Quick THREAD on the Army/Marine Law of Land Warfare Manual, old and new. The original, 1956 Manual was principally written by Richard Baxter. In 1976, it was updated to include the passage below. 1/
If that looks familiar, it should. A variant would appear in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, which the U.S. signed in 1977 but never ratified. 2/
That's pretty good evidence that, in 1976, the U.S. Army considered the "target verification rule" part of customary international law, binding on the U.S. quite apart from API. It is, by the way. 3/ ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/…
Fast forward to 2015, and the rule is conspicuously absent from the 1,200 page DOD Law of War Manual. And the rule doesn't appear in the 200-page Army/Marine Manual released last week. 4/
There are general references to precautions to reduce risks to civilians, but these are most naturally read to refer to risks of incidental harm (cf. API below), not risks of misidentification. 5/
The omission of the target verification rule is bizarre, and especially troubling given DoD's express rejection of the rule of doubt. (To its credit, the new Army/Marine Manual accepts the rule as a matter of practice). 6/
That's it, really.
Oh, one last thing: the Rapporteurs for the Committee that drafted Article 57 were George Aldrich and Richard Baxter.
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Last year, Germany told the ICJ it transferred €255M of arms to Israel from 10/23 to 3/24; the transfers reduced over time; and 98% were not "war weapons."
Today, Germany indicates that it transferred another €230M since then, possibly including "war weapons." 1/🧵
Germany appears to think the ICJ endorsed its "practice of careful case-by-case examination" of potential arms transfers in the case brought against it by Nicaragua.
This is a serious mistake. 2/🧵
The ICJ was very clear that its decision not to indicate provisional measures against Germany was based on the *combination* of Germany's arms transfer process *and* its reduction of arms transfers to Israel, especially "war weapons." 3/🧵
But it makes a serious analytical error when it implies that most of the 25,211 boys over 15 and men under 65 killed by the IDF as of March were fighters.
The IDF itself says that 2/3 to 3/4 of those it kills are civilians.
2. Assuming MoH records include all Hamas fighters (more on that later), that would mean the IDF killed between 12,630 and 16,672 fighters while killing between 12,581 and 8,539 civilian teenage boys and men.
3. The IDF says that it has killed around 20,000 fighters.
That's mostly a made up number.
There's also no way to reconcile that number with MoH records and the IDF's other statements ...
Over at the ICC, Israel has filed its appeal of the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision that art. 18(1) of the ICC Statute did not require the Prosecutor to open a new investigation after 10/7 and notify Israel to that effect.
It's so dumb.
Technical 🧵 below for the hardcores. 1/🧵
2. In 2021, the Prosecutor notified Israel that she had opened an investigation into alleged crimes committed in Palestine "since 13 June 2014."
She found a reasonable basis to believe the IDF and Hamas had committed war crimes in the context of the 2014 hostilities in Gaza.
3. The Prosecutor invited all States with jurisdiction, including Israel, to inform the Court within one month if it was investigating any of the alleged crimes.
If so, the Prosecutor would defer under the complementarity principle.
Over at the ICC, Hungary has submitted its response in the noncompliance proceedings arising from its failure to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu during his recent visit.
Hungary's response is legally flawed and will not avoid a noncompliance finding.
Short 🧵 below.
1. Hungary says it hasn't incorporated the ICC Statute into its national law.
Doesn't matter.
A party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
Basic stuff.
2. Hungary next says that Netanyahu enjoys immunity from arrest as a sitting Head of Government.
The ICC has repeatedly rejected this view, first with respect to Omar Al-Bashir, and most recently with respect to Vladimir Putin—Heads of State of non-States Parties.
Netanyahu's response to the UK, Canada, and France is deranged but revealing.
They demand that Israel cease its military offensive, allow humanitarian aid, refrain from permanent forced displacement, and accept a ceasefire deal that frees all hostages and ends Hamas’ rule. 1/🧵
2. But Netanyahu starts with their last sentence, where they commit to recognize a Palestinian State at some point in the future.
Obviously, a State of Palestine with fixed 1967 borders alongside Israel is not what Hamas wants and is not a "prize" for 10/7.
3. The "Arab plan" would turn governance of Gaza over to a Palestinian committee and ultimately to the Palestinian Authority.