Surveillance state: the HK protests have shone a spotlight on Chinese extraterritorial monitoring & coercion. In one case, Chinese authorities intimidated a protestor at an Australian university by visiting his parents at home in China.
In another, the Chinese Aviation authority demanded that (HK based) Cathay Pacific suspend all staff who have engaged in the protests from flights into Chinese airspace. Many protestors – in HK & abroad – are now hiding their faces, for fear of Chinese facial recognition tech.
.@elyratner argued “this is why you don’t want the Chinese government controlling your data and telecom networks”: the CCP is likely to extend this kind of monitoring and punishment as it becomes more able.
20 years of Putin: the anniversary saw 50,000 Russians in the streets, protesting a lack of fairness in local elections. @Kasparov63 argued that the protests are a “reminder that Putin, like every dictator, has no idea when or how his rule will end. Only that it will be sudden”.
.@AngelaStent argued that Putin has reasserted Russia on the world stage both because he had a plan and because he is a skilful tactician. His judo skills and KGB experience have enabled him to sense his antagonists’ weaknesses, and play a weak hand well.
But @anders_aslund has noted that Russia’s adventures abroad have been designed to serve as a distraction from its economic stagnation at home – where Putin has structured Russia’s economy to facilitate massive scale asset stripping & enrichment of loyal plutocrats.
Trade war: China let its currency fall to 7 to the US dollar to retaliate for – and partially offset the effect of – Trump’s latest tariffs. This led the US Treasury Dept to designate it a “currency manipulator”. But, per @prchovanec, this term “doesn’t have any specific meaning”
He continued, “there is no hard requirement [for the US] to take any specific action” after the designation. So it’s “unclear exactly” what the implications are – except to “raise the temperature of the rhetoric between the US and China further”.
The irony is that the “currency manipulator” label for China has been outdated since mid-2014. Around then, more dollars started flowing out of China than in, creating downward pressure on the yuan – and “China, if anything [has been] intervening to support the yuan”.
Three thought-provoking articles:
.@gideonrachman argued that the Asian strategic order is dying. “There has been a rash of diplomatic and security incidents across east Asia in the past month, which are symptoms of a wider sickness…Collectively, they point to a regional security order that is coming apart”.
He continued: “America's military pre-eminence & diplomatic predictability can no longer be taken for granted. And China is no longer willing to accept a secondary role...In these new circumstances, other countries - including Russia, Japan & North Korea - are testing the rules”.
.@CER_Grant argued that “a no-deal Brexit is less inevitable than it looks. Boris Johnson is currently sending signals that the election shouldn’t be held until after Brexit. But this might not be sincere: would he really want to fight an election amidst the chaos of no deal?
Grant continued, Johnson may prefer that MPs force him to delay Brexit, and fight the election while still inside the EU. “That would allow him to blame MPs for the delay, see off the Brexit Party’s threat & position himself as the people’s champion against the Remainer elite”.
.@BaldingsWorld argued that “Asia is the right place for a US 'Green New Deal’”. US-led funding of environmentally friendly projects across the region would significantly curb global emissions while providing a genuine alternative to China’s Belt and Road.
His rationales: (i) Asia “is experiencing much faster economic growth than the US while relying more heavily on coal-fired power” and (ii) “the US has to do more [in the region] than just hope countries refuse shiny new Chinese infrastructure projects”.
Three events to watch in the near-future:
Hong Kong protests: police violence escalated significantly this weekend. Per @nathanlawkc, particularly egregious examples included: shooting rubber bullets at first aiders & reporters; allowing gangsters to attack protestors, and kicking a protestor down an escalator.
@nathanlawkc .@stavridisj argued that if Hong Kong avoids “a bloody replay of Tiananmen Square” it has Taiwan to thank. “Beijing will be wary of overreacting to protests because of the effect that would have on its biggest goal: reunification with the ‘renegade province’ [of Taiwan]”.
He continued: Beijing knows that Taiwan is the bigger prize, and as a result “China will probably avoid a heavy-handed troop movement into Hong Kong for as long as possible, knowing it would create an even stronger independence movement in Taiwan”.
North Korean missile tests: per @NarangVipin, Kim Jong-un is “playing [Trump] masterfully” – with a pattern of missile tests early in the week, then flattery later in the week. “Rinse and repeat. He can run this play indefinitely because it always works”.
And it is bearing fruit. Per Narang, since the Hanoi summit, Kim has tested three brand new missile systems. Further, some systems are moving beyond tests: one missile is “10 for 10” – & these are “straight up launches” designed to demonstrate their capability & train operators.
Fresh Italian elections? Per Stratfor, “the Italian government is hanging by a thread. The collapse of the coalition between the right-wing League party and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement seems imminent” after Salvini asked for an early general election.
Salvini’s rationale appears to be seizing further power. Per Stratfor, “opinion polls suggest that the League stands a good chance of winning [an election, if it does occur] & then forming a coalition with like-minded parties in the center-right and the far right”.
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The Ambassador’s Brief Editors
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Impeachment Hearings: Bill Burns argued that in their testimonies, “Bill Taylor, George Kent, & Masha Yovanovitch demonstrated professionalism, integrity, & plainspoken courage”. They “upheld their oaths to the Constitution”
He continued, they’ve reminded us that the real threat to US democracy is not an imagined deep state: it’s a “weak state” of hollowed-out institutions – no longer able to effectively compete internationally, or uphold the fragile guardrails of US democracy.
And Trump has is making headway on that hollowing out: it’s not just his “bureaucratic arson, such as the systematic sidelining of career officers or historic proposed budget cuts”. It’s “the cronyism & corruption” that we now “see on full & gory display in the Ukraine scandal”.
30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall: Andrew Bacevich argued “Three decades into this era of ostensible American primacy, we are in a position to assess what it has yielded. The results, to put it mildly, have been disappointing”.
“The era’s defining characteristics [have been] the emergence of China as a great power, Europe’s long fade into geopolitical irrelevance, much of the greater Middle East succumbing to violence and instability, and a too little, too late response to climate change”.
This record shows that the “American model of global leadership has tended to be either irrelevant or counterproductive”. So, “the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall offers an occasion not for celebration but for somber and long overdue reflection”.
Phase one trade deal: @BennSteil & @bdellarocca explained China has offered to buy $20b of US agricultural goods in return for Trump killing both his planned tariff hikes and a round of new tariffs on Chinese imports.
But it’s not an attractive offer. “The right way to evaluate China’s offer is to ask how much US farmers would have exported to China in 2020 had Trump never started his trade war”. The answer: $27b – “China would have bought over $7b more than what it is now offering”.
.@BaldingsWorld argued that the one thing you need to understand about this dispute is: “China is not going to change anything for you. Whether you ask nicely or rudely. Whether it is bilateral or multilateral. GOP or Democrat. It. Does. Not. Matter…Proceed accordingly”
Baghdadi raid: @attackerman argued that ISIS leader Baghdadi is dead, but “the war on Terror will create another…There will be another Baghdadi, and another ISIS, as long as the Forever War keeps going”.
He continued, “the expansive war the U.S. launched does not fight against a static enemy. It generates enemies... Its history shows it yielding further generations of jihadists as long as there are American forces hunting, surveilling, and killing Muslims worldwide”.
And, “as proficient as U.S. special operators have become at manhunting these past 18 years, and as central as manhunting has been during that time, there is no campaign plan, not even a theory, by which the killings of jihadist leaders knit up into a lasting victory”.
Syria: @stephenWalt argued let’s not lose sight of the big picture: US Syria policy has been a "failure for years”. It was “rife with contradictions & unlikely to produce a significantly better outcome no matter how long the US stayed”.
He continued: “As depressing as it is…acknowledging Assad’s victory & accepting his authority in Syria is the least bad option at this point”. The reality is (i)Assad has won (ii) Assad will purge ISIS & (iii) Syria is hardly a major strategic prize; the US has other priorities
As for the Kurds, “Once the Islamic State was under control…the U.S.-[Kurdish] partnership was on borrowed time” as: (i) the partnership was always tactical & conditional, not open ended & absolute & (ii) the Kurds have long been a red line for Turkey.
A trade truce, dressed up as a deal? Trump asserted that the US & China have reached a phase one trade deal. The partial deal purportedly includes China buying more US agricultural goods. But, it hasn’t even been written down.
Stratfor argued that “the partial deal doesn't go beyond the low-hanging fruit previously on the negotiating table. With neither side seemingly willing to make any of the hard, structural concessions…this week's deal is likely fragile at best”.
They continued, “judging by the Trump administration's continued search for leverage — …including threats of divestment and capital controls— a future uptick in hostilities between the United States and China is not only possible but perhaps also inevitable”.