Good morning🌞 - very hot & hazy today so my usual morning hike was le short & more like a stroll. Anyway, US data overnight was meh & weakened the USD somewhat. In Asia, the morning started w/ a whimper as Japan exports contracted -6.7%YoY in June & imports worsened to -5.2% 😬
Got BOK decision at 9 & consensus is a hold but think it should cut rates & if not a cut now the next meeting is fair play. Indonesia'll commence its easing cycle or shall I say reversal of last yr's excessive tightening due to a hawkish Fed. Jokowi's infra push needs a nudge 🇮🇩!
Asia exports in June %YoY (in USD so some FX impact):
Vietnam 🇻🇳+8.5%🤗
Taiwan 🇹🇼+0.5%🙂
China 🇨🇳 -1.3% 😬
Japan 🇯🇵-6.7% 🥶
Indonesia 🇮🇩-9% 🥶
India 🇮🇳 -9.7% 🥶
Korea 🇰🇷-13.5% 🥶
Singapore NDOX 🇸🇬-17.3% 🥶
Q: Who's most impacted?
Korea and Singapore, both heavy exporters👈🏻
If u just take a simple average of Asian exports in June then the contraction WORSENED so u can see that things not looking good for economies very dependent on external demand (🇸🇬🇰🇷😉) & also China given its slowdown. Vietnam recorded strong growth & Taiwan nudged to positive🤗
Chart shows Vietnam diverged from Asia's worsening contraction for 3 reasons:
a) Labor costs comparative advantage (inputs like electricity cheap) & tariff arb;
b) Proximity to China so China +1 strategy
c) Gov focuses on this through trade deals & incentives
d) Infra improving
So the BOK move was exciting but let's get back to my regular programming of Asian exports. How about we talk about China trade? U'd like that wouldn't you?
Okay, June trade was not great for China & China is important b/c it lifted the world out of the GFC & now it's tired 👇🏻
How tired u ask? Well, very b/c of high leverage by the firms, which is domestic in nature & also stress by rising risk aversion despite PBOC easing & tougher external environment.
Ok, wut to do? Imports are CONTRACTING & exports a little better but not good. Ytd exports +0%😬
Stats for June %YoY: Exports -1.3% & imports -7.3% in USD; Ok, but u saw that I smoothed it due to volatility of data & trend is negative esp imports.
How negative? Ytd (Jan-June) exports +0% but imports -4%👈🏻! What does that mean?
Trade surplus +34% ytd & that's the bad news😬
No this +34% of trade surplus is not a sign of strength but rather weakness of domestic demand & don't forget that Xi Jinping had that import fair in Nov which hasn't really turned out to be a big beginning for China import soft power. China boosted global growth & now it's TIRED
If China is not importing as much as before (-4% ytd) then we got a global demand problem if NO ONE PICKS UP THE SLACK. The US is somewhat but not really. Not Europe. Not Asia either & defo not Latam or the Middle East.
Okay, so the -4% is really bad news for Korea for example.
So the -4% ytd import contraction is the aggregate & no everyone is losing out on this sagging Chinese demand. Table below show China exports & imports in Q1 & Q2 by %YoY.
A lot to digest here but let's focus on imports in Q2. Look at Korea -14%, Japan -7%; Taiwan -8%; US -28%
Q2 import growth by China is interesting b/c it shows also the UNEVENNESS OF DOMESTIC CHINESE GROWTH. The 6.2%YoY in Q2 u see from 6.4% in Q1 looks smooth but it masks the divergence of performance.
So Australia +11%. Why? Chinese gov is pushing infra to smooth out the biz cycle
What u're seeing in terms of destination of of imports reflect what's going on in mainland China - growth is uneven by ownership of firms, size of firms & by sectors so don't just take 6.2% & call it a day. As always, the devils are in the details & so study the details of data.
Ok, so let's go back to trade. We know imports are -4% ytd & we know that there are bigger losers of this lackluster demand (yes, Korea is a big loser of declining Chinese demand b/c Korea has the LARGEST EXPOSURE TO CHINA as China is its largest export destination: 25% of total)
Australia is a winner of China infra push so anyone studying the AU market studies Chinese policy b/c it's really about what they want to give incentives via taxes, credit & of course SOEs & local govs.
In all, the decline of Chinese imports is bad news & percolates globally.
So China, by using its current account & by that I mean imports, as a 1st line of defense = China stablization of growth is less helpful to the world as before.
This is key & this is why u see languishing regional exports despite China 6.2% YoY GDP growth in Q2 2019 👈🏻
Why is China using its current account (importing less from the world = spending fewer dollars on foreign goods & so helpful to the CNY as the trade surplus rises) as a 1st line of defense?
B/c NO LONGER able to easily GROW export earnings. Exports expand 0% ytd 😬so no growth👇🏻
Let's look at Chinese shipment overseas by destination in Q2:
Australia down -5% in Q2, why? B/c Australia is not doing that well so its demand lower
HK down
India down
Japan down
Indonesia zero growth
Japan down
Korea down
Singapore down
Thailand zero growth
USA down -8% 🥶
Okay, the US is important b/c it is CHINA'S LARGEST DESTINATION BY COUNTRY, making up roughly 16-20% of total exports.
So the decline of US demand by -8% in Q2 & -9% in Q1 is very very bad news for Chinese exporters & so they need to find new markets or ways to arbitrage losses.
The bad news is that this friction to trade w/ its #1 customer is not going away & will be a source of stress into H2 19. Chinese exporters are clever so will offset w/ arbitrage via diverting trade or re-routing investment but bad news is that it's not just the US getting tough.
Btw, trade & investment go together. U know that b/c it's in my pinned tweet & I always emphasize this.
If exports are not expanding & the outlook is murky at best, then u bet the enthusiasm to investment is very curbed. Nominal FAI data remains weak despite the gov's support 👇🏻
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Highly popular in China as he is entertaining as he has made China great again. His pressure has pushed China reforms forward. China has become more resilient and less reliant against the US. Chinese indigenous tech is decent & confidence domestically is highest ever. External pressure has rallied stakeholders around the central leadership for advancing tech & expanding domestic demand. Exports will not be a key driver & infra ROI down. China has benefited from Trump pressure.
Trump has a good story teller for China as Trump has helped the China story. The Chinese is projecting stability in a more volatile world & saying that China is open for business while the door is closing by the US.
DowJones & SPX down while China is up. Nasdaq down & HSI up. All thanks to Trump.
Middle East:
Everything Trump does in the Middle East is for Trump to focus to China. Trump puts on the table risky strategies. He wants to bully Iran to the table. Bombing Yemen is an example.
No one takes Trump seriously. What he says versus what he does. What he says is the maximum. Example is Palestine. The best strategy is to wait him out & Iran strategy is waiting him out & Iran has no leverage except time.
Time showed his hand of not having time. In a hurry.
People are convinced that Trump is going to collapse in six months. So give him something but not in a hurry to give him a good deal.
Considerations. Trump is willing to negotiate with Russian directly. He is willing to play outside US foreign policy. His handling of Zelenskyy is like a loan shark makes it difficult for Iranians to respond to him.
For Iranians, it is not what he tells them but what he does to others. For him to have wins quickly, he would have to pay the price.
He can’t give Iran what he wants with Israel. The Middle East problem won’t be solved easily.
Trump "Liberation Day" is coming & if it is anything to go by like other tariff days, it won't feel "liberating." Why? Because he is front-loading bad news.
It sounds crazy but I have given it some thoughts and here are what I think his short-term objectives.
First, we know he has 20% tariffs on China on top of others so we are now got a lot of friction to trade with China, which the Trump administration sees as its #1 security threat.
But isn't happy with this friction to trade and investment and keen to close loop holes. Remember that Biden also increased tons of investment and tariff curbs with China.
How to close it is the question? It requires others to do it. Who are the others? The easiest is Mexico and Canada as they have USMCA, which Trump agreed in 2020 (previously NAFTA).
There are clues to what Trump wants from Canada and Mexico in the latest 25% AUTO tariff.
Why? There are exemptions to USMCA for US content and also the implementation of tariff is contingent on them figuring out how this 25% tariff is going to work.
Meaning, USMCA essentially is still in force but only exemptions in USMCA.
But Trump isn't happy w/ current USMCA. Wants change.
I have a thread that I was going to make about auto tariffs but instead, I decided to just read/listen. The Peterson Institute has a good paper on modeling 25% tariff on the EU I am listening to this one by Paul Krugman because, well, he's a free trader and a great trade economist. And most importantly, he's old enough to have some historical perspective. Interesting to listen to him (I am a student of Fukuyama as well) because I think what's interesting is that people of his generation couldn't imagine the world we are in today in the 1980s when they recommended the policies they did.
So basically, Paul Krugman is a big free trader that thinks there is no reason for industrial policy (IP). Why? He thinks that we are not good at picking champions so just let trade be free.
Anyway, upon reflecting on 2025 vs 1987 when he was peak free trading, he sees a few mistakes of his free trade/total globalization idea:
1) Did not see strategic argument to trade, as in, if u free trade everything away, like the US and many countries have, and produce nothing, and the country that is dominant decides to INVADE, well, that's a vulnerability. In the 1980s, he spent ZERO time thinking about risks of free trade and was a free trade maximalist. Now he thinks that was arrogant (I said this not him - he wouldn't say that about himself) to perceive ZERO RISK. 2) Negative externality of globalization and the need to harness political capture for good will. Basically IP is needed to push a world in a certain place, which means, well, free trade got downside. 3) Downside of globalization is that industries are concentrated so losses are felt acutely in areas that lose jobs.
But he goes on to say free trade is best and IP is not good. Anyway and then he goes on to talk about virtues of IP. Haha!
Let's go to the last part of the Miran's paper, which is currencies (Chapter 4 & 5).
Remember that his articulation of all the ills of the US trade imbalance is about the USD as a reserve currency & also the security support the US has to do (two burdens) that has grown, dwarfing the US economy RELATIVE size.
So let's talk about it. But before we even talk about, we have to go through a bit of economics history, if that is okay with you. We'll keep it pretty brief.
Triffin was a famous guy. He famously testified before Congress in 1959 & predicted the collapse of the Bretton Wood system, which happened in 1971 when the US broke away from the gold-dollar link.
What did he say? Well, simply, that as a gold-dollar reserve currency, the US would have to expand its liabilities as fast as required for global trade. But since it's backed by gold, which grows SLOWER than global trade, then we got a problem as lower rates would cause a run on the gold stock or dollar liabilities > gold stock.
And if the US didn't accumulate fast liabilities, well, global liquidity would shrink as US rates would go to high and cause global deflation.
If you want to learn more about it, see the paper below. The author btw isn't a fan of Triffin so says he got a bunch of stuff wrong and whatever he got right, it was probably not by design but accident.
Either way, he predicted that & got very famous obvs. What else did he predict?
Btw, the key reason the BIS author said Triffin was wrong/flukey is that dude didn't account for Euro dollar or USD outside the US (note at the time it was mostly Europe that held that hence the name & also the EUR was not even conceived although Charles de Gaulle was already pissed off about the dollar privilege & coined "exorbitant privilege phrase) so his timing of the "crash" was off. Either way, he was right for something and maybe it would have been different but either way, 1971, Nixon called the dollar-gold thing off.
Anyway, Triffin and went on to modify things because now we are no longer a USD-gold FX but just well, USD fiat currency.
So he now has a current account version of Triffin (btw, there's also a fiscal Triffin too). Let's talk about his current account idea.
He basically says this, well, as reserve FX or KING DOLLAR, the USD liquidity or USD liabilities will need to grow at the rate of global growth, which would lead to persistent current account DEFICIT.
Well, voila, the US did run since 1980s current account deficits (see graph from Miran's note).
Why? Well, it strengthens the USD and makes imports cheaper than exports + other countries' mercantilitic policy that makes them devalue their FX relative to their trade position.
BIS provides a bunch of counter arguments of why Triffin was off so read that but I won't summarize because, well, the point is to read the Miran paper and not why Triffin might be right for the wrong reasons.
Btw, the whole Triffin thing is about eventually, that things would become unsustainable.
But of course, BIS paper disagrees and say, well, FX would readjust and rates would adjust.
Okay, let's talk about Trump end game. To do that, let's read Stephen Miran's "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System" together.
Note that there's a disclaimer that this is not a policy advocacy but catalog of tools available for them to "reshape the global trading system." hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/h…
Trump has been talking about global trade & how he thinks the US trade deficit is unfair since the 1980s (see his Oprah interviews) so this is beef he carries and he has the power to do it.
Trump 1.0 was a test case and Trump 2.0 is going to go full steroid on what he views as the current world order not working for the US. It may work for u, but not for him & his team is going to change it. Here's how Miran is laying it out.
First, the root of all US problems & its imbalances lies in the overvalued dollar. Yes, others lament its "exorbitant privilege" (a French FM said it) but here Trump team & also corroborated by many economists, including @michaelxpettis that while it is good for US FINANCIAL SECTORS, terrible for MAINSTREET. So basically Wall Street gains at the expense of the VACUUMING out of US industrial base.
Let's start with the basics. What's on & what's promised/threatened. So far, on 12th March 2025, we have:
+25% on steel & aluminum on everyone (for steel, not new for everyone & just those that got exemptions. In Asia, that's AU, SK, and Japan. Canada & Mexico got exemptions and so did EU).
+20% on China, including Hong Kong.
Let's talk about the 20% on China. China is clearly targeted with 20% higher tariffs as well as its commercial ships, of which higher fees of docking in the US are being considered.
China will try to cope with higher tariffs as it did the past, which is offshoring productions to more neutral countries such as Mexico, Canada, Southeast Asia and sell more to the rest of the world as well as expanding relationships with the Global South (e.g. BRICS).
But with widening unilateral tariffs as well as others erecting barriers, this time around, beefing up domestic demand will be key.
Who loses in this tariff for Asia? China for US markets, but it will try to export elsewhere so there is a fear of a flood of Chinese goods coming.
Who gains? Well, it depends but those that can limit the flood of Chinese goods as well as export more to the US & attract investment. In other words, a lot of ifs but winners are possible.