Quick THREAD on the Army/Marine Law of Land Warfare Manual, old and new. The original, 1956 Manual was principally written by Richard Baxter. In 1976, it was updated to include the passage below. 1/
If that looks familiar, it should. A variant would appear in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, which the U.S. signed in 1977 but never ratified. 2/
That's pretty good evidence that, in 1976, the U.S. Army considered the "target verification rule" part of customary international law, binding on the U.S. quite apart from API. It is, by the way. 3/ ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/…
Fast forward to 2015, and the rule is conspicuously absent from the 1,200 page DOD Law of War Manual. And the rule doesn't appear in the 200-page Army/Marine Manual released last week. 4/
There are general references to precautions to reduce risks to civilians, but these are most naturally read to refer to risks of incidental harm (cf. API below), not risks of misidentification. 5/
The omission of the target verification rule is bizarre, and especially troubling given DoD's express rejection of the rule of doubt. (To its credit, the new Army/Marine Manual accepts the rule as a matter of practice). 6/
That's it, really.
Oh, one last thing: the Rapporteurs for the Committee that drafted Article 57 were George Aldrich and Richard Baxter.
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Ezra Klein's interview with Philippe Sands is very good overall.
But I want to reiterate that the ICJ has never said that the definition of genocide requires a "single intent."
Nor does the ICJ's standard of proof preclude a finding of genocide in cases of plural intent.
1/🧵
The definition of genocide is obviously consistent with plural intentions.
If a State got up in from of the ICJ and said "well, yes, we intended to destroy a substantial part of the group, but we also intended [fill in the blank]" that is an admission, not a defense.
2/
The ICJ's standard of proof allows for a finding that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from a pattern of conduct is that it was intended to destroy a substantial part of a group and also intended to achieve other goals.
3/
"When large numbers of civilians are systematically and indiscriminately being bombed, shot and starved, states have a legal obligation to stop the violence, regardless of the label applied."
Genocidal intent includes an intent to destroy a substantial part of a group as a means to achieve further military or political aims, such as the forcible displacement of the rest of the group.
This is basically how the ICTY and ICJ saw Srebrenica.
In my view, the ICJ in Croatia v. Serbia did not ignore the possibility of parallel (or plural, or instrumental) intentions, or make genocidal intent impossible to prove when other intentions are present.
2/
The ICJ found that the killings “were not committed with intent to destroy the Croats, but rather with that of forcing them to leave the regions concerned."
The Court found there was only one intent, and it was not and did not involve an intent to destroy part of a group.
"Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel as the occupying power has an obligation to provide unconditional and adequate supplies of essential good and services to the entire population under its control."
"Israel is not fulfilling this obligation."
1/
"When the population is not adequately supplied, the parties ... have an obligation to allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance to all persons in need."
"This obligation is results-based. It's not merely an obligation of means."
2/
"Neither Hamas nor Israel is complying with this obligation."
"We would also like to recall that the use of starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited and constitutes a war crime."
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has rejected Israel's request to withdraw or vacate the arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant and to suspend the ongoing investigation.
I will add a 🧵 below soon.
1. The PTC satisfied itself that it has jurisdiction over the case when it issued the warrants per art 19(1).
The Appeals Chamber's decision on Israel's jurisdictional challenge under 19(2) did not invalidate the PTC's 19(1) decision.
2. The AC decision also did not affect the PTC's ability to adopt the reasoning or argumentation of (a different composition of) the PTC's 2021 decision that the Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Palestine.