So, I half strongly endorse and half strongly oppose this @noahpinion piece on @ewarren’s trade policy (except I don’t think that’s actually what it’s about – more on that below). A brief thread. 1/ bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
@Noahpinion@ewarren First, where I agree: international development should absolutely be an objective of US trade policy. US trade policy is as much (and arguably more) about foreign policy – advancing US interests and values around the world – as about the domestic economic impact. 2/
@Noahpinion@ewarren It irks me when American progressives show little concern for the global poor, and I think it’s both unjust and short-sighted. 3/
@Noahpinion@ewarren I also agree with @noahpinion that export-oriented development has historically been, and will hopefully remain, a key driver of global prosperity. 4/
@Noahpinion@ewarren And I think everything in this last para is basically correct – so long as ‘advocating to correct some of globalization’s excesses’ doesn’t qualify as ‘attacking globalization’ 5/
@Noahpinion@ewarren The big disagreement is that there is nothing in @ewarren’s trade plan that would contradict any of this. 6/
@Noahpinion@ewarren The heart of the issue, as people like @rodrikdani have been pointing out for a while, is that the concept of “trade” has very little to do with today’s “free trade agreements”. This is just the big, fundamental problem in so many criticisms of @ewarren’s trade policy. 7/
@Noahpinion@ewarren@rodrikdani Saying ‘The US will not sign new trade agreements with countries with weak labor / environmental standards’ is simply not the same thing as saying ‘The US will not trade with these countries’. 8/
@Noahpinion@ewarren@rodrikdani Notably, the countries that got rich following export-oriented trade strategies (Asian Tigers) did not have FTAs with the US. And there’s no good evidence that US FTA partners have experienced particularly faster growth or development than other countries. 9/
@Noahpinion@ewarren@rodrikdani For the record, I would love to see @ewarren put out a policy detailing how American foreign economic policy can better support sustainable development and poverty reduction abroad, because I think there is a lot more we could do here. 10/
@Noahpinion@ewarren@rodrikdani But ‘sign a bunch of FTAs that strengthen IP/pharma protections, give investors access to ISDS, and accelerate financialization’ would be nowhere near the top of the list. 11/end
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🚨🚨 New (or at least new to the public) CFIUS case - US blocked Chinese company from acquiring a fertility clinic in San Diego. A few quick thoughts, based on this great in-depth reporting from CNBC here 1/ cnbc.com/2020/10/16/tru…
First, CFIUS secrecy remains a real challenge. CFIUS notes this happened "sometime during the Trump admin", but won't say when. Don't know who the acquiring company or the target was. So we have official sources confirming something happened but can't say what or when... 2/
That said, this report does have more than we normally get, which is a DOJ CFIUS official talking in general terms about, hypothetically, why action would be justified in this type of case. It's a small step toward public engagement, which is welcome 3/
Japan expanding its supply chain policies, specifically focused on a "China+1" model - objective not necessarily reshoring, but avoiding concentration of production in any one country. 1/4
My reading of the investment incentives literature is that these kind of subsidies usually aren't that effective - most of the money ends up going to firms that were going to move anyways, with or without incentives. So we'll see. 2/4
Don't know the details here, but says "subsidies apply to products for which manufacturing tends to be concentrated in a specific country." Curious if there's some kind of H index threshold for eligibility - would allow for regression discontinuity to identify any effect? 3/4
Excellent thread. I think a lot of the quick analysis in the US is misreading what happened here - IMHO this isn't a story about the UK hardening on China, it's about the persistent regulatory power of the US in global supply chains 1/
For example this description from the NYT suggests this is about the UK opting to confront China, views it as a threat, etc. 2/
But the UK gov'ts own explanation for the move doesn't suggest anything like this. They're quite clear: new US sanctions announced in May are going to make it difficult for Huawei to maintain its supply chains, which creates risks about reliability. 3/ ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/a-di…
On A, I think I mostly agree w/ Sarah’s comments here. Certainly true that foreign production isn’t nec more vulnerable, & domestic production isn’t nec more resilient. /2
I see two dimensions in which states are reasserting autonomy: specific worry about dependence on China, & broader worry about being at mercy of ‘global markets’, and seeking more hands-on steering of globalization. Neither of these nec mean bringing production ‘home’. 3/
There’s a global rush to reconfigure supply chains to reassert national autonomy and resilience. A brief thread on why, ironically*, this shift from globalism to sovereign autonomy may demand more int’l coordination, not less. 1/
*plz don’t @ me over definition of irony
First, for all the focus on Donald Trump’s economic nationalism, worth noting that other world powers are also acting to reconfigure supply chains. 2/
For instance, in a speech earlier today, EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan spoke on the need to ensure the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’, including ‘building resilient supply chains, based on diversification’ 3/ ec.europa.eu/commission/com…
This article is a strong argument for invoking the DPA – the medical market has become a deeply dysfunctional Wild West, and desperately needs some top down coordination.
Effective top down coordination in a crisis would be great. As that Post article shows, US hospitals are in the dark negotiating with shady middle men, bidding up prices against each other. No one knows where these goods are coming from. It’s a mess. 2/
But the recent record of the USG doesn’t give much reason to expect effective coordination. Partially this is about Trump himself, and the appointees/high level advisers around him, who don’t exactly inspire confidence. 3/