russian version claimed to be a translation of an English-language original.
But the English-language original's wording was... interesting.
"The ensuing events remind the thriller from the 90s"??
The English version started with the words "As is known."
Any English journalist who started a piece like that would face the editor's wrath. But as "как известно", it's acceptable Russian reporting. (These from RIA Novosti.)
This reads like a translation from Russian.
And where else did the English-language version show up?
Medium, that's where. Posted by a burner account that only ever published the one story. That's the fingerprint of this operation.
Note the date: September 2016. This operation has been running a long time.
An interesting angle: a few of this persona's later posts amplified "leaks" from a Telegram account called "SBU Mole" (Кріт СБУ). (SBU = Ukrainian intel.)
The "leaks" went from the Mole, via burner accounts, to the op's Facebook account.
Worth looking more at the Mole.
Not all the "blue man"'s posts were about Ukraine. This one was on Azerbaijan, but used the same method: an apparently forged letter, burner accounts, multiple language, stolen profile pic (this time of Felicia Chin).
A few times, the operation used the same account multiple times in English too. This was the most prolific we've found so far: "Dama Mroczna," the Dark Lady, mostly posting on BeforeItsNews.
This time, the profile picture was taken from the movie "Blancanieves", by Pablo Berger.
Here's one of its stories: a claim that Ukraine had blacklisted @realDonaldTrump for his comments on Crimea. Based on a screenshot, and therefore easily photoshopped.
Attempt to divide Ukraine and the U.S.?
Further evidence that this was a) part of the operation, and b) fake: the story was also posted on Medium by a single-use burner account with a stolen profile picture.
Recognise the pattern?
This was another piece: a conspiracy story on Ukraine.
The use of language is just... well, read for yourselves.
What's fascinating here is that the BeforeItsNews version sourced itself to a story on @BuzzFeed. The URL is now broken.
Still trying to establish whether the link was fake, or the op managed to plant a false story on BF.
This was another Dark Lady classic. Ostensibly written by an American journalist, reporting on South Korean "assassination plots" against Kim Jong Un, but oh my, the wording.
And yet again, the same story showed up on Medium, posted by a burner account.
There was one other story the "Dark Lady" shared, too: a claim that the U.S. was planning a false-flag chemical weapons attack on Venezuela to justify intervention, back in late February.
Hell of an intercept... or would be, if it were real.
But it was posted by a single-use burner account, again.
Created on Feb 26. Posted on Feb 26. Only one post.
The same old pattern.
And the use of language is worthy of a James Bond villain.
"Current situation is jeopardizing our joint action directed against the regime of usurper Maduro"???
Seriously?
The operation really pushed this one. Half a dozen different Spanish sites and subreddits. In German on meinbezirk.at and ask1.org.
Single-use burner accounts, as ever.
"Joined: March 1. Contributions: 1. Last seen: March 1."
A separate burner account posted an English version of the story to @Indybay, which the operation used to plant many of its fakes.
Well, I say "English", but...
("Informational war" is a phrase also used by Russian MoD translators, incidentally.)
It's all about spreading division. Discrediting the US in the eyes of others. Dividing Western countries. But in most cases, the secrecy was so high that they buried their own stories.
One case was different. Posts on that later.
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🚨BREAKING🚨 @Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations. about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND... about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.
We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines... about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.
It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.
The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.
Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013. @Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27) graphika.com/reports/irans-…