@ArmsControlWonk's Threads
I've mapped @gbrumfiel's reporting of the status of IMS radionuclide stations in Russia. A red pin (📌) shows the station is down. Stations with a yellow pin were down, now back online and backfilling data. Green is online and white is under construction. 
@gbrumfiel The pattern is fairly suspicious. The stations most likely to detect the plume based on @ctbto_alerts modeling (RN61, RN54 and RN59) are down. The two back online were marginal detection risks (RN56 and RN57). The two stations with no chance (RN58 and RN60) remained online.
@gbrumfiel @ctbto_alerts Having the CTBTO IMS is so useful right now. Even the fact that Moscow seems to be turning off stations is enormously revealing. As I said the other day, making guilty parties to act guilty is an under-appreciated aspect of verification.
I was wondering when a story like this would appear - although I am not sure it quite gets at the nature of the problem. Two IMS stations (Dubna and Kirov) reportedly stopped transmitting two days after the accident.
wsj.com/articles/russi…
wsj.com/articles/russi…
Two days is a long time. The bigger question, to me, is why did no stations in Russia detect the event? Here is the initial @ctbto_alerts release -- the screenshots contain the names of the four stations that detected the explosion on August 8.
All four (FINES, ARCES, HFS and IS37) are in Nordic countries (red pins). Using distance as a proxy for likelihood of detection, four stations in Russia might have been expected to also detect it. AFAIK, none did.
So, we're now trying to understand precisely what the Russians were working on at Nenoksa and what went wrong. We can, at least, confirm the outlines of the Russian account -- after an engine test, there was an explosion and fire on a barge that killed five nuclear scientists.
We can confirm the major aspects of the Russian version. Yes, there was an explosion -- the @ctbto_alerts detected it around 6:00 UTC or 9:00 am local time. It would be great if a seismologist worked out the precise event time.
We can also see the damaged barge in satellite images. @planetlabs got a 70 cm image on August 11; @Maxar (via @ckoettl) got a 30 cm image on August 12.
Went on record with @JonathanLanday about our suspicion that something went wrong during or after a Russian test of its nuclear powered cruise missile (9M730 Burevestnik, NATO name: SSC-X-9 Skyfall). Three pieces of evidence underpin our suspicion.
reuters.com/article/us-rus…
reuters.com/article/us-rus…
First, Russia appears to have recently moved SSC-X-9 testing to Nenoksa. In the past year, Russia built a launch area that closely resembles the one removed from Novaya Zemlya with a shelter on rails. (Also, blue shipping containers!)
Second, we can see the Serebryanka, a nuclear fuel carrier, sitting off the coast inside the exclusion zone. (It is visible in satellite images and its AIS transponder is turned on.) This vessel was previously used last summer in an effort to recover a crashed SSC-X-9.
The Russian news agency @tassagency_en is reporting that an explosion occurred near Nenoksa that killed at least two people and resulted in a "brief" spike in radiation levels.
tass.com/emergencies/10…
tass.com/emergencies/10…
Nenoksa is an interesting site -- it is a Russian missile test site along the Arctic Coast. @planetlabs has an image taken on August 8 at 11:29 local time. (We still aren't sure exactly when the explosion occurred.)
Lenta reports that two sources claimed the explosion "may be" related to the testing of the Zircon. The Russian Defense Ministry also said it was a liquid propellant engine (жидкостной реактивной двигательной) missile, which would fit the Zircon.
Love is patient, love is kind.
It does not envy, it does not boast,
it is not proud.
It is not rude, it is not self-seeking,
it is not easily angered,
it keeps no record of wrongs.
It does not envy, it does not boast,
it is not proud.
It is not rude, it is not self-seeking,
it is not easily angered,
it keeps no record of wrongs.
Love does not delight in evil
but rejoices with the truth.
It always protects, always trusts,
always hopes, always perseveres.
but rejoices with the truth.
It always protects, always trusts,
always hopes, always perseveres.
Love never fails.
Can you imagine getting paid 10 grand for an op-ed that runs in @thehill?
@thehill "And in conclusion ..."
The reaction to this (huge) story illustrates one of the practical dangers of not accepting the reality of North Korea as a nuclear power. We should be *happy* with @Huawei. A short thread. 1/11
(Oh FYI: It isn't clear to me that @Huawei has violated any sanctions. Orascom has an exemption for Koryolink and its not clear to me when @huawei did what.) 2/11
nknews.org/2018/09/un-gra…
nknews.org/2018/09/un-gra…
North Korea's leaders appear to rely on a special channel on their cellphone network, Koryolink, to carry encrypted communications. This network is run by an Egyptian company, Orascom. 3/11
nknews.org/2015/08/inside…
nknews.org/2015/08/inside…
The US deployed an engineering unit to Prince Sultan Air Base in mid-June as a step toward a larger presence. @planetlabs captured images of the construction and encampment. (1/3)
planet.com/stories/prince…
planet.com/stories/prince…
I am old enough to remember being told we had to invade Iraq because the US presence in Saudi was too effective a recruiting tool for Al Qaeda. It’s almost like these people have no idea what they are doing. 🤷♂️(2/3)
web.archive.org/web/2004021002…
web.archive.org/web/2004021002…
The strangest part about this story is the claim these bases are somehow of reach of Iran’s missiles. Meet the solid-fueled Dezful, with a 1,000 km range. Looking at the burn scars at Shahrud, there are yet bigger missiles to come. (3/3)
To add: These are nuggets of conventional wisdom that everyone “serious” believes but that aren’t really true. A short thread.
The claim that ICBMs are more “prompt” because of ease of communication was oft asserted but never tested until 1992 when @USGAO discovered it wasn’t true — SLBMs had “about the equal of speed and reliability of communications to ICBM silos”
gao.justia.com/department-of-…
gao.justia.com/department-of-…
As a result, @USGAO concluded that “depending on the scenario, SLBMs from SSBNs would be almost as prompt as ICBMs in hitting enemy targets.”
After the collapse of talks in Hanoi, Kim set a very public deadline for significant sanctions relief -- the end of the year. I don't care if they shook hands and stepped into North Korea. There is no evidence that Kim has relaxed that demand.
Kim meet Trump because stroking Trump's ego seems like an effective tactic to achieve sanctions relief. The only interesting question now is whether Trump was sufficiently flattered to take the deal he walked away from in Hanoi.
Under that deal, North Korea would close Yongbyon in exchange for some sanctions relief. I don't pretend this will significantly constrain Kim's nuclear plans, but there is little hope Kim will disarm. It is past time to focus on other diplomatic goals.
pressreader.com/cambodia/globa…
pressreader.com/cambodia/globa…
This really doesn't look like much of a geolocation challenge.
news.vice.com/en_us/article/…
news.vice.com/en_us/article/…
Does that boat look like it belongs to the Kootenai County Sheriff? If so, I would start looking at lakeside properties around Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. No guarantees, but its a place to start. C'mon, let's crowdsource this.
Here are images of the house, as well as several shots of the dock and teepee.
A few more thoughts on the claims that Russia is conducting low-yield nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya test site.
While I do think it is strange that @DefenseIntel released the statement rather than @ODNIgov, if one looks at the @StateAVC compliance reports over the past few years, it is clear that the idea that Russia was conducting low-yield nuclear tests was gaining steam inside the IC.
A faction within the IC has been arguing since the 90s that Russia is conducting low-yield nuclear explosions. I would caution these arguments have led to embarrassing mistakes, like démarching Moscow over an earthquake. Still, stopped watches and all.
nytimes.com/2001/03/04/wor…
nytimes.com/2001/03/04/wor…
Kim Jong Un has visited another important defense factory and the site of its November 2017 ICBM launch. KCNA and Rodong Sinmun identified the place as the Phyongnam General Machine Plant, although it appears to be the March 16 Factory in Pyongsong: 39.2818, 125.8676.
KCNA did not release exterior images, but the inside of the building is a good match for the March 16 Factory. One image is from June 2, 2019; the other is from November 4, 2017. You can tell which is which.
A 3 meter satellite image from @planetlabs on June 1 does show an unusual object near the building where missiles launchers are completed. That object coincides with the possible visit by Kim although at 3 meters it could be anything. I say coincide/feel free to say coincidence.
Kim Jong Un toured four defense plants in Kanggye province. I've pinned the locations. We should talk about what this tour might mean in terms of where things are headed with North Korea.
Also, you know how much I love North Korean machine plants! Let's take a look at each of the four in turn. Note that a lot of these plants have several names.
armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120666…
armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120666…
FIRST! The February 8 General Machine Factory. KCNA and Rodong Sinmun did not release any exterior shots of the this plant, but @mhanham and I located it several years ago: 40.631, 126.432
38north.org/2014/02/jlewis…
38north.org/2014/02/jlewis…
These rumors have been floating around for a while. I am still not sure I believe them, but they are getting awfully specific.
Here is the Chosun Ilbo story -- its only in Korean at the moment.
Recall @SecPompeo's rather inappropriate reaction when asked about the rumors.
Is Russia conducting low-yield nuclear tests? Maybe, but I doubt it. An entirely too long thread.
LT GEN Ashley, the @DefenseIntel director, said at the @HudsonInstitute that "The United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the 'zero-yield' standard." dia.mil/News/Speeches-…
Michael Gordon was waiting in the audience to follow up. You can here his question and LT GEN Ashley's careful answer at 24:52
hudson.org/events/1694-th…
hudson.org/events/1694-th…
Kim has repeatedly and forcefully stated the opposite, including during his major policy speech in April.
What Kim said:
“In fear of the security of its own land in the face of the rapid development of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK, the U.S. floated the idea of improved relations and peace at the negotiations ...”
“In fear of the security of its own land in the face of the rapid development of the nuclear armed forces of the DPRK, the U.S. floated the idea of improved relations and peace at the negotiations ...”
“... and on the other hand, made desperate efforts to create the conditions for forcing the DPRK to drop arms and toppling its social system after making it run off its way through persistent application of economic sanctions.”
Oh, the infamous fatwa. A short thread on this silliness.
The Iranians have made a big deal about the supposed fatwa prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons. Iran used to have a website on its nonproliferation obligations -- and the fatwa got big billing.
web.archive.org/web/2015021617…
web.archive.org/web/2015021617…
The problem is that no one has ever seen the actual fatwa. @ArianeTabatabai has called it the "phantom fatwa" in the best article I know discussing how a fatwa might, and might not, constrain Iran's nuclear ambitions.
thebulletin.org/2014/11/how-do…
thebulletin.org/2014/11/how-do…
The DPRK has released yet another statement explaining that negotiations in Hanoi collapsed because the United States insisted on North Korea's unilateral disarmament.
dprktoday.com/index.php?type…
dprktoday.com/index.php?type…
I have said from the beginning of this farce that Kim is not offering to disarm North Korea. Insisting on disarmament as a condition for peace ensures the process will fail. The summits are not sincere efforts to make peace with North Korea as it is.
The only question is whether it fails safely or it fails dangerously like in The #2020Commission. I wrote the book the reason! Ratcheting up the pressure on a nuclear-armed country because you don't know what else to do is sheer madness.
amazon.com/Commission-Rep…
amazon.com/Commission-Rep…
A quick explanation on this story -- what it means, what it doesn't mean. This is an interview that @Tasnimnews_Fa did with Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). So, its a public warning.
There is an english version out now. It looks basically the same as the Farsi version, but there are few little differences. tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/0…
Iran is increasing the pace at which it produces low-enriched uranium, which it is allowed to do under the JCPOA. Iran is not, according to Kamalvandi, increasing the number of centrifuges nor the level of enrichment above 3.67 percent, both of which would violate the JCPOA.
When North Korea broke its voluntary flight test moratorium in 2006, it did so in steps, starting with an SRBM in the spring and ending with a test of Scuds, Nodongs and a Teapodong-2 on July 4. I presume North Korea today is working upward. (1/2)
At the time, the Bush Administration downplayed the first test of the KN-02 in March. Then, as now, the moratorium only covered longer-range missiles. But in hindsight, it was a warning of the fireworks to come in July. (2/2)
nytimes.com/2006/03/09/wor…
nytimes.com/2006/03/09/wor…
Also, “Taepodong-2”. I am distracted.
But guess who *does* have a picture? @planetlabs
Our friends at @planetlabs captured the floating dock moved into position for the April 23 launch of the Belgorod submarine.
