One point on attributing operation #SecondaryInfektion, because there are various theories going around: we don't have the smoking keyboard here, so attribution is a question of degrees of probability.
medium.com/dfrlab/top-tak…
medium.com/dfrlab/top-tak…
#SecondaryInfektion was:
persistent (since Jan 2014);
sophisticated;
well resourced;
obsessed with secrecy;
rubbish at getting impact.
The security measures were relentless, and unprecedented for any op I've seen.
All that suggests an intelligence op.
persistent (since Jan 2014);
sophisticated;
well resourced;
obsessed with secrecy;
rubbish at getting impact.
The security measures were relentless, and unprecedented for any op I've seen.
All that suggests an intelligence op.
It doesn't look like the Internet Research Agency. They were actually good at getting impact, at least sometimes.
The GRU would be the next obvious choice, because they have form. Remember Alice Donovan?
medium.com/dfrlab/trolltr…
The GRU would be the next obvious choice, because they have form. Remember Alice Donovan?
medium.com/dfrlab/trolltr…
But obvious isn't necessarily the same as likely. There's insufficient evidence to identify the actor at this stage.
#SecondaryInfektion came from Russia. It was long-lasting, well-resourced, sophisticated, and obsessed with secrecy.
Beyond that, the search continues.
#SecondaryInfektion came from Russia. It was long-lasting, well-resourced, sophisticated, and obsessed with secrecy.
Beyond that, the search continues.
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