Thread: @Cloudflare’s decision to cut off #8chan was probably right. The site wasn’t far from ISIS-style propaganda. But the case has surfaced some real policy dilemmas that won’t always have easy answers in the future. 1/7
Here’s the problem we’re already familiar with: Tech companies have the ability & legal authority to moderate harmful speech—yet they lack democratic legitimacy or any real investment in the philosophical values at stake. They're still the best we have today. 2/7
Until now, debates about content moderation have focused on the Internet’s “application layer” of consumer-facing information platforms (e.g. Facebook, Google). These sites are the primary filters of bad content, & they’ve muddled their way to some basic expertise. 3/7
But what happens when an application owner (like #8chan) refuses to moderate? Then, any moderation would need to happen farther down the “technical stack”—by infrastructure providers like ISPs, domain registrars, payment processors, ad brokers... 4/7
That’s where @Cloudflare comes in: it helped keep #8chan online. But asking a cybersecurity co. to make free speech decisions is awkward at best; they just aren't equipped. You might as well ask electric utilities to pull the plug on bad websites. Should be rare last resort. 5/7
@Cloudflare We’ve seen this happen before. In 2010, Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal stopped processing payments for WikiLeaks after the release of U.S. diplomatic cables. Now largely forgotten, the episode frightened civil libertarians at the time. 6/7 theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
Unlike WikiLeaks, #8chan has few defenders. But the calls won’t always be so clear-cut. As society grapples with the content moderation challenge, the question of “who decides” may be the most urgent of all. 7/7
Many think it’s the most urgent question of our time. Others say it’s poorly framed or misguided. Clearly, a serious problem exists—but we struggle to define, measure, or solve it.
That’s why Dean Jackson and I wrote this new report: 🧵
Our aim was to synthesize as much empirical data as possible on what “works” against disinformation, translated into practical policy language.
But you can’t do that without wrestling with the “disinformation” idea and admitting how little is known about it. We tried to do both.
If I’ve already sold you, here’s the full 130 pages—broken up into skimmable chunks.
2/ On strategic purpose: “This is not about the economic destruction of China... We’re not looking at a decoupling, that’s not where our focus is.” Solely about “national security.”
3/ BIS has “top-down guidance to go after national security threats.” Moreover, “we do not balance national security against [US] trade [losses].” For example, “I do not coordinate export controls w/ my trade counterpart in Commerce.”
First, there's the fear that U.S. investments in and/or offshoring to China can increase U.S. *dependence* on Beijing, and therefore might enable Chinese coercion, sabotage, espionage, or influence.
This concern is conceptually distinct from a second fear—that U.S. investments in China might *support* Chinese technological advances and therefore empower a bad actor. E.g. could aid Beijing's military aggression, repression, economic dominance, or unfair trade.
First, some background. Hikvision is a large, publicly-traded Chinese video surveillance equipment manufacturer with major a global presence and international sales to many governments and private companies (including in the U.S.).
Westerners have many concerns w/ Hikvision: poor cybersecurity + data security, status as state-owned enterprise / subsidy recipient / national champion, support for the PLA, participation in Chinese mass surveillance, sales to repressive regimes. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
I’m elated that @CarnegieEndow has released my big US-China tech “decoupling” report, w/ a kind foreword by @ericschmidt. Grateful for feedback + support from so many.
Tech “decoupling” is extremely complicated + hard to define. It’s also one of the most consequential things happening in today’s world.
The US and China are the largest knots in a globe-spanning technological web. Rewiring this web will alter economies, societies, + geopolitics.
In 2018-19, I was a civilian advisor in the Pentagon. I watched as the Trump admin marshaled a huge array of restrictions against China’s tech sector, often on military grounds. Export controls, investment limits, visa bans, sanctions, and more were used in unprecedented ways.