1. I always take @leahstokes seriously even when I disagree with her. But this take is more befitting of an activist than a scholar. Since Bill isn't on twitter, I'll address a few things here.
2. First, full disclosure, there is plenty I disagree with Bill about. I am dubious that pricing policies can ever be sustained in a form in which they can deliver on the efficiency suggested by models and theory or produce scale of innovation necessary for deep decarb.
3. But whether you agree or disagree with his methods and remedies, no one would have a functional language with which to think about climate policy and economics without his work.
4. He was explicit that 2C limit was thought-experiment based on historic temp variation. There was hardly any science to guide at time. And 1.5C followed exactly same reasoning. Based on staying within Holocene temp variation. Science justifying both was back-filled post-facto.
5. But whether you think 1.5 or 2 or some other limit is right, you can thank Bill for temp limit-based framework. Most of the other disputes about his methods and legacy are similarly dependent upon his work to even make critique...
6. Prefer a different discount rate? Fine, but you have to stand on his shoulders to make that argument. Don't like his damage function? Ditto. Think climate models should endogenize technological change, same...
7. What his work offered was a way to think about all of the social and economic complexity and trade-offs unavoidably implicated in any effort to address the problem - intergenerational equity, coordinated global action, mitigation vs adaptation, technological change...
8. This is also why so much of activist/advocate community has always hated his work. Because the advocacy project has always imagined that sustained action could be achieved by simply eliding trade-offs and costs (ed. note: it can't).
9. Now apparently, his estimates of cost of climate impacts in the 90's are reason we didn't act on climate change, which is... ridiculous. Only in climate debate could people convince themselves that fate of planet hinged on an Integrated Assessment Model!!!
10. If the critiques of his work have demonstrated anything, it is that neither climate nor economic models can tell us what to do about the problem. Both at this point are mostly being used for support, not illumination...
11. Decide the outcome that you want, then choose a combination of climate sensitivity, discount rate, damage exponent, and rate of tech change to suit your priors. Presto, climate science and economics have revealed the truth from deep and irresolvable uncertainty!
12. I have my own views on many of these questions and have written extensively on them. But key point here is that I, like everyone else, have no starting point to think about any of it without Bill's work. That's why he has Nobel and we are tweeting about it.
13. One final coda. At Nobel celebration, I asked the colleagues/collaborators he had invited what they thought his most important work was. With one exception, all agreed it was actually his work on long-term cost of lighting and it's implications for measuring economic growth.
14. That has important implications for both social discount rate and how we think about importance of tech and innovation policy. Too much attention imho has been dedicated to former and not enough to latter in thinking about climate innovation and policy. FIN/
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One thing that has been lost in the kerfuffle over @hollyjeanbuck excellent @jacobin essay on the cost of the climate left's obsession with climate disinformation is just how much disinformation is coming from the self-appointed disinformation police. 🧵
It's not just that the obsession distracts from the actual work of building a clean energy economy, it's that these arbiters of disinformation reliably misrepresent both climate science and the basic techno-economic realities of emissions reduction efforts.
I wrote about the massive disinformation effort to connect present day extreme weather and disasters to climate change - why its wrong, where it came from, and why it undermines both climate mitigation and adaption efforts in @tnajournal this spring. thenewatlantis.com/publications/d…
In my new essay for New Atlantis, I write about how the climate discourse became increasingly detached from the actual climate science. Popular understanding of the relationship between climate change, extreme weather, and natural disasters is basically wrong. 🧵
In reality, there would still be major heatwaves, droughts, floods, and hurricanes without climate change. The primary driver of extreme weather events, now and in the future, is natural climate variability, not climate change. The impact of climate change is on margins.
The relationship to climate related natural disasters is even more tenuous. Vulnerability to climate related disasters has fallen for decades. Rising economic costs are entirely the result of more people and wealth in harm's way, not intensification of natural hazards.
The outrage of clean energy modelers at any suggestion policies based on their models might not work out as predicted is really something. Doing so makes us "ivory tower elitists"(@robbieorvis), "anti-innovation and anti-abundance"(@JesseJenkins), "neo-malthusian"(@arthurhcyip)
Techno-optimism, in model world, is spoken, er, modeled into being - a modern day green prosperity gospel. "The EV revolution is inevitable AND we need forever subsidies and strict regulations to make sure it happens!!!" That is the true Breakthrough gospel according to Jesse.
Um no. The idea behind making clean energy cheap was never to use subsidies as a reverse carbon price for mature technologies that simply cost too much. It was to invest in early stage innovation to drive cost down so clean tech could compete without subsidies or regulations.
How tough are new Biden EPA fuel economy standards? It depends. If EV sales don't hit Biden targets, new rule will price gasoline powered vehicles out of the market. If they do, impact will be modest.
Biden target is 67% by 2032. Most other estimates are far lower (e.g. IEA = 15% in 2030). The standard is a fleet average, so higher EV penetration = lower fuel economy requirement for ICE vehicles in fleet and lower EV penetration = higher fuel economy requirement for fleet.
If EV sales hit 67% target, ICE fuel economy can basically remain same as today. But if EV sales are closer to IEA, ICE fuel economy would need to roughly double.
This @jon_rauch in @atlantic piece gives very good account of effort to reinvent the nuclear industry, which is much needed. But efforts to parse problems with the industry from environmental opposition from an insane regulatory framework are misguided. theatlantic.com/magazine/archi…
The regulatory framework, as it evolved from late 60s onward made the kind of innovation Rauch describes extremely difficult. The industry, meaning utilities didn't push back because, at least initially, there was no reason to.
Ever proliferating and costly safety requirements could simply be rate-based. It was just another opportunity for utilities to build profit into business model. But that was an adaptation to the underlying regulatory reality.
The backflips by many on the EcoLeft to insist that the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka is due to neoliberalism or capitalism, not insane agricultural policies long advocated by EcoLeft is really something. A few points they always leave out:
1. Rajapaksa didn't come up with his fertilizer ban out of the blue to deal with his exchange rate policies. He proposed a ten year transition to fully organic agriculture in his presidential campaign, well before the pandemic.
2. Sri Lanka wasn't appreciably more corrupt or indebted than many of its South Asian neighbors before pandemic. Indeed, it was richer, better positioned than many, largely due to successful agricultural export economy, which Rajapaksa proceeded to wreck with fertilizer ban.