Went on record with @JonathanLanday about our suspicion that something went wrong during or after a Russian test of its nuclear powered cruise missile (9M730 Burevestnik, NATO name: SSC-X-9 Skyfall). Three pieces of evidence underpin our suspicion. reuters.com/article/us-rus…
First, Russia appears to have recently moved SSC-X-9 testing to Nenoksa. In the past year, Russia built a launch area that closely resembles the one removed from Novaya Zemlya with a shelter on rails. (Also, blue shipping containers!)
Second, we can see the Serebryanka, a nuclear fuel carrier, sitting off the coast inside the exclusion zone. (It is visible in satellite images and its AIS transponder is turned on.) This vessel was previously used last summer in an effort to recover a crashed SSC-X-9.
Third, ROSATOM, the Russian state atomic energy corporation, has now admitted that five of its employees were killed while providing "engineering and technical support of isotopic power sources in a liquid propulsion system." rosatom.ru/journalist/new…
A few (ok, many) thoughts on possible Chinese nuclear testing, after @UnderSecT declassified the fact that the IC believes China has been conducting low-yield nuclear explosions including on on June 22, 2020. Ends with Trump getting a Nobel Prize if he wants it. Weird journey.🧵
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear explosions. Both countries have signed, but not ratified, the treaty. Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, China is "obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty.
China, like the United States, has declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. The CTBT, though, bans "nuclear explosions", not testing, but it does not define a nuclear explosion. The debate concerns whether China is abiding by our definition.
Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 🧵 1/17
Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
References to "tactical" nuclear weapons in this otherwise great @guardian story by @hugolowell are misleading. The US would drop a strategic B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator with a yield of 300 or 400 kilotons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 21 kt. theguardian.com/world/2025/jun…
Here are the nuclear weapons in the US "enduring stockpile" from @ENERGY's stockpile management plant. Note that the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator is labeled as a "strategic bomb" -- and for good reason. energy.gov/sites/default/…
The yield of the B61-11 is classified, but it is a converted B61-7 bomb. The yield of the -7 and -11 are usually given as more than 300 kilotons. @nukestrat says the B61-11 was increased to 400 kt. Either way, this is a very powerful nuclear weapon.
I see @SangerNYT asked why Israel hasn't hit the stockpile of enriched uranium. My understanding is that the hex is stored in the tunnels at Isfahan and Israel hasn't been able to destroy the hard, deeply buried targets. Thread.
Isfahan UCF has some tunnels that are are about 100 m under a mountain that Israel has not yet tried to hit. The Iranians were pretty proud of these tunnels, which were constructed around the same time as Fordow by the same dwarves (aka the Passive Defense Organization).
This is pretty esoteric knowledge that is only covered in specialists journals like ... the @nytimes. 😉 (Sorry, I just appreciate Bill Broad and want to give him some love.)
This is probably the the new North Korean uranium enrichment facility that @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi briefed the Board of Governors about. @sam_lair and I have a summary on the blog. Nice shot by our friends at @planet. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/122048…
The dimensions, layout and other features do resemble the Kangson UEP when it was constructed. Here is a 2002 image of the Kangson under construction -- the central enrichment hall is about 93 m long, which is the right length for two 164-centifuge cascades end-to-end.
Trump's offer to Iran, as reported by @BarakRavid, is a dollar-store-JCPOA.
The JCPOA -- which Trump abandoned -- had all of these provisions, usually in ways that were stronger or more carefully constructed.
He's trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. A thread.
@BarakRavid Here is the original story. The proposal was "described to Axios by two sources with direct knowledge — one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown." This is a paraphrase, so sometimes its hard to know what they are getting at. axios.com/2025/06/02/ira…
@BarakRavid Here is the text of the JCPOA. You don't have to take my word for it; you can look it up yourself. europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460…