Quick THREAD on the Army/Marine Law of Land Warfare Manual, old and new. The original, 1956 Manual was principally written by Richard Baxter. In 1976, it was updated to include the passage below. 1/
If that looks familiar, it should. A variant would appear in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, which the U.S. signed in 1977 but never ratified. 2/
That's pretty good evidence that, in 1976, the U.S. Army considered the "target verification rule" part of customary international law, binding on the U.S. quite apart from API. It is, by the way. 3/ ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/…
Fast forward to 2015, and the rule is conspicuously absent from the 1,200 page DOD Law of War Manual. And the rule doesn't appear in the 200-page Army/Marine Manual released last week. 4/
There are general references to precautions to reduce risks to civilians, but these are most naturally read to refer to risks of incidental harm (cf. API below), not risks of misidentification. 5/
The omission of the target verification rule is bizarre, and especially troubling given DoD's express rejection of the rule of doubt. (To its credit, the new Army/Marine Manual accepts the rule as a matter of practice). 6/
That's it, really.
Oh, one last thing: the Rapporteurs for the Committee that drafted Article 57 were George Aldrich and Richard Baxter.
fin
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And we're off. Gilad Noam striking a more combative different tone than in January.
Objects to the short timeline. Says the rest of the legal team was unavailable today. Asked to reschedule, was denied. Notes that SA changed its first request.
Opens by reframing facts. Israel is fighting a war of self-defense, rocket fire ongoing. Rafah is a Hamas stronghold. 120 rockets fired last two weeks, hostages likely held. Says Palestinians will be "liberated" only if Hamas is defeated in Rafah.
Invokes self-defense, says civilians and hostages are human shields. Says there has not been a major assault on Rafah, only targeted operations.
2. The Court found "plausible" the rights claimed by South Africa.
For some judges, that just means it's plausible that the rights exist under international law (obvi).
For other judges, that also means it's plausible that the rights have been violated.
3. In other words, some judges think provisional measures are all about preventing harm and preserving rights, and shouldn't even touch the merits of the case.
Other judges think the Court shouldn't grant interim relief if a case is obviously baseless.
1. The Court mentions self-defense twice, when it summarizes Israel's arguments (a) that the Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction and (b) that the rights claimed by South Africa are not plausible.
The Court rejected both arguments.
2. When the Court turns to South Africa's request that it order Israel to suspend military operations, the Court does not mention Israel's argument that this order would impair its right of self-defense.
It only mentions Israel's argument that this order would reverse precedent.
3. Israel invoked the Bosnia case for the proposition that, when genocidal acts allegedly occur in the context of an armed conflict, the Court should order the prevention and punishment of the genocidal acts but not the suspension of all military operations.
2. The same UNGA resolution, as well as the Dec. 22 UNSC resolution, affirm that IHL requires both parties to allow and facilitate humanitarian relief.
3. This is significant because Israel has argued that it is taking advantage of an exception to its legal obligation, reflected in GC IV art. 23.
1. All States have a legal obligation to cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).