Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

You can paste full URL like: https://x.com/threadreaderapp/status/1644127596119195649
or just the ID like: 1644127596119195649

How to get URL link on X (Twitter) App

  1. On the Twitter thread, click on or icon on the bottom
  2. Click again on or Share Via icon
  3. Click on Copy Link to Tweet
  4. Paste it above and click "Unroll Thread"!
  5. More info at Twitter Help
Adil Haque Profile picture
Adil Haque
@AdHaque110
Distinguished Professor, @RutgersLaw. Executive Editor, @just_security. Author, Law and Morality at War.
2 subscribers
Aug 14 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Ezra Klein's interview with Philippe Sands is very good overall.

But I want to reiterate that the ICJ has never said that the definition of genocide requires a "single intent."

Nor does the ICJ's standard of proof preclude a finding of genocide in cases of plural intent.

1/🧵 Image The definition of genocide is obviously consistent with plural intentions.

If a State got up in from of the ICJ and said "well, yes, we intended to destroy a substantial part of the group, but we also intended [fill in the blank]" that is an admission, not a defense.

2/
Aug 8 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
"When large numbers of civilians are systematically and indiscriminately being bombed, shot and starved, states have a legal obligation to stop the violence, regardless of the label applied."

This is what matters now.

A few less urgent thoughts: 🧵 2. The ICJ's "only reasonable inference test" does not imply that genocidal intent must be the perpetrator's exclusive intent.

The only reasonable inference from the totality of the evidence may be that the perpetrator acted with both genocidal intent and other aims. Image
Image
Jul 27 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
This piece is mostly excellent (unsurprising since it extensively quotes Juliette and Mike).

1. ICJ cases move *very* slowly.

Bosnia v. Serbia took 14 years.

Croatia v. Serbia took 16 years.

There are many procedural steps and the Court regularly grants extensions.

1/🧵 Image States cannot wait for an ICJ judgment to take action.

They have a legal duty to act in the face of a "serious risk" of genocide.

They also have a legal duty to ensure that Israel respects IHL, and a legal duty to cooperate to stop crimes against humanity.

2/ Image
Jul 24 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Genocidal intent includes an intent to destroy a substantial part of a group as a means to achieve further military or political aims, such as the forcible displacement of the rest of the group.

This is basically how the ICTY and ICJ saw Srebrenica.

One note to add:

1/🧵 Image In my view, the ICJ in Croatia v. Serbia did not ignore the possibility of parallel (or plural, or instrumental) intentions, or make genocidal intent impossible to prove when other intentions are present.

2/ Image
Jul 23 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
"Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel as the occupying power has an obligation to provide unconditional and adequate supplies of essential good and services to the entire population under its control."

"Israel is not fulfilling this obligation."

1/ Image "When the population is not adequately supplied, the parties ... have an obligation to allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance to all persons in need."

"This obligation is results-based. It's not merely an obligation of means."

2/ Image
Jul 16 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has rejected Israel's request to withdraw or vacate the arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant and to suspend the ongoing investigation.

I will add a 🧵 below soon. Image 1. The PTC satisfied itself that it has jurisdiction over the case when it issued the warrants per art 19(1).

The Appeals Chamber's decision on Israel's jurisdictional challenge under 19(2) did not invalidate the PTC's 19(1) decision. Image
Image
Jul 13 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
Remarkable statement that "in his initial responses to Hamas’s atrocities in October 2023, Netanyahu acted as any Israeli prime minister might have in his place."

The starvation-related charges at the ICC start on October 8 with the first aid blockade.

1/🧵 Image
Image The piece itself notes that accusations of genocide mounted in Fall 2023.

South Africa filed its application at the ICJ on December 29, 2023.

2/🧵 Image
Image
Jun 18 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Israel's Deputy Attorney General repeats a longstanding confusion. 🧵

1. An 'armed conflict' triggers the application of protective rules of IHL to both sides of the conflict.

It does not authorize the use of force by either side of the conflict (let alone by both sides). Image
Image 2. Only an 'armed attack' within the meaning of the UN Charter can authorize one State to use force against another in self-defense.

While 'armed conflict' and 'armed attack' sound similar they mean different things and serve different purposes.
Jun 9 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
UK: "a blockade is prohibited if it is intended to starve the civilian population; or to deprive [it] of objects essential to its survival,"

"or if the suffering of the civilian population is excessive in relation to the military advantage to be gained from the blockade"

1/🧵 Image "if the civilian population of the blockaded
territory is inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its survival, the blockading party must allow the free passage of such items"

2/🧵 Image
Jun 2 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
Last year, Germany told the ICJ it transferred €255M of arms to Israel from 10/23 to 3/24; the transfers reduced over time; and 98% were not "war weapons."

Today, Germany indicates that it transferred another €230M since then, possibly including "war weapons." 1/🧵 Image
Image Germany appears to think the ICJ endorsed its "practice of careful case-by-case examination" of potential arms transfers in the case brought against it by Nicaragua.

This is a serious mistake. 2/🧵 Image
May 27 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
This Reuters piece contains useful information.

But it makes a serious analytical error when it implies that most of the 25,211 boys over 15 and men under 65 killed by the IDF as of March were fighters.

The IDF itself says that 2/3 to 3/4 of those it kills are civilians.

1/🧵 Image
Image 2. Assuming MoH records include all Hamas fighters (more on that later), that would mean the IDF killed between 12,630 and 16,672 fighters while killing between 12,581 and 8,539 civilian teenage boys and men.
May 27 • 15 tweets • 5 min read
Over at the ICC, Israel has filed its appeal of the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision that art. 18(1) of the ICC Statute did not require the Prosecutor to open a new investigation after 10/7 and notify Israel to that effect.

It's so dumb.

Technical 🧵 below for the hardcores. 1/🧵 Image 2. In 2021, the Prosecutor notified Israel that she had opened an investigation into alleged crimes committed in Palestine "since 13 June 2014."

She found a reasonable basis to believe the IDF and Hamas had committed war crimes in the context of the 2014 hostilities in Gaza. Image
Image
May 23 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Over at the ICC, Hungary has submitted its response in the noncompliance proceedings arising from its failure to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu during his recent visit.

Hungary's response is legally flawed and will not avoid a noncompliance finding.

Short 🧵 below. Image 1. Hungary says it hasn't incorporated the ICC Statute into its national law.

Doesn't matter.

A party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

Basic stuff. Image
Image
May 21 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
The ICC Prosecutor has responded to Israel's request that the Pre-Trial Chamber withdraw or vacate the arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant.

The OTP argues that Israel's request should be denied, mostly for reasons anticipated in the 🧵 QTed below.

Some odds and ends. 1/🧵 Image As expected, the OTP explains that the arrest warrants rest on the PTC satisfying itself that it has jurisdiction under art. 19(1).

The warrants remain valid pending resolution of Israel's challenge under art. 19(2).

2/5 Image
Image
May 20 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
Netanyahu's response to the UK, Canada, and France is deranged but revealing.

They demand that Israel cease its military offensive, allow humanitarian aid, refrain from permanent forced displacement, and accept a ceasefire deal that frees all hostages and ends Hamas’ rule. 1/🧵 Image 2. But Netanyahu starts with their last sentence, where they commit to recognize a Palestinian State at some point in the future.

Obviously, a State of Palestine with fixed 1967 borders alongside Israel is not what Hamas wants and is not a "prize" for 10/7. Image
May 12 • 11 tweets • 5 min read
Over at the ICC, Israel has requested that the arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant be withdrawn or vacated pending a ruling on Israel’s jurisdictional challenge.

This request rests on some basic mistakes.

Technical 🧵 below for the hardcores. 1/ Image 2. Under art. 19(1) of the ICC Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction before issuing arrest warrants.

Art. 19(2) allows certain persons and States to challenge its jurisdiction.

Typically, the warrant comes first, then the challenge. Image
Apr 26 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Many mistakes here.

1. The Pre-Trial Chamber made a determination with respect to jurisdiction.

2. The Appeals Chamber instructed the PTC to revisit a technical question of standing.

3. The warrants were issued lawfully. They remain in effect and legally binding.

🧵 Image 1. Under art. 19(1), "[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it."

The PTC did so here, with respect to both Israeli and Hamas leaders.

It did so after receiving dozens of amicus briefs by States, scholars, and NGOs. Image
Mar 18 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
"My name is Mahmoud Khalil and I am a political prisoner. I am writing to you from a detention facility in Louisiana where I wake to cold mornings and spend long days bearing witness to the quiet injustices underway against . many people precluded from the protections of the law" Image
Image documentcloud.org/documents/2559…
Mar 14 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Note that Israel's official legal position is that Hamas's 10/7 attack did not trigger its right of self-defense.

Instead, Hamas's attack and Israel's response are part of an ongoing armed conflict.

On this view, self-defense is relevant only to the initial resort to force. 1/ Image This view is false. Force may only be used to halt or repel an ongoing (or maybe imminent) armed attack. And the requirements of necessity and proportionality internal to self-defense apply throughout an armed conflict.

3/
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Dec 5, 2024 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
On the ICJ's standard of proof for genocide:

1. At the ICJ, an applicant must show that the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that the respondent acted with genocidal intent.

The applicant need not show that the respondent acted with *only* genocidal intent. 2. Put the other way around, an applicant must show that it is unreasonable to infer from the evidence that the respondent acted *without* genocidal intent.

The applicant must exclude any reasonable inference that the respondent acted exclusively with non-genocidal aims.
Jun 11, 2024 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
Good piece. A few more thoughts. 🧵

1. IHL rules still apply when troops are under fire, including distinction, precautions, and proportionality.

Serious violations still constitute war crimes.

Baruch is wrong to suggest otherwise.

Image
Image 2. In applying the proportionality rule, force protection does not carry infinite value.

Like any other military advantage, it must be weighed against foreseeable civilian harm.

Otherwise the proportionality rule would collapse anytime ground forces enter an urban area.