Ben Nimmo Profile picture
Jun 23, 2019 24 tweets 11 min read Read on X
More on the info op from Russia that we've dubbed #SecondaryInfektion, for its resemblance to the Soviet-era AIDS libel.

Planting stories far away, then amplifying them with covert assets.

Full report here: docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9d177c_3e5… Image
As far as we can tell, the operation started in Russian in early 2014, and focused on Ukraine.

A few of the Russian-language personas were repetitive posters.

Note the blue-face version of @navalny, too. He's a frequent target.

medium.com/dfrlab/russian…
The same persona posted the same story to multiple platforms. The Facebook account started in March 2015; an account with the same name and profile picture was on LiveJournal in early 2014. Image
It tied in with operation assets in other languages too. That's especially interesting, because it allows us to trace the op's multi-language approach at least as far back as 2016.

Take this piece on NATO "bioterrorism," for example. Image
The Russian version claimed to be a translation of an English-language original.

But the English-language original's wording was... interesting.

"The ensuing events remind the thriller from the 90s"?? Image
The English version started with the words "As is known."

Any English journalist who started a piece like that would face the editor's wrath. But as "как известно", it's acceptable Russian reporting. (These from RIA Novosti.)

This reads like a translation from Russian. Image
And where else did the English-language version show up?

Medium, that's where. Posted by a burner account that only ever published the one story. That's the fingerprint of this operation.

Note the date: September 2016. This operation has been running a long time. Image
An interesting angle: a few of this persona's later posts amplified "leaks" from a Telegram account called "SBU Mole" (Кріт СБУ). (SBU = Ukrainian intel.)

The "leaks" went from the Mole, via burner accounts, to the op's Facebook account.

Worth looking more at the Mole. Image
Not all the "blue man"'s posts were about Ukraine. This one was on Azerbaijan, but used the same method: an apparently forged letter, burner accounts, multiple language, stolen profile pic (this time of Felicia Chin). Image
A few times, the operation used the same account multiple times in English too. This was the most prolific we've found so far: "Dama Mroczna," the Dark Lady, mostly posting on BeforeItsNews.

medium.com/dfrlab/russian…
This time, the profile picture was taken from the movie "Blancanieves", by Pablo Berger. Image
Here's one of its stories: a claim that Ukraine had blacklisted @realDonaldTrump for his comments on Crimea. Based on a screenshot, and therefore easily photoshopped.

Attempt to divide Ukraine and the U.S.? Image
Further evidence that this was a) part of the operation, and b) fake: the story was also posted on Medium by a single-use burner account with a stolen profile picture.

Recognise the pattern? Image
This was another piece: a conspiracy story on Ukraine.

The use of language is just... well, read for yourselves. Image
What's fascinating here is that the BeforeItsNews version sourced itself to a story on @BuzzFeed. The URL is now broken.

Still trying to establish whether the link was fake, or the op managed to plant a false story on BF.

Cc @JaneLytv @CraigSilverman @kevincollier Image
This was another Dark Lady classic. Ostensibly written by an American journalist, reporting on South Korean "assassination plots" against Kim Jong Un, but oh my, the wording. Image
And yet again, the same story showed up on Medium, posted by a burner account.

"Military Observer," this time. Note the profile pic, apparently lifted from the @ItalyMFA website: esteri.it/mae/en/politic… Image
There was one other story the "Dark Lady" shared, too: a claim that the U.S. was planning a false-flag chemical weapons attack on Venezuela to justify intervention, back in late February.

medium.com/dfrlab/russian…
This one started off in Spanish. Posted to globedia.com, embedding what looks like a letter from @ljsacks73 of @USAID Colombia to @jguaido.

Hell of an intercept... or would be, if it were real. Image
But it was posted by a single-use burner account, again.

Created on Feb 26. Posted on Feb 26. Only one post.

The same old pattern. Image
And the use of language is worthy of a James Bond villain.

"Current situation is jeopardizing our joint action directed against the regime of usurper Maduro"???

Seriously?
The operation really pushed this one. Half a dozen different Spanish sites and subreddits. In German on meinbezirk.at and ask1.org.

Single-use burner accounts, as ever.

"Joined: March 1. Contributions: 1. Last seen: March 1." Image
A separate burner account posted an English version of the story to @Indybay, which the operation used to plant many of its fakes.

Well, I say "English", but...

("Informational war" is a phrase also used by Russian MoD translators, incidentally.) Image
It's all about spreading division. Discrediting the US in the eyes of others. Dividing Western countries. But in most cases, the secrecy was so high that they buried their own stories.

One case was different. Posts on that later.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Ben Nimmo

Ben Nimmo Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @benimmo

Sep 27, 2022
🚨BREAKING🚨
@Meta took down two covert influence ops:
Big one from Russia🇷🇺 targeting Europe with spoofed media websites like the Guardian and Spiegel
First one from China 🇨🇳 to focus on both sides of domestic US 🇺🇸 politics and Czech-China relations.
about.fb.com/news/2022/09/r…
@Meta The operations were very different, but both worked on multiple social media platforms and petitions sites.
The Russian op was even on LiveJournal (cute).
List of domains, petitions etc in the report. #OSINT community, happy hunting!
@Meta China: this was the first Chinese network we’ve disrupted that focused on US domestic politics ahead of the midterms and Czech foreign policy toward China and Ukraine.
It was small, we took it down before it built an audience, but that’s a new direction for Chinese IO.
Read 11 tweets
Aug 4, 2022
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Takedowns from around the world:
Cyber espionage in South Asia;
Harassment in India;
Violating networks in Greece, South Africa, India;
Influence ops from Malaysia & Israel
AND...
about.fb.com/news/2022/08/m…
A deep dive into a Russian troll farm, linked to people with ties to what’s known as the Internet Research Agency.
It used fake accounts across the internet to make it look like there’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine - and to pretend the troll farm's doing a good job.
The operation called itself “Cyber Front Z”.

We think of it as the Z Team, because it was about as far from being the A Team as you can get.
Read 11 tweets
Apr 7, 2022
🚨JUST OUT🚨
Quarterly threat report from @Meta’s investigative teams.
Much to dig into:
State & non-state actors targeting Ukraine;
Cyber espionage from Iran and Azerbaijan;
Influence ops in Brazil and Costa Rica;
Spammy activity in the Philippines...
about.fb.com/news/2022/04/m…
I’ll focus this thread on Ukraine. For more on the rest, see the great @ngleicher and @DavidAgranovich.
We’ve seen state & non-state ops targeting Ukraine across the internet since the invasion, including attempts from:

🇧🇾 Belarus KGB
👹 A Russian “NGO” w/ some links to past IRA folks
👻 Ghostwriter

We caught these early, before they could build audience or be effective.
Read 15 tweets
Feb 28, 2022
🚨 TAKEDOWN 🚨
This weekend, we took down a relatively small influence operation that had targeted Ukraine across multiple social media platforms and websites. It was run by people in Russia and Ukraine: about.fb.com/news/2022/02/s…
It consisted of approx 40 accounts, Groups and Pages on FB and IG, plus on Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram.

It mainly posted links to long-form articles on its websites, without much luck making them engaging. It got very few reactions, and under 4k followers.
It ran a few fake personas posing as authors. They had fake profile pics (likely GAN), and unusually detailed public bios - e.g. former civil aviation engineer, hydrography expert.

The op posted their articles on its websites and social media, & amplified them using more fakes.
Read 6 tweets
Feb 27, 2022
Personal 🧵 based on years of OSINT research into influence operations since 2014.

Looking at the Russian official messaging on “de-nazification” and “genocide”, it’s worth putting them in context of the many different Russian IO that targeted Ukraine over the years.
Way back in 2014, Russian military intel ran a series of fake “hacktivist” personas that targeted Ukraine. Note the “Nazi” theme.

Screenshots from @Graphika_NYC research, based on Facebook takedown.
about.fb.com/news/2020/09/r…
public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphi… Image
Still in 2014, one of the busiest days the Internet Research Agency had on Twitter was when it falsely accused Ukraine of shooting down flight MH-17 as a “provocation”.
Screenshot from @DFRLab /Twitter archives.
transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/inf…
medium.com/dfrlab/trolltr… Image
Read 10 tweets
Jan 20, 2022
JUST OUT: Report on coordinated inauthentic behaviour takedowns in December, and a look back over the past year & more.

Interesting: 2/3 of all ops we removed since 2017 were wholly or partially focused on domestic audiences.

about.fb.com/news/2022/01/d… Image
We took down three operations last month:

* Iran, targeting the UK, focusing on Scottish independence;
* Mexico, a PR firm targeting audiences across LATAM;
* Turkey, targeting Libya, and linked to the Libyan Justice and Construction Party (affiliated w/Muslim Brotherhood).
It’s not the first time for an Iranian op to pose as supporters of Scottish independence.
In the past, FB found a page that copied and posted political cartoons about independence as far back as 2013.
@Graphika_NYC writeup here (pages 26-27)
graphika.com/reports/irans-…
Read 11 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(