Jon Bateman Profile picture
Aug 5, 2019 7 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Thread: @Cloudflare’s decision to cut off #8chan was probably right. The site wasn’t far from ISIS-style propaganda. But the case has surfaced some real policy dilemmas that won’t always have easy answers in the future. 1/7
Here’s the problem we’re already familiar with: Tech companies have the ability & legal authority to moderate harmful speech—yet they lack democratic legitimacy or any real investment in the philosophical values at stake. They're still the best we have today. 2/7
Until now, debates about content moderation have focused on the Internet’s “application layer” of consumer-facing information platforms (e.g. Facebook, Google). These sites are the primary filters of bad content, & they’ve muddled their way to some basic expertise. 3/7
But what happens when an application owner (like #8chan) refuses to moderate? Then, any moderation would need to happen farther down the “technical stack”—by infrastructure providers like ISPs, domain registrars, payment processors, ad brokers... 4/7 Image
That’s where @Cloudflare comes in: it helped keep #8chan online. But asking a cybersecurity co. to make free speech decisions is awkward at best; they just aren't equipped. You might as well ask electric utilities to pull the plug on bad websites. Should be rare last resort. 5/7
@Cloudflare We’ve seen this happen before. In 2010, Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal stopped processing payments for WikiLeaks after the release of U.S. diplomatic cables. Now largely forgotten, the episode frightened civil libertarians at the time. 6/7 theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
Unlike WikiLeaks, #8chan has few defenders. But the calls won’t always be so clear-cut. As society grapples with the content moderation challenge, the question of “who decides” may be the most urgent of all. 7/7

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More from @JonKBateman

Feb 1
How can democracies fight disinformation?

Many think it’s the most urgent question of our time. Others say it’s poorly framed or misguided. Clearly, a serious problem exists—but we struggle to define, measure, or solve it.

That’s why Dean Jackson and I wrote this new report: 🧵 Image
Our aim was to synthesize as much empirical data as possible on what “works” against disinformation, translated into practical policy language.

But you can’t do that without wrestling with the “disinformation” idea and admitting how little is known about it. We tried to do both. Image
If I’ve already sold you, here’s the full 130 pages—broken up into skimmable chunks.



For the 10-tweet version, read on!carnegieendowment.org/2024/01/31/cou…
Read 14 tweets
Dec 19, 2022
Russian cyber operations in Ukraine: I’ve spent months collating and analyzing data on…

» Their military effectiveness
» Reasons why they weren’t more impactful
» Lessons for other states

The result is a very long paper and this 🧵... carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus…
I look at 2 kinds of RU cyber ops in UKR:

» Destructive/disruptive attacks—or “cyber fires,” a military term that emphasizes wartime context.

» Intelligence collection. Largely overlooked by analysts, perhaps b/c it’s less visible and harder to assess.
I argue that RU cyber fires contributed modestly to initial invasion, then quickly faded in relevance. High watermark was Week 1.

Viasat hack (combined w/ RU EW) plausibly helped degrade UKR C4I in battle of Kyiv. But no subsequent op has had comparable known military impact.
Read 22 tweets
Oct 27, 2022
1/ Very important remarks from @BISgov head Alan Estevez on China chip export controls.

My take: USG is highly confident in its actions, sees no real downside (from allies/industry), intends to do more on other tech. 🧵

(Bravo to @MartijnRasser @CNASdc)
2/ On strategic purpose: “This is not about the economic destruction of China... We’re not looking at a decoupling, that’s not where our focus is.” Solely about “national security.”
3/ BIS has “top-down guidance to go after national security threats.” Moreover, “we do not balance national security against [US] trade [losses].” For example, “I do not coordinate export controls w/ my trade counterpart in Commerce.”
Read 17 tweets
Jun 14, 2022
The latest Congressional proposal for outbound investment screening sounds like an improvement on prior bill, but it still needs work. Quick thread:

(1) What's the objective? Need to distinguish two issues that are commonly conflated...
First, there's the fear that U.S. investments in and/or offshoring to China can increase U.S. *dependence* on Beijing, and therefore might enable Chinese coercion, sabotage, espionage, or influence.
This concern is conceptually distinct from a second fear—that U.S. investments in China might *support* Chinese technological advances and therefore empower a bad actor. E.g. could aid Beijing's military aggression, repression, economic dominance, or unfair trade.
Read 15 tweets
May 4, 2022
Huge US-China tech news: @Dimi reports the US is “laying the groundwork” to sanction Hikvision under the Global Magnitsky Act.

This would be a profound escalation of tech tensions—perhaps a turning point akin to Trump’s actions against Huawei. I think this is a mistake. 🧵
First, some background. Hikvision is a large, publicly-traded Chinese video surveillance equipment manufacturer with major a global presence and international sales to many governments and private companies (including in the U.S.).
Westerners have many concerns w/ Hikvision: poor cybersecurity + data security, status as state-owned enterprise / subsidy recipient / national champion, support for the PLA, participation in Chinese mass surveillance, sales to repressive regimes. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
Read 32 tweets
Apr 25, 2022
I’m elated that @CarnegieEndow has released my big US-China tech “decoupling” report, w/ a kind foreword by @ericschmidt. Grateful for feedback + support from so many.

In lieu of a dry summary, a 🧵 on why I wrote this tome + what I learned along the way: carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/u.s…
Tech “decoupling” is extremely complicated + hard to define. It’s also one of the most consequential things happening in today’s world.

The US and China are the largest knots in a globe-spanning technological web. Rewiring this web will alter economies, societies, + geopolitics. Image
In 2018-19, I was a civilian advisor in the Pentagon. I watched as the Trump admin marshaled a huge array of restrictions against China’s tech sector, often on military grounds. Export controls, investment limits, visa bans, sanctions, and more were used in unprecedented ways. Image
Read 22 tweets

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