A lot of the mixed messages around No-Deal preparation stems from the complexity of what a "No-Deal impact" actually is, and what preparation can look like.
2/ I mentally catalog No-Deal impacts into two groups:
(a) "Broken as Intended" and
(b) "Oh Shi..."
3) "Broken as Intended" refers to the big, long-term impacts of leaving the SM/CU and the EU.
This includes things like UK farmers facing EU tariffs and UK hairdressers no longer being able to just take up a job in Berlin.
4) "Oh Shi..." covers short term disruptions which arise from the abruptness and complexity of the transition.
It includes any disruption that occurs during the first few months of No-Deal, as processes previously reliant on the EU have to be reconfigured.
5) The "Broken as Intended" vs "Oh Shi..." distinction is important for evaluating preparations and responses.
The former requires long term solutions and a vision for the future, whereas the latter needs rapid, ideally pre-emptive intervention.
6) Many No-Deal challenges might be a mix of both.
For example, lamb farmers face a "Broken as Intended" problem in the shape of lost access to their largest market, but they also face an "Oh Shi..." problem in the form of thousands of sheep more than they can profitably sell.
7) Responses, by contrast, fall into three mutually dependent categories:
- UK Government
- Private Sector
- Foreign Governments
8) Much of No-Deal preparation is in the hands of the UK Government. This includes amending legislation, expanding customs posts, and hiring more customs officials.
It can also encourage and inform the private sectors preparations, and lobby foreign governments.
9) In the short term, probably the biggest "Oh Shi..." risks come from lack of private sector capacity and preparedness.
If 5,000 trucks with the wrong paperwork show up at Dover in early November, there are going to be problems.
10/ Problems may also arise if elements of the private sector haven't adequately thought through their supply chains dependence on friction-less trade.
The government can help and encourage, but it can't do the supply chain integrity work of a hundred thousand businesses.
11/ There are also challenges which only the timely action (and largess) of other governments can address.
If Spain decides not to honor UK drivers licenses immediately after Brexit, then that's disruptive but out of the UK's hands.
12/ In light of the above, it's worth keeping some questions in mind when evaluating government statements regarding No-Deal preparation.
(a) To what extent is the impact you're trying to mitigate a short term one born of disruption, and to what extent is it a new normal?
13/
(b) To what extent is your proposed measure reliant on private sector action, and what do we know about the state of their preparedness around this?
14/
(c) To what extent is your proposed measure reliant on other governments taking action, have they formally indicated they'll do so, and how long will it take?
15/ The Government is working hard, but when they say "we are fully prepared for No-Deal Brexit" it's worth asking "what part of it, exactly?" and also, "who is we?"
Anyway, that's how I think about it. Maybe you'll find it useful too. /end
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1/ I guess (with no expertise) that one reason the Ukrainians may have gambled on Kursk is that the Russian army is at its weakest when having to react quickly.
That's when rigid top-down leadership, low morale, poor communications, terrible logistics and so on hurts the most.
2/ In Donetsk the Russians are playing to their strengths. It doesn't take a lot of coordination to slowly flatten one village after another with glide bombs until meat waves can seize it, then advance a kilometre and do it again.
It's grinding attrition. Warfare by spreadsheet.
3/ The Ukrainians could have sent these forces that are currently rampaging around Kursk to Donetsk instead, but maybe they felt the fighting there was too rigid, too constrained by terrain, defences and so on to make full use of their advantages?
1/ Except Ukraine isn't in Russia's Sphere of Influence anymore.
That's the point.
You could argue Ukraine WAS in Russia's Sphere of Influence immediately after its 1991 independence from the Soviet Union, but Russia (not the CIA or Nuland's cookies) completely blew that.
2/ Ukrainian agriculture is only going to grow more competitive once it has won the war.
Beyond the peace dividend itself, investment will flow in, mechanisation will increase, facilities for meeting sanitary/phytosanitary requirements will be built and scaled.
3/ At the same time, the moral case for letting Ukrainians sell grain into Europe will never be stronger than it is today, when they are fighting for their own, and Europe's freedom.
If the EU can't win this argument now, it will only get harder during Accession talks.
1/ In his great piece today Alan lays makes a case for why the UK should cease doing trade agreements as they'll deliver little value, and may imperil eventual re-joining or alignment with the EU.
I agreed with the facts, but disagree with the prescription.
1/ First and foremost, if it ever comes to a real jets, tanks and missiles shooting war with China, the paltry parcels of old tech the US is contributing to Ukraine will be completely immaterial to the outcome.
2/ A conflict with China will either be very small and contained, with both sides desperately monitoring escalation - in which case what the US has already will suffice, or a massive total war requiring production on levels that dwarf what's being sent to Ukraine.
3/ Even discounting nuclear weapons, a total war with China scenario is virtually impossible to 'prepare for' adequately unless the US is ready to basically put its economy on a war footing immediately.
Certainly you can't prepare for it by cheaping out on aid to Ukraine.