Whatever your position on Brexit, don't you deserve to know the basis on which the government is preparing for this monumental decision?
Why do you have to learn it from a document of uncertain providence, uncertain timeliness and debatable purpose slipped to the Sunday Times?
By the way, if you believe the entire Civil Service are incompetent Remoaner Saboteurs, surely it would be good to learn whether the government thinks so too?
After all, many of the contingency plans being floated will be designed and delivered by the Civil Service.
If you believe this is all an elaborate bluff, and that leaks like this undermine the UK negotiating position...
... I don't want to disappoint you or deride @RosamundUrwin's skills as a journalist but I can promise you French intelligence has had these for months.
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1/ I guess (with no expertise) that one reason the Ukrainians may have gambled on Kursk is that the Russian army is at its weakest when having to react quickly.
That's when rigid top-down leadership, low morale, poor communications, terrible logistics and so on hurts the most.
2/ In Donetsk the Russians are playing to their strengths. It doesn't take a lot of coordination to slowly flatten one village after another with glide bombs until meat waves can seize it, then advance a kilometre and do it again.
It's grinding attrition. Warfare by spreadsheet.
3/ The Ukrainians could have sent these forces that are currently rampaging around Kursk to Donetsk instead, but maybe they felt the fighting there was too rigid, too constrained by terrain, defences and so on to make full use of their advantages?
1/ Except Ukraine isn't in Russia's Sphere of Influence anymore.
That's the point.
You could argue Ukraine WAS in Russia's Sphere of Influence immediately after its 1991 independence from the Soviet Union, but Russia (not the CIA or Nuland's cookies) completely blew that.
2/ Ukrainian agriculture is only going to grow more competitive once it has won the war.
Beyond the peace dividend itself, investment will flow in, mechanisation will increase, facilities for meeting sanitary/phytosanitary requirements will be built and scaled.
3/ At the same time, the moral case for letting Ukrainians sell grain into Europe will never be stronger than it is today, when they are fighting for their own, and Europe's freedom.
If the EU can't win this argument now, it will only get harder during Accession talks.
1/ In his great piece today Alan lays makes a case for why the UK should cease doing trade agreements as they'll deliver little value, and may imperil eventual re-joining or alignment with the EU.
I agreed with the facts, but disagree with the prescription.
1/ First and foremost, if it ever comes to a real jets, tanks and missiles shooting war with China, the paltry parcels of old tech the US is contributing to Ukraine will be completely immaterial to the outcome.
2/ A conflict with China will either be very small and contained, with both sides desperately monitoring escalation - in which case what the US has already will suffice, or a massive total war requiring production on levels that dwarf what's being sent to Ukraine.
3/ Even discounting nuclear weapons, a total war with China scenario is virtually impossible to 'prepare for' adequately unless the US is ready to basically put its economy on a war footing immediately.
Certainly you can't prepare for it by cheaping out on aid to Ukraine.