(1) The UK’s membership of the EU is defined by EU law under its Treaties.
(2) The repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 has zero bearing on membership. It only affects whether the UK is domestically compliant with EU law.
Oh, and (3) commencement regulations, which don’t require MPs’ approval, can be made at practically any time. In the case of the 2018 Act they have zero bearing on whether and when the UK leaves the EU. Govt could have made them in July 2018 or October 2019. No legal difference.
The making of commencement regulations underlines that the Communities Act will be repealed “on exit day” whenever that is.
An unremarkable thing given repealing it before exit day would breach EU law and repealing it afterwards would create massive uncertainty in domestic law.
Things that making EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 commencement regulations doesn’t do:
(1) take the UK out the EU
(2) prevent a further extension of Article 50 or a change to exit day
(3) prevent steps being taken to revoke Article 50 per the CJEU Wightman judgment
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Something worth bearing in mind. The Supreme Court, last year, gave a judgment on a double Bill reference, on the UNCRC and ECLSG Bills.
It rejected a @scotgov argument that Holyrood could legislate with words clearly beyond competence, then ask the courts to "read it down". 🧵
In the judgment, Lord Reed placed great weight on the fact that the Scotland Act has an established set of mechanisms for "vetting" Bills for legislative competence, including the promoter's and the Presiding Officers' competence statements on introduction.
An attempt to refer a potential, but unintroduced, Bill might face obstacles based on a similar line of reasoning: that the Scotland Act provides a specific mechanism (a bill reference before Royal Assent under s33) and that informs the scope of Schedule 6 "devolution issues".
This is an important thread, not just for #indyref2 but also for the wider role of the UK Supreme Court in accepting and determining references on disputes about devolution and devolved competence.
Normally, the UK Supreme Court operates as an appellate court. Parties appeal against decisions taken by lower courts, and they uphold or overturn them.
The devolution settlements slightly broaden this role, to allow both "bill references" and "devolution issue references". 2/x
Bill references allow legislation agreed by the devolved legislature to be vetted by the UKSC for "competence" issues.
Devolution issue references normally allow disputed points about devolved competence, forming part of another dispute, to be preliminarily settled. 3/x
It is often claimed, wrongly, that "the constitution" is a reserved matter (i.e. something that only the UK Parliament can pass legislation about).
This has never been the case.
Even to try to do that would make no sense. (1/x)
Why? Because then you'd have to define or describe the extent and limits of what the UK constitution is.
Why's that a problem? Because it isn't codified!
Such a situation would be fraught with ambiguities. What counts as constitutional and what doesn't? (2/x)
When the Labour Government in 1997-98 first introduced the Scotland Bill, they did actually propose to reserve "the constitution" (see the original Schedule 5 below).
They quickly realised this was (as a matter of clarity) a dreadful way to frame the devolution statute. (3/x)
Today the Government introduced a bill to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. This bill differs from the draft bill published in December 2020 in several important respects.
Be warned, this is a mega🧵but for the geeks, hopefully a useful summary of where we are.
The first most visible change is to the bill's title. It no longer refers to repealing the 2011 Act. This responds to an accessibility point raised by the @JointCtteeFTPA.
The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill is more RONSEAL. It make laws about what it says on the tin.
The second notable change is on election timetabling.
Under the FtPA, dissolution triggers an election.
Under the draft bill, it wouldn't have (on its own).
Witnesses to @JointCtteeFTPA observed this left open a theoretical risk of Governments "governing without Parliament".
Ratification of a Future Relationship Treaty by the UK [THREAD]
The UK Government cannot ratify a treaty with the EU unless and until it has complied with, or disapplied, Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act [1/x]
The default rule is that the Government has to lay a copy of any treaty it reaches with an international organisation. It then has to give Parliament 21 joint sitting days to scrutinise the treaty.
That means both Commons and Lords must be sitting for each of those 21 days [2/x]
How long is 21 joint sitting days? The Commons is only expected to sit Monday-Thursday each week for the rest of 2020.
Parliament usually is in recess (at least) between Christmas and New Year.
This leaves only 15 Commons sitting days in December (1-3, 7-10, 14-17, 21-24) [3/x]
Both the Advocate General for Scotland and the Attorney General have argued in recent days, that section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides a precedent for the UK legislating contrary to its international obligations.
[THREAD] [1/15]
The Government's argument seems to be that this illustrates both how:
(a) domestic law and international law sometimes come into conflict; and
(b) this sometimes justifies Ministers acting contrary to international law and/or Parliament legislating contrary to it. [2/15]
Specifically, they point to section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This provision imposed a new obligation on Ministers when introducing a Bill before Parliament.
A Minister has to make one of two statements, in writing, when they are introducing a Bill. [3/15]