geoffrey gertz Profile picture
Geopolitics, globalization, technology. States + markets, structure + agency. Formerly @BrookingsInst, @Politics_Oxford. Personal account.
Oct 16, 2020 7 tweets 2 min read
🚨🚨 New (or at least new to the public) CFIUS case - US blocked Chinese company from acquiring a fertility clinic in San Diego. A few quick thoughts, based on this great in-depth reporting from CNBC here 1/ cnbc.com/2020/10/16/tru… First, CFIUS secrecy remains a real challenge. CFIUS notes this happened "sometime during the Trump admin", but won't say when. Don't know who the acquiring company or the target was. So we have official sources confirming something happened but can't say what or when... 2/
Oct 15, 2020 4 tweets 1 min read
Japan expanding its supply chain policies, specifically focused on a "China+1" model - objective not necessarily reshoring, but avoiding concentration of production in any one country. 1/4

asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan… My reading of the investment incentives literature is that these kind of subsidies usually aren't that effective - most of the money ends up going to firms that were going to move anyways, with or without incentives. So we'll see. 2/4
Jul 14, 2020 8 tweets 3 min read
Excellent thread. I think a lot of the quick analysis in the US is misreading what happened here - IMHO this isn't a story about the UK hardening on China, it's about the persistent regulatory power of the US in global supply chains 1/ For example this description from the NYT suggests this is about the UK opting to confront China, views it as a threat, etc. 2/
Apr 17, 2020 19 tweets 6 min read
Some great thought-provoking responses to this thread, so a quick follow-up on 3 related issues (/1)
A.Resiliency =/= domestic autonomy (@sarahbauerle)
B.What role for firms? (@LogTechEric, @sarahbauerle, @HeikoBorchert, @jeromelarosch)
C.Forums for coordination (@TGehrke_) On A, I think I mostly agree w/ Sarah’s comments here. Certainly true that foreign production isn’t nec more vulnerable, & domestic production isn’t nec more resilient. /2
Apr 16, 2020 15 tweets 3 min read
There’s a global rush to reconfigure supply chains to reassert national autonomy and resilience. A brief thread on why, ironically*, this shift from globalism to sovereign autonomy may demand more int’l coordination, not less. 1/

*plz don’t @ me over definition of irony First, for all the focus on Donald Trump’s economic nationalism, worth noting that other world powers are also acting to reconfigure supply chains. 2/
Mar 27, 2020 9 tweets 3 min read
This article is a strong argument for invoking the DPA – the medical market has become a deeply dysfunctional Wild West, and desperately needs some top down coordination.

That said, I’m growing less optimistic on its prospects – a brief thread. 1/
washingtonpost.com/business/2020/… Effective top down coordination in a crisis would be great. As that Post article shows, US hospitals are in the dark negotiating with shady middle men, bidding up prices against each other. No one knows where these goods are coming from. It’s a mess. 2/
Nov 8, 2019 12 tweets 4 min read
I’ve been meaning to get around to writing up some thoughts on the @rodrikdani et al proposal for managing US-China trade, and prompted by some recent debates on here finally got around to it. A brief thread: 1/

cdn.shanghai.nyu.edu/sites/default/… My core point: There are two big issues on US-China trade -- A, how do you manage trade between countries with very different economic systems, and B, how do you manage trade between geopolitical rivals.

The proposal is a great answer to A, but doesn’t really answer B. 2/
Aug 27, 2019 8 tweets 4 min read
Great thread here by @Brad_Setser trying to puzzle out Trump’s trade strategy. (TL;DR – escalating at this point doesn’t give Trump much leverage, and China knows it.)

One additional puzzle from me: where are all the national security voices on this? (1/x) @Brad_Setser DC is full of debates on rethinking China, ‘the new China consensus’, whether or not there actually *is* a consensus, rival “open letters”, etc. But this discussion is, for the most part, carrying on separately from current US-China trade tensions. (2/)
Aug 13, 2019 11 tweets 9 min read
So, I half strongly endorse and half strongly oppose this @noahpinion piece on @ewarren’s trade policy (except I don’t think that’s actually what it’s about – more on that below). A brief thread. 1/ bloomberg.com/opinion/articl… @Noahpinion @ewarren First, where I agree: international development should absolutely be an objective of US trade policy. US trade policy is as much (and arguably more) about foreign policy – advancing US interests and values around the world – as about the domestic economic impact. 2/
Apr 17, 2019 17 tweets 4 min read
Today @StateDept announced Americans whose property was expropriated in Cuba 60 years ago can sue in US courts–a move aimed at Cuba but that is mostly going to annoy Europe & Canada. If that sounds complicated it’s because it is. A (not so brief) thread 1/ wsj.com/articles/new-u… Let's start from the beginning: When Castro came to power in 1959 he expropriated lots of property owned by Americans, from big sugar plantations and power plants down to individual family homes and apartments. 2/